NP:Leading atheist branded a ‘heretic’ for daring to question Darwinism

[s0crates]

I think it does make sense if you leave the "cognitive process" part in there. Volition is a cognitive process.

I'm quite happy to think of consciousness and volition in terms of process, but I doubt we have the same idea of "process" in mind. (I'm thinking events in process, as opposed to matter in process).

You'd have to explain to me how you think the qualifier "cognitive process" makes a difference to my question. It isn't obvious.

What led you to believe that Daniel Dennett and Patrecia Churchland deny that we have "volition" and "consciousness"?

. . .

This may be the reason why you brought up Dennett and Churchland - indeed they claim volition and consciousness are wrongly perceived, but they do not deny their existence.

Dennett is basically a behaviorist (he used to define consciousness in terms of speech, as in something counts as a conscious state only if it produces speech behaviors, although his recent work is more nuanced). Here's Dennett giving a Ted talk entitled "the Illusion of Consciousness":

http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_our_consciousness?language=en

Churchland is widely regarded as an eliminative materialist. She has that whole "folk psychology" bit. I think the description on her wiki page is fair:

"She is associated with a school of thought called eliminative materialism, which argues that commonsense, immediately intuitive, or "folk psychological" concepts such as thought, free will, and consciousness will likely need to be revised in a physically reductionistic way as neuroscientists discover more about the nature of brain function."

 

Neuroscience is much farther along than Deepak Chopra would have you believe. How open are you to moving from "we do not know the answer to the hard problem of consciousness" to "there is no hard problem of consciousness?"

Why bring Deepak Chopra into this? That seems to me a low blow. I referenced Whitehead's philosophy of organism (aka process philosophy) as being close to my view, why not attribute that to me instead?

I do think there is a hard problem of consciousness . . .

I am seeing a huge gap between saying that "reductive materialism is insufficient" and saying that "materialism/naturalism is false"

Materialism and naturalism are distinct concepts. You could be a phenomenalist (typically understood as radical empiricism, where reality is subjective, not objective as in materialism) and a naturalist (I might describe Hume that way, for example).

I would describe myself as a naturalist, but not a materialist. I'm not arguing for anything spooky or supernatural, I'm just pointing out that what we think we know about ourselves as conscious beings doesn't sit squarely with what we think we know about the objective world.

I do agree with Nagel that reductive materialism is probably false (although as I said, perhaps in the same way Newtonian physics is false).

We can agree that the "movement of atoms" explanation is insufficient. This may mean:

1) Movement of atoms produces something more than just movement of atoms (emergent properties)

2) Something happens that cannot be produced by movement of atoms (magic)

Where do you stand on this?

#1 is closer to my meaning (again I'm not arguing for anything supernatural, just a better understanding of the natural world). I do think the focus on emergence (as opposed to reduction or elimination) is good.

Emergent materialism is a much different idea than reductive or eliminative materialism though.

My view isn't exactly emergent materialism either (again I think reality is made of events not stuff), but that is at least a close approximation to what I think as I do think emergence is part of the process of reality. The whole is the sum of its parts, but the whole is also more than the sum of its parts. 

[alexey]

#1 is closer to my meaning (again I'm not arguing for anything supernatural, just a better understanding of the natural world). I do think the focus on emergence (as opposed to reduction or elimination) is good.

Emergent materialism is a much different idea than reductive or eliminative materialism though.

My view isn't exactly emergent materialism either (again I think reality is made of events not stuff), but that is at least a close approximation to what I think as I do think emergence is part of the process of reality. The whole is the sum of its parts, but the whole is also more than the sum of its parts.

Thank you for clarifying this.

According to wiki, eliminative materialism does not deny that the mind is an emergent phenomena or that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Your "events not stuff" position reminded me of the Quantum Field Theory. I do not understand it, of course, but it seems to say that stuff is actually made up of events.

Alexey - What led you to believe that Daniel Dennett and Patrecia Churchland deny that we have "volition" and "consciousness"?

Dennett is basically a behaviorist (he used to define consciousness in terms of speech, as in something counts as a conscious state only if it produces speech behaviors, although his recent work is more nuanced). Here's Dennett giving a Ted talk entitled "the Illusion of Consciousness":

http://www.ted.com/t...ess?language=en

Churchland is widely regarded as an eliminative materialist. She has that whole "folk psychology" bit. I think the description on her wiki page is fair:

"She is associated with a school of thought called eliminative materialism, which argues that commonsense, immediately intuitive, or "folk psychological" concepts such as thought, free will, and consciousness will likely need to be revised in a physically reductionistic way as neuroscientists discover more about the nature of brain function."

This is why I expressed a concern with using the word "illusion". The word "illusion" conflates two very different meanings: an illusion can be something that does not exist, or something that exists, but is wrongly perceived.

Eliminative materialism may reject folk psychology of consciousness and volition, but it does not deny that we have them when it calls them an illusion.

I do think there is a hard problem of consciousness . . .

...

I would describe myself as a naturalist, but not a materialist. I'm not arguing for anything spooky or supernatural, I'm just pointing out that what we think we know about ourselves as conscious beings doesn't sit squarely with what we think we know about the objective world.

I do agree with Nagel that reductive materialism is probably false (although as I said, perhaps in the same way Newtonian physics is false).

Newtonian physics can be falsified with measurements - I do not see how theories of mind could be falsified in the same way.

How could theories of mind be falsified? I suppose it can happen as science continues to move forward. As we learn more and more about the mind, some theories will eventually emerge as winners.

Do you think some time may pass until all philosophers get on board with the winning theory of mind, even after it emerges as a clear winner in the scientific circles?

I think so. Here is the kicker - I think this already happened. Science showed that there is no "hard problem" of consciousness. Dennett, Churchland, and a whole bunch of other philosophers and scientists have realized that we have a winner, and they are already on board.

People like Nagel, Chalmers, Searle are lagging behind. This does not necessarily prevent them from doing useful work... but it does put them in the camp of reinforcing the nonexistent (and frankly somewhat science-denying) "hard problem". To understand that there is no "hard problem" we have to get into the science itself, or turn to "science interpreting" philosophers like Dennett and Churchland. Not everybody can or wants to read stuff like this:

http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/essential-sources-scientific-study-consciousness

[s0crates]

According to wiki, eliminative materialism does not deny that the mind is an emergent phenomena or that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

. . .

Eliminative materialism may reject folk psychology of consciousness and volition, but it does not deny that we have them when it calls them an illusion.

Wiki on emergence:

"In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence is conceived as a process whereby larger entities, patterns, and regularities arise through interactions among smaller or simpler entities that themselves do not exhibit such properties. In philosophy, almost all accounts of emergence include a form of irreducibility (either epistemic or ontological) to the lower levels.[1] AIn philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence is conceived as a process whereby larger entities, patterns, and regularities arise through interactions among smaller or simpler entities that themselves do not exhibit such properties. In philosophy, almost all accounts of emergence include a form of irreducibility (either epistemic or ontological) to the lower levels.

Wiki on eliminative materialism:

"Eliminative materialism (also called eliminativism) is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. Its primary claim is that people's common-sense understanding of the mind (or folk psychology) is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist. Some eliminativists argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of behaviour and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level.[1] Other versions entail the non-existence of conscious mental states such as pain and visual perceptions.[2]"

[PeterMP]

My view isn't exactly emergent materialism either (again I think reality is made of events not stuff), but that is at least a close approximation to what I think as I do think emergence is part of the process of reality. The whole is the sum of its parts, but the whole is also more than the sum of its parts. 

 

Aren't events just things that happen to stuff?

 

Does it really matter if I describe something as events or stuff?

 

Emergent properties are properties of stuff.

 

A has properties.

B has properties

A and B together (AB) has properties.

 

The properties are not events, they are the properties of the stuff (AB).

 

No?

 

Those properties cause/contribute to events, but the underlying thing is still the stuff.

 

(Is energy stuff?)

 

I'll also point out that even in the study of quantum mechanics reductionism is common.

[s0crates]

Your "events not stuff" position reminded me of the Quantum Field Theory. I do not understand it, of course, but it seems to say that stuff is actually made up of events.

I'm no expert on quantum physics either, but I'm very influenced by Whitehead's metaphysics, which was influenced by 20th century physics (in particular relativity and quantum theory).

Newtonian physics can be falsified with measurements - I do not see how theories of mind could be falsified in the same way.

Two things about this:

1) We have consciousness, it is a datum.

2) The first inklings that Newton was wrong were based on abstract reasoning and thought experiments, the observations came later. (Think Einstein's thought experiments leading him to paradox).

[s0crates]

Aren't events just things that happen to stuff?

Does it really matter if I describe something as events or stuff?

Emergent properties are properties of stuff.

A has properties.

B has properties

A and B together (AB) has properties.

The properties are not events, they are the properties of the stuff (AB).

No?

Those properties cause/contribute to events, but the underlying thing is still the stuff.

(Is energy stuff?)

I'll also point out that even in the study of quantum mechanics reductionism is common.

This is why I distinguished my view from emergent materialism. Emergence helps, but the basic mistake of thinking of reality as stuff remains.

Notice that you are arguing for the Aristotelian idea of substance (stuff with essential properties). My proposal is an ontology that replaces Aristotelian substance with happenings, occasions, or events.

The idea of matter is a useful abstraction of course, but I think it is a mistake. Consider that an atom is almost entirely empty space, that electrons and Bucky balls behave as both waves and particles (like light), etc. The idea of solid matter isnt really right . . .

When I have time later, I'll try to describe Whitehead's metaphysical primary, "actual occasions," again. My first attempt to explain this in this threads failed, but that is basically my view, and my answer to your questions will involve describing "actual occasions." In the meantime, I recommend:

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RkkccdJ0iGI

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4s2gRsRvBBA

 

[PeterMP]

This is why I distinguished my view from emergent materialism. Emergence helps, but the basic mistake of thinking of reality as stuff remains.

Notice that you are arguing for the Aristotelian idea of substance (stuff with essential properties). My proposal is an ontology that replaces Aristotelian substance with happenings, occasions, or events.

The idea of matter is a useful abstraction of course, but I think it is a mistake. Consider that an atom is almost entirely empty space, that electrons and Bucky balls behave as both waves and particles (like light), etc. The idea of solid matter isnt really right . . .

When I have time later, I'll try to describe Whitehead's metaphysical primary, "actual occasions," again. My first attempt to explain this in this threads failed, but that is basically my view, and my answer to your questions will involve describing "actual occasions." In the meantime, I recommend:

 

There is nothing inherently Aristotelian by stating that there is stuff with properties, especially if we are going to say energy is stuff (the 1st law of thermodynamics energy and matter are not created or destroyed, but can be converted into one another).

 

Light has (essential) properties.  It has a mass, a speed, and a wavelength.

 

It has both wave and particle like properties.

 

Things (events) happen to light.

 

Light becomes bent in a gravitational field.  That is an event that happens to light, but that event happening is dependent on their being light and its properties.

 

If light had twice as much mass, it would behave differently in gravitational fields (the event would change).

 

Quantum mechanics says that events (we can talk about quantum tunneling) happens to stuff and is related to the stuffs properties (something like tunneling is dependent on the wave like properties of the stuff (i.e. its wave equation) and its particle like properties (i.e. its mass)).

 

I think the idea that modern physics says that "stuff" doesn't have properties and that those properties aren't related to its behavior (i.e. events that its involved in) isn't right.

 

Certainly, modern physics says that in many cases that isn't all that matters because there is a probability component, but even that is related to those properties (i.e. how probable certain events are related to the properties of the stuff.  Tunneling is a probablisitic event, but that probability is related to the mass and the wave equation of stuff.).

 

Modern physics does not say that stuff does not have properties, and the behavior of the stuff (i.e. the events it under goes) is not based on the properties of the stuff.

[alexey]

Wiki on emergence:

"In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence is conceived as a process whereby larger entities, patterns, and regularities arise through interactions among smaller or simpler entities that themselves do not exhibit such properties. In philosophy, almost all accounts of emergence include a form of irreducibility (either epistemic or ontological) to the lower levels.[1] AIn philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence is conceived as a process whereby larger entities, patterns, and regularities arise through interactions among smaller or simpler entities that themselves do not exhibit such properties. In philosophy, almost all accounts of emergence include a form of irreducibility (either epistemic or ontological) to the lower levels.

Wiki on eliminative materialism:

"Eliminative materialism (also called eliminativism) is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. Its primary claim is that people's common-sense understanding of the mind (or folk psychology) is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist. Some eliminativists argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of behaviour and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level.[1] Other versions entail the non-existence of conscious mental states such as pain and visual perceptions.[2]"

I understand eliminative materialism from the perspective of its "primary claim," per wiki:

"Its primary claim is that people's common-sense understanding of the mind (or folk psychology) is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist. "

Wiki on Irreducibility:

"The principle of Irreducibility, in philosophy, has the sense that a complete account of an entity will not be possible at lower levels of explanation and which has novel properties beyond prediction and explanation."

Can we agree that a thing can be reducible in one way (mapping it to reality to ensure it is real) and irreducible in another (mapping it to reality does not produce a complete account)?

It is a caricature to claim that Dennett and Churchland hold reductionism to be capable of providing a complete account for things like meaning, hopes and dreams, appreciation of music, and so on. Their positions do not stand against those experiences themselves, but against common misinterpretations of them.

You are accusing Dennett and Churchland of holding positions that are obviously and clearly wrong. I would caution you against strawmanning your fellow philosiophers. I am somewhat familiar with their work and I would gladly discuss it, if you are interested... but I would ask that you stop labeling them and engage in a deeper level of analysis.

Let's use the word "belief" as an example. Looks like Churchland has a following perspective:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief#As_a_psychological_phenomenon

Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it

I see Churchland saying that common-sense theories are likely incorrect because they do not map to findings of neuroscience. How do you interpret this position?

Perhaps the complete account bit is the key to our disagreement. In their neurscience-informed fight against common misconceptions, neither Churchland nor Dennett claim that neuroscience can provide a complete account of human experience. Do you dispute this statement?

In my previous post I made a strong claim against the "hard problem of consciousness." I claimed that science has already demonstrated that the "hard problem" does not exist. What kind of scientific evidence would convince you of that?