NP:Leading atheist branded a ‘heretic’ for daring to question Darwinism

[PeterMP]

"It would entail, among other things, that the behavior of ordinary matter would occasionally deviate from that expected on the basis of physics alone, even in circumstances where consciousness was not involved in any obvious way."

 

If we are going to start talking about matter deviating from what is expected, somebody needs to define expected in a probabilistic manner in the context of quantum mechanics.

 

Is something happening twice in two consecutive opportunities that we expect to happen with a probability of 1E-5 on the scale of the universe (infinite) and time (very very long) deviating from the expected or is it expected?

 

I don't honestly know the answer to that question.

 

Arguments that appeal to expected behavior of matter without a definition of what is expected and why are no more appealing to arguments of incredulity and common sense.

 

In terms of subjectivity, physical sciences, with respect to the mind, are going to deal with subjectivity in a probabilistic manner related to stochastic (and potentially quantum) events.

 

Single celled organisms experience "subjectivity" too.

 

http://msb.embopress.org/content/1/1/2005.0015.long

 

(Whether they express the genes or not is "subjective".)

[alexey]

I think the claim that "the materialist conception of nature is almost certainly true" shows a real ignorance of the criticisms of that conception of nature.

 

Materialism is the thesis that reality is composed entirely of mindless, purposeless, physical objects operating according to the mechanical laws of physics.  (The neo-Darwinian thesis is an extension of this, the view that evolution is a blind, material, algorithmic process of natural selection).

 

I'd like to draw out some of the implications of this view for illustration, but before I do let me make sure we agree on terms. Do you think my definition is accurate?

I am not sure about the relationship between naturalism and materialism, as well as how materialism accounts for emergent properties. Emergent properties are particularly important here because materialism should not deny that mind, purpose, etc., can emerge from a reality that is entirely composed of mindless, purposeless, etc., objects. I am assuming the "neo-Darwinian thesis" does not deny such emergent properties either, while something like "extreme reductionism" does deny them. In other words, yes

[s0crates]

I am not sure about the relationship between naturalism and materialism, as well as how materialism accounts for emergent properties. Emergent properties are particularly important here because materialism should not deny that mind, purpose, etc., can emerge from a reality that is entirely composed of mindless, purposeless, etc., objects. I am assuming the "neo-Darwinian thesis" does not deny such emergent properties either, while something like "extreme reductionism" does deny them. In other words, yes

 

I'll get to the point since you have agreed to my use of terms, but let me first point out that your idea of "emergent properties" is at odds with the reductive materialist thesis Nagel is arguing against. In other words, the disagreement here might not be as deep as you assume it to be.

[alexey]

...

If we are going to start talking about matter deviating from what is expected, somebody needs to define expected in a probabilistic manner in the context of quantum mechanics.

 

Is something happening twice in two consecutive opportunities that we expect to happen with a probability of 1E-5 on the scale of the universe (infinite) and time (very very long) deviating from the expected or is it expected?

it is not easy to go against:

"precisely defined, extremely robust, and impressively well-tested"

Single celled organisms experience "subjectivity" too.

That depends on what it means to "experience" and "subjectivity"

[PokerPacker]

That depends on what it means to "experience" and "subjectivity"

Would you say that... "subjectivity" is subjective?

[alexey]

I'll get to the point since you have agreed to my use of terms, but let me first point out that your idea of "emergent properties" is at odds with the reductive materialist thesis Nagel is arguing against. In other words, the disagreement here might not be as deep as you assume it to be.

I think that's a good point. Nagel seems to dig where there is nothing to dig for, so yes its not deep at all

Nagel writes:

"This means that the scientific outlook, if it aspires to a more complete understanding of nature, must expand to include theories capable of explaining the appearance in the universe of mental phenomena and the subjective points of view in which they occur – theories of a different type from any we have seen so far."

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/the-core-of-mind-and-cosmos/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0

Sean Carrol addresses this:

"Which is why, at the end, his position isn’t very interesting. (Because he doesn’t have anything like a compelling alternative theory, not because he’s a philosopher.)"

http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/08/22/mind-and-cosmos/

So yeah neurobiology will never let you really truly know what its like to be a bat. Too bat so sat Got any better ideas?

[s0crates]

In my next few posts, I will give several (crudely stated) arguments that suggest a problem with the materialist assumption. Here is the first:

The paradox of empirical science:

1. Empiricism is the view that experience is the principle epistemic authority.

2. Empirical science assumes that materialism is true (the universe is composed entirely of objects).

3. Therefore, according to empirical science, we come to know the nature of objective reality by experience (1,2).

4. But experience is subjective, not objective.

5. Therefore empirical science denies the very thing they say is the source of our knowledge about the objective world (3,4).

[PeterMP]

In my next few posts, I will give several (crudely stated) arguments that suggest a problem with the materialist assumption. Here is the first:

The paradox of empirical science:

1. Empiricism is the view that experience is the principle epistemic authority.

2. Empirical science assumes that materialism is true (the universe is composed entirely of objects).

3. Therefore, according to empirical science, we come to know the nature of objective reality by experience (1,2).

3. But experience is subjective, not objective.

4. Therefore empirical science denies the very thing they say is the source of our knowledge about the objective world (3,4).

 

But this isn't a particular issue for evolutionary biology, but science in general.

 

So why single out evolutionary biology?

 

The same issue applies to the scientific study of the origin of the universe and the nature of dark matter.

 

And yes the germ theory of disease.

 

In addition, from what I've read Nagel is suggesting that the solution comes from within or part of science.

 

I at least don't see how the solution here comes from within or is part of science.

 

This is a call for a new way to think about things completely.  Now a good bit (or even all) scientific information might come along with it, but the new thing would have to be independent or somehow subsume science.

it is not easy to go against:

"precisely defined, extremely robust, and impressively well-tested"

 

Especially if the testing rejects anything that does not support the test.

 

If you can't tell me if the thing(s) that is "precisely defined, extremely robust, and impressively well-tested" would generate comparable results in a random system, you'll have to excuse me if I find your definition of "precisely defined, extremely robust, and impressively well-tested"...well.....subjective

 

But you know that.

[alexey]

In my next few posts, I will give several (crudely stated) arguments that suggest a problem with the materialist assumption. Here is the first:

The paradox of empirical science:

1. Empiricism is the view that experience is the principle epistemic authority.

2. Empirical science assumes that materialism is true (the universe is composed entirely of objects).

3. Therefore, according to empirical science, we come to know the nature of objective reality by experience (1,2).

3. But experience is subjective, not objective.

4. Therefore empirical science denies the very thing they say is the source of our knowledge about the objective world (3,4).

I think it is important to distinguish between different kinds of experiences. Some experiences are highly fallible, while others can be rigorously and systematically verified. We value objectivity of subjective experiences enough to test people's eyesight when they apply for driver's licenses.

Materialism/naturalism is one idea that did not go away as we kept testing and testing and testing different ideas for thousands of years. It did not have a head start or a privileged position.

[s0crates]

The argument from moral responsibility:

Step 1: Materialism implies determinism

1. Materialism holds that all events are understandable in terms of objects operating according to the mechanical laws of nature.

2. If that is true, then provided knowledge of the position of objects and the laws that govern them, we could predict the subsequent history of the universe (Laplace's demon)

3. Therefore there is only one possible future according to the materialistic conception of reality (such that we can predict things like eclipses and high tides). Call this determinism

Step 2: Determinism denies free will

4. If determinism is true, then everything is determined by factors beyond one's control (by objects operating according to the laws of nature)

5. If everything is determined by factors beyond one's control, then one's acts, choices, and character would be beyond one's control.

6. Therefore if determinism is true, we do not choose our actions.

Step 3: ought implies can

7. If what we do is beyond our control, then we cannot be held responsible for what we do.

8. But our belief in moral responsibility is self evident (at least as much as our belief in universal causality).

9. Therefore determinism cannot be accepted.

10. Therefore materialism cannot be accepted.

[alexey]

...

I at least don't see how the solution here comes from within or is part of science.

 

This is a call for a new way to think about things completely.  Now a good bit (or even all) scientific information might come along with it, but the new thing would have to be independent or somehow subsume science.

... 

Especially if the testing rejects anything that does not support the test.

 

If you can't tell me if the thing(s) that is "precisely defined, extremely robust, and impressively well-tested" would generate comparable results in a random system, you'll have to excuse me if I find your definition of "precisely defined, extremely robust, and impressively well-tested"...well.....subjective

If you can demonstrate some important stuff that we are missing, please do that. I just do not see any value in talking about it in principle.

[PeterMP]

If you can demonstrate some important stuff that we are missing, please do that. I just do not see any value in talking about it in principle.

 

Cheap renewable energy, time travel, interglactic travel, people stop killing people because they disagree with them, people starving essentially due to resource allocation.

 

Are you really claiming that there aren't important things that we aren't missing?

 

I wonder if people said the same thing to Francis Bacon while he was working on formulating the scientific method.

[s0crates]

Argument from identity:

1. Materialism holds that minds are identical to brains

2. If something is identical to something else, then it must have all the same properties (Leibniz's law)

3. Minds have phenomenal properties (feelings, sensations, doubts, fears, beliefs, tastes, smells, etc.)

4. Brains lack phenomenal properties (as physical objects)

5. Therefore minds are not identical to brains

6. Therefore materialism is false

I take it this is the point of Chalmers' colorblind neuroscientist thought experiment.

These are just tinker toy arguments off the top of my head (I may return with more later, but for now I need a break). Anyhow I hope they will at least suggest the sort of issues motivating Nagel, as I think he is being unfairly criticized in this thread.

[alexey]

The argument from moral responsibility:

Step 1: Materialism implies determinism

1. Materialism holds that all events are understandable in terms of objects operating according to the mechanical laws of nature.

2. If that is true, then provided knowledge of the position of objects and the laws that govern them, we could predict the subsequent history of the universe (Laplace's demon)

3. Therefore there is only one possible future according to the materialistic conception of reality (such that we can predict things like eclipses and high tides). Call this determinism

Step 2: Determinism denies free will

4. If determinism is true, then everything is determined by factors beyond one's control (by objects operating according to the laws of nature)

5. If everything is determined by factors beyond one's control, then one's acts, choices, and character would be beyond one's control.

6. Therefore if determinism is true, we do not choose our actions.

Step 3: ought implies can

7. If what we do is beyond our control, then we cannot be held responsible for what we do.

8. But our belief in moral responsibility is self evident (at least as much as our belief in universal causality).

9. Therefore determinism cannot be accepted.

10. Therefore materialism cannot be accepted.

If possible I would like to get a better understanding of this argument by asking a few questions.

How does this deal with feedback loops?

How does this model distinguish between "predictable in theory" vs "predictable in reality"?

Are natural consequences (e.g. hunger) a part of 'held responsible'?

If 'our control' is a skill, can we hold people responsible according to their capabilities?

Can we build a society that aims to 'expand capabilities' rather than 'hold responsible'?

Argument from identity:

1. Materialism holds that minds are identical to brains

2. If something is identical to something else, then it must have all the same properties

3. Minds have phenomenal properties (feelings, sensations, doubts, fears, beliefs, tastes, smells, etc.)

4. Brains lack subjective properties (as physical objects)

5. Therefore minds are not identical to brains

6. Therefore materialism is false

These are just tinker toy arguments off the top of my head (I may return with more later), but I hope they will at least suggest the sort of issues motivating Nagel.

This one seems to be about language. We know that minds are constructed by brains. Does that mean they are identical? Some may say yes, others may say no.

[dfitzo53]

I wish I hadn't started reading this thread after 10PM.  I just can't process it all, but I will return.  I am reading all of the perspectives with great interest.

[Slateman]

Sticking with the ad hominem attacks and dogmatic thinking I see.

Any chance you might examine what he thinks, why he thinks it, and address that?

Judging by your comments so far, I'm guessing not.

I have. I find his credibility wanting and his reasoning lacking.

[s0crates]

If possible I would like to get a better understanding of this argument by asking a few questions.

Frankly I think some of these questions aren't really asking me to clarify as much as leading me on tangents, but I'll try to answer.

How does this deal with feedback loops?

I don't think it does directly. Doug Hofstadter has an idea that the self is a kind of feedback loop, an idea which I think has merit, and I'm sure it has implications here, but I'd have to look up how he addresses the free will problem.

I think it is worth noting the kind of efforts being made to answer these questions with new ideas like Hofstadter's (and systems theory, and emergence). It suggests people are aware there is a problem with the explanations given so far (functional, behavioral, reductive material, eliminative material, algorithmic, etc.).

How does this model distinguish between "predictable in theory" vs "predictable in reality"?

I think generally we posit an all-knowing computer/demon/God because the amount you would have to know to predict complex phenomena like human behavior and weather with the same accuracy as high tides and eclipses is vast. So I think I'd respond "predictable in theory." The key idea is that the law like conception of nature implies there is only one possible future. "The laws of physics are the decrees of fate, merciless and indifferent." Think Laplace's demon.

Are natural consequences (e.g. hunger) a part of 'held responsible'?

I think I see your point, but I was thinking of "moral responsibility," which seems distinct from suffering consequences, or isn't it?

If 'our control' is a skill, can we hold people responsible according to their capabilities?

Don't we? Isn't that why we treat minors differently in criminal trials, for example?

Can we build a society that aims to 'expand capabilities' rather than 'hold responsible'?

More social justice, less criminal justice? I could get behind that.

This one seems to be about language. We know that minds are constructed by brains. Does that mean they are identical? Some may say yes, others may say no.

But that's the fundamental issue here!

I take it mind states and brain states are highly correlated, but are they one and the same?

[PokerPacker]

The argument from moral responsibility:

Step 1: Materialism implies determinism

1. Materialism holds that all events are understandable in terms of objects operating according to the mechanical laws of nature.

2. If that is true, then provided knowledge of the position of objects and the laws that govern them, we could predict the subsequent history of the universe (Laplace's demon)

3. Therefore there is only one possible future according to the materialistic conception of reality (such that we can predict things like eclipses and high tides). Call this determinism

Step 2: Determinism denies free will

4. If determinism is true, then everything is determined by factors beyond one's control (by objects operating according to the laws of nature)

5. If everything is determined by factors beyond one's control, then one's acts, choices, and character would be beyond one's control.

6. Therefore if determinism is true, we do not choose our actions.

Step 3: ought implies can

7. If what we do is beyond our control, then we cannot be held responsible for what we do.

8. But our belief in moral responsibility is self evident (at least as much as our belief in universal causality).

9. Therefore determinism cannot be accepted.

10. Therefore materialism cannot be accepted.

This argument, to me, sounds like "I do not like the implications, therefore I reject it and there must be something else."

 

Argument from identity:

1. Materialism holds that minds are identical to brains

2. If something is identical to something else, then it must have all the same properties (Leibniz's law)

3. Minds have phenomenal properties (feelings, sensations, doubts, fears, beliefs, tastes, smells, etc.)

4. Brains lack phenomenal properties (as physical objects)

5. Therefore minds are not identical to brains

6. Therefore materialism is false

And this argument seems to just be pointing out the difference between physical and abstract. It's like saying that a CPU is not a computer, because computers have graphics and a CPU can't comprehend graphics (please don't give me a 'gotcha' involving GPUs, for the purposes of this analogy, it's a part of the architecture like different specialized components of the brain), and yet here we are looking at these graphics on our monitors. All those ones and zeros, can be interpreted to create these graphics we see. Actually, we don't even have ones and zeros; THOSE are an abstraction of the voltage levels of transistors within the CPU. So you could even argue that a CPU doesn't understand ones and zeros, but rather voltages. Those voltages are interpreted as ones and zeros and then potentially as graphics. There's not some mystical force at play here outside of the physical to explain the difference between the concrete and the abstract.

So just because the brain is a very complicated machine that we do not fully understand does not mean that the abstract concept of the mind is not fully explained by the physical brain; it just means that it's really complicated and we have a lot of work to do in reverse-engineering it. There is nothing out there that shows the physical brain cannot explain the abstract mind, so there is no reason to decide there must be something supernatural to complete the mind. This kind of reasoning is exactly why people aren't impressed by his credentials as a philosopher as he challenges science with conjecture.

[s0crates]

This argument, to me, sounds like "I do not like the implications, therefore I reject it and there must be something else."

The implication is we either reject our understanding of the material world or our understanding of moral responsibility. This is just a specific version of the larger problem of making what we believe about ourselves consistent with what we believe about the universe.

Despite bold claims to the contrary I think this fundamental problem remains unsolved. Maybe neuroscience will get there, but it hasn't yet. . .

And this argument seems to just be pointing out the difference between physical and abstract. It's like saying that a CPU is not a computer, because computers have graphics and a CPU can't comprehend graphics (please don't give me a 'gotcha' involving GPUs, for the purposes of this analogy, it's a part of the architecture like different specialized components of the brain), and yet here we are looking at these graphics on our monitors. All those ones and zeros, can be interpreted to create these graphics we see. Actually, we don't even have ones and zeros; THOSE are an abstraction of the voltage levels of transistors within the CPU. So you could even argue that a CPU doesn't understand ones and zeros, but rather voltages. Those voltages are interpreted as ones and zeros and then potentially as graphics. There's not some mystical force at play here outside of the physical to explain the difference between the concrete and the abstract.

So just because the brain is a very complicated machine that we do not fully understand does not mean that the abstract concept of the mind is not fully explained by the physical brain; it just means that it's really complicated and we have a lot of work to do in reverse-engineering it. There is nothing out there that shows the physical brain cannot explain the abstract mind, so there is no reason to decide there must be something supernatural to complete the mind. This kind of reasoning is exactly why people aren't impressed by his credentials as a philosopher as he challenges science with conjecture.

This sounds to me like functionalism. The basic idea seems to be that our brains are like computer hardware and our minds are like computer software. This is a pretty common view, and I don't think it is a bad explanation at all. The more we understand about brain function the better.

The worry about this view is that the mind becomes superfluous. The actual conscious experience seems to do no work on this account. I can tell a whole story (vastly oversimplified) about how photons hit my retinas, which send certain electromagnetic signals to certain visual centers in my brain causing c-fibers to fire, which causes certain activity in language and speech centers of my brain. which causes me to say, "That house is pink," but what role does the actual conscious experience of seeing pink play in this story?

I have a buddy who is interested in the possibility of attaining immortality by uploading our minds into quantum computers. I told him I would want some assurances that it would still feel like something to be me, and it would not be merely the functional equivalent of me (say it could pass the Turing test, conversing like me, but would it still love my mother or hear music the way I do?). If you understand that worry, then I think you will see why some reasonable people reject functionalism.

P.S. Why the disparaging comment about philosophers?

[PokerPacker]

The implication is we either reject our understanding of the material world or our understanding of moral responsibility. This is just a specific version of the larger problem of making what we believe about ourselves consistent with what we believe about the universe.

Despite bold claims to the contrary I think this fundamental problem remains unsolved. Maybe neuroscience will get there, but it hasn't yet. . .

Or we determine that whether or not the world is in reality deterministic, we do not perceive it that way and thus we may continue to interact with the world as we always have. Were all of my thoughts and feelings pre-determined by the conditions of the beginning of the universe? Maybe, but I still feel them and from my perspective I still think for myself, so I have no problem saying "so what?" to a world that happens to be deterministic but has a future that we cannot forsee.

 

This sounds to me like functionalism. The basic idea seems to be that our brains are like computer hardware and our minds are like computer software. This is a pretty common view, and I don't think it is a bad explanation at all. The more we understand about brain function the better.

The worry about this view is that the mind becomes superfluous. The actual conscious experience seems to do no work on this account. I can tell a whole story (vastly oversimplified) about how photons hit my retinas, which send certain electromagnetic signal to certain visual centers in my brain causing c-fibers to fire, which causes certain activity in language and speech centers of my brain. which cause me to say "that house is pink," but what role does the actual conscious experience of seeing pink play in this story?

I have a buddy who is interested in the possibility of attaining immortality by uploading our minds into quantum computers, I told him I would want some assurances that it would still feel like something to be me, and not merely the functional equivalent of me that could pass the Turing test. If you understand that worry, then I think you will see why some reasonable people reject functionalism.

Actually, I'm not even saying that the mind is the equivalent of software, but rather it's just a layer of abstraction that we can better understand.

As for downloading your mind into a computer, well that, if ever possible, would be a LONG ways off. Both from the standpoint of our understanding of the human brain and from the standpoint of computer architecture. Replicating the plasticity of the brain to reconfigure it's hardware all the time to teach itself new things would be incredible. Also, the Computer Engineer in me wants me to tell you that a computer and the human brain are rather opposing in the way they go about what they do. A CPU is a very general-purpose device that is meant to be able to do pretty much everything at really high speeds in sequential order. The brain, on the other hand, is more reliant on specialized components for different functions and works at much lower speeds, but makes up for this with great throughput due to ridiculous levels of parallel processing (a bit like the philosophy behind GPUs).

ANYWAYS, I don't see how having a worry about something makes it legitimate to reject it as (possible) truth. The world does not conform itself to our desires; if it's deterministic, then it'll continue to be deterministic whether we wish it or not (and it'll determine whether or not we wish it ). Your worries about whether a machine could be as you as you can be? Well I'd venture to say it's not gonna happen because the brain is just too complex of a machine to perfectly emulate, especially since all of our brains are different, despite their close similarities. And then further complicating that matter of actually uploading whatever is in your brain's equivalent of stored data to this emulated brain... I can't envision a world where this technology is feasible, but it has nothing to do with non-materialism, but rather such wild complexity that is impossible to emulate.

Now creating an artifical "brain" that can develop consciousness? I could see that being plausible, but I don't even know where I'd begin; use modern computing hardware concepts and develop software, or would we want to develop new hardware that tries to replicate the plasticity of the brain rather than just self-updating software? I'm going off on a tangent here, so I'll stop here.

 

P.S. Why the disparaging comment about philosophers?

I'm not disparaging philosphers, but that challenging established science is not their element of authority. The conjecture in here is far from scientific. I'm quite happy to discuss the rammification of things like "if the universe is 100% deterministic, what does that mean for how we interact with one another?", but that is not science and does not belong in a discussion of the validity of scientific theory.

I mean, Aristotle was a great philosopher of his time, and I respect him as such. But a great physicist, he was not. He declared that objects could only move horizontally while a force is continually pushing it (as opposed to what we now have in Newton's first law of motion where an object in motion will stay in motion without an external force opposing it). Obviously, this didn't seem to work so well for something you throw as it continues to move after it leaves your hand and thus you are no longer pushing it, so he decided that as an object moves, it leaves empty space behind it and that air would rush in to fill that vacuum and in doing so push the object further ahead.

The point I'm trying to make here is that a philospher is out of his element when he tries to challenge established science with some conjecture. Aristotle didn't have established science to compete with in his time, and as such, his conjecture stood as fact for centuries, but now we have better methods for observing the world around us; I'll stick with science for that. When discussing the meaning of life, I'll turn to a philosopher.

[PeterMP]

Or we determine that whether or not the world is in reality deterministic, we do not perceive it that way and thus we may continue to interact with the world as we always have. Were all of my thoughts and feelings pre-determined by the conditions of the beginning of the universe? Maybe, but I still feel them and from my perspective I still think for myself, so I have no problem saying "so what?" to a world that happens to be deterministic but has a future that we cannot forsee.

 

We can continue to act like we have, but then I don't see any real reason to jump on people for pointing out that there appears to be something missing/a contradiction.

 

In addition, some people do jump on people when others suggest a non-deterministic framework.

 

You can't have it both ways.

 

You can't simultaneously essentially claim the universe is deterministic and then make arguments based on it not being deterministic.

 

"We value objectivity of subjective experiences enough to test people's eyesight when they apply for driver's licenses."

 

That type of argument is basically an argument that we have/had a choice, which would mean the system isn't deterministic, but if it isn't deterministic then there are a whole lot of ideas that argument is supporting must go out the window.

[alexey]

I don't think it does directly. Doug Hofstadter has an idea that the self is a kind of feedback loop, an idea which I think has merit, and I'm sure it has implications here, but I'd have to look up how he addresses the free will problem.

There is only one "free will problem" - that people cannot define "free will" yet they keep talking about it

Free will is free from what?

I think generally we posit an all-knowing computer/demon/God because the amount you would have to know to predict complex phenomena like human behavior and weather with the same accuracy as high tides and eclipses is vast. So I think I'd respond "predictable in theory." The key idea is that the law like conception of nature implies there is only one possible future. "The laws of physics are the decrees of fate, merciless and indifferent." Think Laplace's demon.

I think feedback loops pose a problem for "predictability in theory" because our actions will be influenced by our attempts to predict them.

I think we value unpredictability and "could have done otherwise" type stuff because of game theory. Predictable person does not win.

And what does it mean to be predictable? Say a machine can predict whether I will pick red or blue. If I know machine's prediction in advance, then I will pick the opposite... So the machine has to predict at the same time as I make the choice, which is not a prediction any longer, or it has to keep me from knowing its prediction... and if a machine predicts everything that I do, then that machine is basically me in the future. Fun stuff.

There seems to be a huge gap between effective predictability and theoretical predictability. For me, effective predictability is an interesting and important topic that involves actual abilities to predict the future. I do not see much value in theoretical predictability, although it could be fun to talk about.

Alexey - Are natural consequences (e.g. hunger) a part of 'held responsible'?

I think I see your point, but I was thinking of "moral responsibility," which seems distinct from suffering consequences, or isn't it?

Alexey - If 'our control' is a skill, can we hold people responsible according to their capabilities?

Don't we? Isn't that why we treat minors differently in criminal trials, for example?

I do not understand what you mean by "moral responsibility". How does it interact with reality?

I think that our system of holding people responsible is largely based on punishment and revenge. Hopefully someday we will move towards building a system that is focused on actually helping people become better moral agents.

Alexey -

This one seems to be about language. We know that minds are constructed by brains. Does that mean they are identical? Some may say yes, others may say no.

But that's the fundamental issue here!

I take it mind states and brain states are highly correlated, but are they one and the same?

I do not see any depth in this question. Mind is an emergent property of the brain. If you look from the top, you will only see the mind. If you look from the bottom, you will only see the brain. If you look from the side, you will see both. Or you can draw a Venn diagram with two circles - mind and brain are "one and the same" in the middle, and they are not "one and the same" on the left and on the right.

[s0crates]

Thanks for the replies guys, you make some good points (advocating relatively familiar positions in philosophy of mind), which I think merit detailed responses I don't have time for at the moment. I'll try to reply later today.

PS I really appreciate this conversation has moved in the direction of discussing Nagel's arguments (as opposed to the flippant dismissals I was reading earlier).

[Predicto]

PS I really appreciate this conversation has moved in the direction of discussing Nagel's arguments (as opposed to the flippant dismissals I was reading earlier).

 

 

Most of that is because this discussion is about 1000 times better than the crappy, slanted article linked in the OP (which is what I was dismissing).  

[PeterMP]

There is only one "free will problem" - that people cannot define "free will" yet they keep talking about it

Free will is free from what?

I think feedback loops pose a problem for "predictability in theory" because our actions will be influenced by our attempts to predict them.

I think we value unpredictability and "could have done otherwise" type stuff because of game theory. Predictable person does not win.

And what does it mean to be predictable? Say a machine can predict whether I will pick red or blue. If I know machine's prediction in advance, then I will pick the opposite... So the machine has to predict at the same time as I make the choice, which is not a prediction any longer, or it has to keep me from knowing its prediction... and if a machine predicts everything that I do, then that machine is basically me in the future. Fun stuff.

There seems to be a huge gap between effective predictability and theoretical predictability. For me, effective predictability is an interesting and important topic that involves actual abilities to predict the future. I do not see much value in theoretical predictability, although it could be fun to talk about.

 

Free will is the concept that you are free to make decisions independent of previous events in the context of the current condition.  That at point B in time that all relevant possibilities are actually possible going forward.  That given the restrictions of moving from point A to point B, I can move to any given possible point (points C1, C2, C3......Ci) from point B (where I go from A, to B, to C).  That is given the state I am at point B, where I was at point A does not affect where I go next.

 

Currently, I'm sitting in my office.  From there, I can do several things.  Free will suggest that I actually have the ability to do all of those things.  I can't move from my office instantly to Pairs so that isn't an option.  My prior state (point A-I was in the hall entering my office) has put some limits on my current state (point B-I'm in my office), but moving from point B to the set of possible states (C1...Ci) my previous state (point A) has no bearing on it other than its influence on my current state (the fact that I'm in my office).

 

(I can't believe that you've actually honestly read much about free will to conclude that there is an issue with the meaning of free will and not seen this presentation of free will.)

 

In a deterministic system, while there might seem to be multiple possibilities, there is no real decision being made.  In a purely deterministic system, it will be possible to predict which state of C the person will end up when they are at point A.  

 

We know AT LEAST, the system is not purely deterministic.  The question really is it probabilistically deterministic or non-determistics (though one can imagine combinations- it is probabilitistically deterministic except specific times/places).

 

Is it it actually possible to determine real (meaningful) probabilities of the person's state when at point C from point A based on physical laws?

 

A purely deterministic belief/system says that before I got in my office based on physical laws you should be able to predict what I was going to do next (ignoring quantum mechanics).

 

With quantum mechanics involved, deterministic systems say at probabilistic level (to take into the relevant (if any) quantum mechanical events), you should be able to predict what I'd do when I entered my office.

 

Pure free will says neither of those two things are true.

 

Game theory says nothing about this (I'm also extremely doubtful that game theory says the most predictable player always loses too.  I suspect it is much more likely that game theory says given a set of assumptions the more predictable person will lose more frequenlty.).  The concept of feed back loops does not change the issue.  The feed back loops are still present at point A.

 

They, in theory, make the prediction harder, but they don't inherently change the nature of the system.

 

You seem to have this issue with the value of things where the value is not yet clear.  Because concepts are of unclear value doesn't mean that there isn't value that will become more clear later.

 

That's why we do and fund basic research.  Were you happy we didn't build the super collider to identify the Higgs-Boson in the US?