NP:Leading atheist branded a ‘heretic’ for daring to question Darwinism

[PokerPacker]

I'm having a problem with this theoretical future predictor. In order to predict the future of the universe, we must simulate the entire universe. But how can something possibly be powerful enough to simulate the universe (faster than the universe can progress through time) when the simulator itself is a part of the universe and thus must simulate itself? So to simulate one second into the future, it must also simulate what it would simulate one second into the future, and within that simulation of it's own simulation, it must simulate itself, etc. creating an instance of infinite recursion making the simulation impossible. Now if we were to create a theoretical machine that could simulate the entire universe EXCLUDING itself, then we're still left with the illusion of free will as what we simulated was not, in fact, a closed system, and will be affected by our simulator which did not simulate itself within it's simulation of the universe, and this external input to our system of the universe will create an alternate future that we did not predict.

tl;dr

non-causality sure is complicated.

[PeterMP]

I'm having a problem with this theoretical future predictor. In order to predict the future of the universe, we must simulate the entire universe.

 

If it makes it easier for you, consider it in the context of predicting the past based on physical laws.

 

Then you don't have to worry about the whole simulator predicting the future thing with itself as part of the future.

 

A lot of validation for simulations is based on "predicting" past events.  Generally, we consider that an acceptable form of validation of a physical model.

[PokerPacker]

If it makes it easier for you, consider it in the context of predicting the past based on physical laws.

 

Then you don't have to worry about the whole simulator predicting the future thing with itself as part of the future.

 

A lot of validation for simulations is based on "predicting" past events.  Generally, we consider that an acceptable form of validation of a physical model.

Well then we have the ultimate "what if?" machine! I vote we test out The Butterfly Effect by altering the flapping of a butterfly's wings and continue the simulation and see how the simulation changes versus reality!

Anyways, if we're not predicting the future with the machine, and keeping causality intact, then we're still kinda back to where we started in that we still will not know the future, so we will still experience the world as we always have keeping the illusion of free will. And as long as that illusion is still intact, does it really matter?

[PeterMP]

Well then we have the ultimate "what if?" machine! I vote we test out The Butterfly Effect by altering the flapping of a butterfly's wings and continue the simulation and see how the simulation changes versus reality!

Anyways, if we're not predicting the future with the machine, and keeping causality intact, then we're still kinda back to where we started in that we still will not know the future, so we will still experience the world as we always have keeping the illusion of free will. And as long as that illusion is still intact, does it really matter?

 

If we don't have free will, then there will be degrees with respect to the illusion of free will (how "good" or "bad" is the illusion?  How believable is it?).

 

And yes, I suspect that if we get to the point that we are making accurate/robust "predictions" of people's decisions in the past based on physical laws it will make a difference.

 

(I suspect these types of conversations make a difference now:

 

http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130924-how-belief-in-free-will-shapes-us

 

)

[alexey]

Free will is the concept that you are free to make decisions independent of previous events in the context of the current condition.

I cannot make sense of this statement. "decision" is actually a continuous stream of events that take place in your brain. There is no discrete point of time called "make decision".

Currently, I'm sitting in my office. From there, I can do several things. Free will suggest that I actually have the ability to do all of those things. I can't move from my office instantly to Pairs so that isn't an option.

I do not understand your point here. Does this mean we all got more free will with invention of transcontinental flights?

(I would actually say yes we did, and I think so would Dan Dennett)

A purely deterministic belief/system says that before I got in my office based on physical laws you should be able to predict what I was going to do next (ignoring quantum mechanics).

It is actually possible to have an unpredictable deterministic system. Imagine a fastest possible computer solving a hardest possible problem. The answer is deterministic, but it cannot be predicted (because the problem cannot be solved any faster).

Game theory says nothing about this (I'm also extremely doubtful that game theory says the most predictable player always loses too. I suspect it is much more likely that game theory says given a set of assumptions the more predictable person will lose more frequenlty.).

Predictable player loses every time in rock-paper-scissors.

[PeterMP]

I cannot make sense of this statement. "decision" is actually a continuous stream of events that take place in your brain. There is no discrete point of time called "make decision".

So is making a right hand turn in a car, but we still talk about making right hand turns in cars.

I suspect when somebody tells you to make a right turn, you don't say that a "turn" is actually a continous stream of events that takes place in a car. I cannot make sense of that statement.

I do not understand your point here. Does this mean we all got more free will with invention of transcontinental flights?

(I would actually say yes we did, and I think so would Dan Dennett)

No because the invention of transcontinental flights were true and based on things before point A much less in point A.

Really simply free will doesn't exist if it is possible to predict people's actions/decisions based on the laws of physics.

It is actually possible to have an unpredictable deterministic system. Imagine a fastest possible computer solving a hardest possible problem. The answer is deterministic, but it cannot be predicted (because the problem cannot be solved any faster).

See my post to PP about predicting the past. Put that comment in that context.

(Though, I will point out that I don't think such a system is actually deterministic. You're assuming the computer would come up with the right answer.

If you know the computer is going to find the right answer that means you know the right answer and that the computer can find it, but that also means you've solved the problem so the speed of the computer is irrelevant, and you can predict the answer the computer is going to fine (the right one))

Predictable player loses every time in rock-paper-scissors.

I suspect that game theorist would tell you that the such a player is unskilled and highly unskilled players are likely to lose. One characteristic of being unskilled in a game like rock papers scissors is being predictable.

(With some assumptions (i.e. the players are of about equal skill) the more predictable player is more likely to lose.)

[alexey]

If you know the computer is going to find the right answer that means you know the right answer ......

you do not know the answer. Nobody knows the answer. You only know that this most powerful computer is deterministic and the answer to the most difficult problem will be deterministic. The answer may even be wrong, but it is still deterministic and unpredictable. You cannot get the answer before the computer is finished calculating it.

[PeterMP]

I think the last thing that I need to say in this thread is that science will find that free will doesn't exist.

 

It doesn't have a choice.  It might say that the decision making process is complex.  That there are unknown variables.  That the process is stochastic in nature and even has a quantum component to it so can only be addressed as a set of probabilities.

 

But in the end there is no mechanism by which science can say it isn't scientific, which it would have to be to not follow the "laws of physics" and therefore not be predictable based on a proper understanding of the "laws of physics".

 

People that claim to be testing free will using science are either ignorant or dishonest.

[s0crates]

There is only one "free will problem" - that people cannot define "free will" yet they keep talking about it

In this argument, "free will" is defined as the ability to choose between alternate possible futures, such that: At any given time T, given the same antecedent conditions, an agent can choose between act A1 and act A2.

For example, when my alarm clock rings in the morning, I can either get out of bed and go to work or stay in bed and skip work. If I choose to go to work, then it is still true that at that time I could have done otherwise.

Determinism is basically the view that there is only one possible future, usually based on the notion of universal causality (as in my above argument) but sometimes based on the idea of God's omniscience (as in Calvinism).

By these definitions,either we have free will or our behavior is determined by antecedent causes, but both cannot be true. They are incompatible.

There are people who define free will in such a way as to make it compatible with determinism, but I agree with William James in his assessment of their argument, it is "nonsense upon stilts."

[alexey]

I think the last thing that I need to say in this thread is that science will find that free will doesn't exist.

...

Science will show that "free will" is not what we thought it was, just like it did with pretty everything else.

In this argument, "free will" is defined as the ability to choose between alternate possible futures, such that: At any given time T, given the same antecedent conditions, an agent can choose between act A1 and act A2.

For example, when my alarm clock rings in the morning, I can either get out of bed and go to work or stay in bed and skip work. If I choose to go to work, then it is still true that at that time I could have done otherwise.

Determinism is basically the view that there is only one possible future, usually based on the notion of universal causality (as in my above argument) but sometimes based on the idea of God's omniscience (as in Calvinism).

By these definitions,either we have free will or our behavior is determined by antecedent causes, but both cannot be true. They are incompatible.

There are people who define free will in such a way as to make it compatible with determinism, but I agree with William James in his assessment of their argument, it is "nonsense upon stilts."

In my view this is a trick that does not actually answer the question.

What is free will? It's when you could have done otherwise.

Ok then, what does it mean "could have done otherwise"?

[s0crates]

Science will show that "free will" is not what we thought it was, just like it did with pretty everything else.

In my view this is a trick that does not actually answer the question.

What is free will? It's when you could have done otherwise.

Ok then, what does it mean "could have done otherwise"?

 

Sounds like Dennett's take.  He is a compatibilist.  Like I said, compatibilism is "nonsense upon stilts."

 

I don't know how to give you a better definition than I already did:

 

"'Free will' is defined as the ability to choose between alternate possible futures, such that: At any given time T, given the same antecedent conditions, an agent can choose between act A1 and act A2."

[alexey]

Sounds like Dennett's take. He is a compatibilist. Like I said, compatibilism is "nonsense upon stilts."

I don't know how to give you a better definition than I already did:

"'Free will' is defined as the ability to choose between alternate possible futures, such that: At any given time T, given the same antecedent conditions, an agent can choose between act A1 and act A2."

Compatibilist position only makes sense after careful exploration of what we mean when we use language like "could have done otherwise", "choose between alternate possible futures", etc.... so I understand how compatibilism can seem like nonsense in the absence of that kind of analysis.

Do you have any comments on my example of unpredictable determinism?

[s0crates]

Compatibilist position only makes sense after careful exploration of what we mean when we use language like "could have done otherwise", "choose between alternate possible futures", etc.... so I understand how compatibilism can seem like nonsense in the absence of that kind of analysis.

Do you have any comments on my example of unpredictable determinism?

I could give you a compelling argument for compatibilism, as I do in my classes. Basically the idea is that a freely chosen action is one done voluntarily, without coercion, in accordance with one's own desires and beliefs (which seem to be caused by genetic and environmental factors).

Ghandi on hunger strike freely choose not to eat, whereas a starving man on a lifeboat did not. Both were determined by antecedent events, but one was free and the other was not.

I get the argument, but I think it is nonsense. It makes free will compatible with determinism by definitional fiat, but in doing so it completely dodges the question. To act freely, I myself must be the cause.

[alexey]

I could give you a compelling argument for compatibilism, as I do in my classes. Basically the idea is that a freely chosen action is one done voluntarily, without coercion, in accordance with one's own desires and beliefs (which seem to be caused by genetic and environmental factors).

Ghandi on hunger strike freely choose not to eat, whereas a starving man on a lifeboat did not. Both were determined by antecedent events, but one was free and the other was not.

I get the argument, but I think it is nonsense. It makes free will compatible with determinism by definitional fiat, but in doing so it completely dodges the question. To act freely, I myself must be the cause.

i was with you up until the end, but then you brought up this undefined "I myself must be the cause" thing.

What does it mean for you yourself to be the cause? In your example, is Ghandi himself the cause of his hunger strike?

[s0crates]

i was with you up until the end, but then you brought up this undefined "I myself must be the cause" thing.

What does it mean for you yourself to be the cause? In your example, is Ghandi himself the cause of his hunger strike?

Probably you were with me because I was explaining the compatibilist position as best I could ("He who knows only his own side of a case knows little of that").

I do get the argument, but the problem is it ignores the fundamental issue. The basic question is this: Is there more than one possible future? If there is not, then free will is at best an illusion.

In the Ghandi example, I don't think his choice was free if it was the only possibility.

PS Please stop saying I haven't defined what I mean by free will, I've given you a very clear definition: At any given time, given the same antecedent conditions, an agent can choose between act 1 and act 2.

Maybe it is true that there is no such thing as free will in that sense, but I think that would imply our notion of moral responsibility is false (because ought implies can). Some of us find this implication of determinism very troubling . . . 

[alexey]

Are you saying that you do not know whether people make decisions?

Are you saying that you cannot say that somebody could have done otherwise because you do not know whether determinism is true?

In other words, are we discussing what people have or what word should be used to refer to whatever it is that people have?

[s0crates]

I'm just discussing the implications of determinism (which I think is part of the materialistic worldview).  I believe I can do that without committing myself to some particular ontology.

[alexey]

I'm just discussing the implications of determinism (which I think is part of the materialistic worldview). I believe I can do that without committing myself to some particular ontology.

I do not see you addressing my points or the unpredictable detrminism thought experiment.

Is lack of determinism a necessary condition of "could have done otherwise," in your view?

And if so, do you admit that such meaning deviates from the colloquial usage of this phrase?

[s0crates]

I do not see you addressing my points or the unpredictable detrminism thought experiment.

I'm not sure what the payoff is here, unless you mean to suggest that determinism is false.

The point of Laplace's demon is not that we actually can predict the future, it's that there is only one possible future.

I will say that I tend to think determinism isn't true. I think the latest physics suggests that there is a fundamental indeterminacy in the basic constituents of reality. Unfortunately some of the other sciences haven't quite caught up it seems (say perhaps biology, for example).

The physicists may actually vindicate the philosophers who have been arguing against 17th century style materialism all along.

 

Is lack of determinism a necessary condition of "could have done otherwise," in your view?

Yes

 

And if so, do you admit that such meaning deviates from the colloquial usage of this phrase?

It's interesting you make an appeal to ordinary language. There was a school of philosophy in the 20th century following Wittgenstein who called themselves "ordinary language philosophers." Some of them argued for compatibilism and behaviorism. Dennett is one of their intellectual descendants.

Anyhow, it seems like most people do understand free will as choosing between alternate possibilities for the future, especially in cases where we assign blame or praise.

For example, it makes no sense to blame somebody for not being tall, because his height is not within his control (he could not be otherwise). Whereas I could blame somebody for being obese, because his overeating and not exercising are within his control. I can't say, "You ought to be taller," but I can say, "You ought to eat less and exercise more." The difference here is that in one case you couldn't do otherwise, and in the other case you could.  Eating less and exercising more is a matter of willpower, your height is not.

I can multiply examples here if needed, but basically: "Free will" means can, and ought implies can.

There are people who claim we don't use the words that way, but I'm not convinced of that.

[s0crates]

Or we determine that whether or not the world is in reality deterministic, we do not perceive it that way and thus we may continue to interact with the world as we always have. Were all of my thoughts and feelings pre-determined by the conditions of the beginning of the universe? Maybe, but I still feel them and from my perspective I still think for myself, so I have no problem saying "so what?" to a world that happens to be deterministic but has a future that we cannot forsee.

Do you mean to distinguish between the way you perceive the world and the way the world actually is? Do you think your "thoughts and feelings" are real?

 

ANYWAYS, I don't see how having a worry about something makes it legitimate to reject it as (possible) truth. 

As far as worries being sufficient reasons to reject a theory, I guess it depends what the worries are. I might worry that certain observations violate Newton's laws of motion, for example, in which case I would have grounds to reject Newton's laws.

The worry here is that we have this raw data of our own consciousness that doesn't seem explainable within the theoretical framework of materialism. It seems to me a pretty substantial worry.

If either the way we understand ourselves or the way we understand the world is mistaken (because they imply contradictions of each other), then some drastic revision of our understanding is necessary. Assuming science will allow the use of logic of course.

 

I'm not disparaging philosphers, but that challenging established science is not their element of authority. The conjecture in here is far from scientific. I'm quite happy to discuss the rammification of things like "if the universe is 100% deterministic, what does that mean for how we interact with one another?", but that is not science and does not belong in a discussion of the validity of scientific theory.

One role philosophy plays is "critic of abstractions." Science is based on certain abstract ideas, and philosophers are well qualified to analyze the implications of such ideas.

I'd be interested to hear your criteria for what "qualifies as science" . . .

 

I mean, Aristotle was a great philosopher of his time, and I respect him as such. But a great physicist, he was not. He declared that objects could only move horizontally while a force is continually pushing it (as opposed to what we now have in Newton's first law of motion where an object in motion will stay in motion without an external force opposing it). Obviously, this didn't seem to work so well for something you throw as it continues to move after it leaves your hand and thus you are no longer pushing it, so he decided that as an object moves, it leaves empty space behind it and that air would rush in to fill that vacuum and in doing so push the object further ahead.

Patricia Churchland uses this exact example to make a similar point. She calls this "folk physics," which she uses to illustrate her idea of "folk psychology." She thinks that ideas like consciousness, self, and free will will eventually go the way of Aristotle's idea of impetus.

Of course we needn't take her seriously according to you, because she is only a philosopher, and what could a philosopher tell us about science?

 

The point I'm trying to make here is that a philospher is out of his element when he tries to challenge established science with some conjecture. Aristotle didn't have established science to compete with in his time, and as such, his conjecture stood as fact for centuries, but now we have better methods for observing the world around us; I'll stick with science for that. When discussing the meaning of life, I'll turn to a philosopher.

I think this notion of "established science" sounds awfully dogmatic, and is quite frankly "far from scientific." I'm under the impression that all scientific theories must be falsifiable and are held tentatively (pending further observation/experimentation). Sometimes I think philosophers of science understand the very basics of the discipline better than most scientists . . .

It's also worth noting that the basic idea of materialism is essentially Aristotelian. You see Aristotle held that the universe was composed of substances with essential properties. Descartes borrowed this idea which still reigned in his time. He famously divided reality into two kinds of substance: Mental substance whose essence is "thinking" (consciousness) and material substance whose essence is "extension" (mass).

 

Now Descartes' material substance is observable, measurable, and operates according to physical laws. Sound familiar? I think the materialist world view basically says Descartes' material substance is the only real thing.

Incidentally I think the mistake that the materialist makes is to think of substance in this basically Aristotelian way, and that is why we have the sort of problems that concern Nagel. My own view is that reality is better understood as being composed of events or happenings rather than substances.

But I'm just a philosopher so . . .

[PeterMP]

I'm not sure what the payoff is here, unless you mean to suggest that determinism is false.

The point of Laplace's demon is not that we actually can predict the future, it's that there is only one possible future.

I will say that I tend to think determinism isn't true. I think the latest physics suggests that there is a fundamental indeterminacy in the basic constituents of reality. Unfortunately some of the other sciences haven't quite caught up it seems (say perhaps biology, for example).

The physicists may actually vindicate the philosophers who have been arguing against 17th century style materialism all along.

 

This is going to start to matter what we are calling free will.  While I think alexey's example was flawed, it is possible to make computers that are not completely deterministic and therefore not purely predictable.

 

http://es.redskins.com/topic/363947-ask-an-atheist-thread/page-3#entry9349907

 

I don't consider that free will.

 

I can even make it quantum based (the basis of most physicist talking about the universe not being purely deterministic).  I can set up a system where electrons are quantum tunneling from some some entity down to a metal surface and measure the voltage that passes to the metal surface (this is the basis of scanning tunneling microscopy. I could create a computer that does different things based on the voltage where tunneling is probabilistic event (as best we know) so the current is going to change and the behavior of the computer is going to change based on that voltage (the distance the electrons have to tunnel also matters so the closer the source to the surface the higher the voltage, but I could hold the distance constant and see changes in the voltage in the surface).

 

Depending on the current in the metal surface when you hit the A key several different things can happen.  The system is not purely deterministic.  Now, the probability of tunneling follows a mathematical equation, and if I know enough details, I can make accurate and robust probabilistic predictions.

 

 

Does such a system have free will?

 

I'd argue no.

 

From there, biology certainly understand there are forces that interact at that level.  Tunneling happens in biological molecules (there are reactions that involve tunneling that happen in enzymes, and it least appears the enzymes help the tunneling happen) that are subject to evolution.

 

I don't know of a case where quantum (probabilistic events) are directly implicated regularly in evolution, but I'd be shocked if you can find somebody that says it never happens.  Evolution is frequently thought of and modeled as a random walk process.

 

There is currently no evidence that quantum probabilistic events are directly involved in the decision making system, but I certainly wouldn't rule it out.

 

Maybe though I've misunderstood your point.  I don't think there are many people in science today that think of the universe as being purely deterministic.  From a scientific stand point, quantum mechanics is real and has affects.

[alexey]

Alexey - I do not see you addressing my points or the unpredictable detrminism thought experiment.

I'm not sure what the payoff is here, unless you mean to suggest that determinism is false.

At a minimum, the payoff would be us actually having a conversation.

It is difficult to engage with you in the oppressive shadow of your concerns with supposed consequences of determinism, as well as various "aha! I know this argument!" knee jerks.

How do you imagine the day we find out that determinism is true? Chaos on streets, all prisoners let out, cats sleeping with dogs, newspapers with headlines "Determinism shown to be true! Turns out nobody could have ever done anything otherwise!"

Let's take "volition" as the starting point. Hopefully we can agree that we have "volition" regardless of whether determinism is true. Then we could explore how "volition" would map to "could have done otherwise". Maybe you'd claim that "volition" is compatible with determinism while "could have done otherwise" is not compatible with determinism?

Will you claim that "volition" does not exist if determinism is true?

Will you claim that "volition" is not "free will" if determinism is true?

What would that actually mean, beyond banal concerns about usage of words? You say it's about holding people responsible... but we hold people responsible for their actions to achieve desired consequences, not because "volition = free will".

Will you claim that "consequences" do not exist if determinism is true?

[PeterMP]

At a minimum, the payoff would be us actually having a conversation.

It is difficult to engage with you in the oppressive shadow of your concerns with supposed consequences of determinism, as well as various "aha! I know this argument!" knee jerks.

How do you imagine the day we find out that determinism is true? Chaos on streets, all prisoners let out, cats sleeping with dogs, newspapers with headlines "Determinism shown to be true! Turns out nobody could have ever done anything otherwise!"

Let's take "volition" as the starting point. Hopefully we can agree that we have "volition" regardless of whether determinism is true. Then we could explore how "volition" would map to "could have done otherwise". Maybe you'd claim that "volition" is compatible with determinism while "could have done otherwise" is not compatible with determinism?

Will you claim that "volition" does not exist if determinism is true?

Will you claim that "volition" is not "free will" if determinism is true?

What would that actually mean, beyond banal concerns about usage of words? You say it's about holding people responsible... but we hold people responsible for their actions to achieve desired consequences, not because "volition = free will".

Will you claim that "consequences" do not exist if determinism is true?

 

The question becomes if there is no free will does holding people responsible actually have any direct relationship or benefit to actions you want to achieve.

 

Is there even a reasonable mechanism that you can describe by which holding somebody responsible for their actions can change their behavior with respect to what is desired in the absence of free will?

 

If there is no evidence for that, then why go through the effort of holding them responsible for their actions?

 

(You might also want to read the BBC story I posted in a reply to PockerPacker.)

[alexey]

The question becomes if there is no free will does holding people responsible actually have any direct relationship or benefit to actions you want to achieve.

This is an empirical question. Studies show that some ways of holding people responsible are more effective than others. However, the paradigm itself is well established - people's actions can be changed by holding them responsible.

Is there even a reasonable mechanism that you can describe by which holding somebody responsible for their actions can change their behavior with respect to what is desired in the absence of free will?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavior_modification

[PeterMP]

This is an empirical question. Studies show that some ways of holding people responsible are more effective than others. However, the paradigm itself is well established - people's actions can be changed by holding them responsible.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavior_modification

 

But how much of that is because people think they actually have a choice?

 

In the absence of a mechanism to describe how that can happen in a deterministic system, how much of that goes away (again see the link I posted on the other page in response to PockerPakcer)?

 

People's beliefs matter and that can and will change.

 

In addition, in the bigger picture, does it even matter in a deterministic system?

 

At a system wide level are you actually contributing to the more desired results or is the law of unattended consequences killing you and you'd be better off doing nothing?