NP:Leading atheist branded a ‘heretic’ for daring to question Darwinism

[PeterMP]

It's not about length of time, its about peer-review and standing up to experimentation and being able to provide prediction. Science isn't established by someone being the first to guess on something, but through careful experimentation and analysis of the results. Established science doesn't earn reverence for being around for a long time, but for standing up to scrutiny. When something new comes along to challenge it, that something new will have to stand up to repeated experimentation, peer-review, and scrutiny to show that it is more correct than what it is challenging.

 

Can you give me an example of a currently accepted scientific idea that has been accepted for the last 50 years that you would say is less well established than a scientific idea that has been only accepted for the last 2 years?

 

Can you point to any pair of ideas where both are currently accepted where you'd say the more recent one is more established than the older one?

[alexey]

I've read the studies and the BBC piece that I posted, and I'm pretty sure they are explicit to free will and not a general concept or a potentially related concept that may nor may not be the same based on how you want to define words.

That they are specific to free will and not a concept that YOU, but potentially many other people, might consider equivalent.

In fact, I'm pretty positive of that, and the BBC piece is pretty clear on that.

I tried to look further into it... unfortunately many studies post abstracts and not actual questions.

http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130924-how-belief-in-free-will-shapes-us

Psychologists have used this section of the book, or sentences taken from it or inspired by it, to induce feelings of determinism in experimental subjects. A typical study asks people to read and think about a series of sentences such as "Science has demonstrated that free will is an illusion”, or "Like everything else in the universe, all human actions follow from prior events and ultimately can be understood in terms of the movement of molecules”.

First example appears to conflate free will with volition, while the second example aims for reductionism.

It is unfortunate that study designs seem to aim for sexy headlines over legitimate exploration of differences between volition and free will.

Note that volition can be used to deny both of these claims. Volition is not an illusion, and volition cannot be ultimately understood in terms of movement of molecules.

The effects on study participants are generally compared with those of other people asked to read sentences that assert the existence of free will, such as "I have feelings of regret when I make bad decisions because I know that ultimately I am responsible for my actions", or texts on topics unrelated to free will.

Volition can be used to assert this claim.

We are less likely to behave ethically and kindly if our belief in free will is diminished.

...

Fortunately, the evidence shows that most people have a sense of their individual freedom and responsibility that is resistant to being overturned by neuroscience.

Again we see a conflation of volition and free will.

If deternimism makes free will an illusion while keeping volition intact, perhaps it would be worthwhile to explore whether belief in volition is sufficient to address numerous problems that come with believing in lack of free will.

[alexey]

...

Does the computer program I described previously to s0crates have violition?

If responsible for actions = free will

Then responsible for actions does not (necessarily) equal voilition based on earlier conversation.

In theory I have no problem in granting volition, consciousness, or any other traditionally human attributes to robots or programs.

However, in practice my answer would be no, until we resolve all relevant issues associated with saying yes.

[PeterMP]

Note that volition can be used to deny both of these claims. Volition is not an illusion, and volition cannot be ultimately understood in terms of movement of molecules.

If deternimism makes free will an illusion while keeping volition intact, perhaps it would be worthwhile to explore whether belief in volition is sufficient to address numerous problems that come with believing in lack of free will.

 

How do you know that volition can't be explained by the movement of molecules?

 

If we are defining volition as "decision making", how do you know that it can't be explained by the movement of molecules?

 

What other factors do you think are likely involved?

 

Words and phrases have connotations, mechanisms (determinism vs. non-determinism) matter, and people beliefs matter.

[PeterMP]

In theory I have no problem in granting volition, consciousness, or any other traditionally human attributes to robots or programs.

However, in practice my answer would be no, until we resolve all relevant issues associated with saying yes.

 

What issues?

[planter]

Why would atheists or agnostics care about a philosopher's take on biologic science?

[alexey]

How do you know that volition can't be explained by the movement of molecules?

If we are defining volition as "decision making", how do you know that it can't be explained by the movement of molecules?

What other factors do you think are likely involved?

Words and phrases have connotations, mechanisms (determinism vs. non-determinism) matter, and people beliefs matter.

I think we can agree on that. The question is whether desired results can be achieved with something like compatibilism/determinism/volition. I think it can be, but as far as I know that question has not yet been answered.

What issues?

google "robot personhood"

Why would atheists or agnostics care about a philosopher's take on biologic science?

Desire to promote critical thinking and work against bad arguments.

[PeterMP]

I think we can agree on that. The question is whether desired results can be achieved with something like compatibilism/determinism/volition. I think it can be, but as far as I know that question has not yet been answered.

 

So are you saying that you don't know that volition can be explained by the movement of molecules?

Can you describe a process by which volition would occur in a deterministic system that I couldn't describe based on the movement of molecules (realistically here we are probably talking about atomic ions (e.g. Na+)), which are not technically molecules, but if you are going to claim that in the context of the question/research being done that the difference between atomic ions and molecules matters, I am going to laugh at you)?

 

Emergent properties aren't magic things.

 

I have a phospholipid bilayer that makes up a membrane (this is the thing that surrounds up cells).  Due to its chemical nature, the diffusion of Na+ through the membrane is slow.  There is a higher concentration (more) Na+ on one side of the membrane than the other.  Due to simple laws of thermodynamics, the movement of the Na+ is thermodynamically favorable, but it doing it is slow. (paper catching under going combustion (burning) is another thermodynamically favorable process that is kinetically slow unless you do something to help get it going).

 

Therefore the Na+ does not move across the membrane much on a biological time scale (it is kinetically slow).

 

I add a protein to the membrane.  The protein has the ability to allow the Na+ to move through a tunnel in it instead of acting with the phospholipids the Na+ is now able to move through protein and interact with protein groups.

 

(Proteins are molecules.  Big ones, but still molecules and so are phospholipids).

 

I have a system that has emergent properties.  I can't explain the system completely using only the protein, the membrane or the Na+.

 

When I add them all together, I get Na+ moving through the membrane, which causes a change in the electrical potential.

 

I can even make it more complex.  I can add in another molecule.  The protein changes its structure in the presence of a molecule called glutamate (it moves).  In the presence of glutamate, the protein allows more Na+ through the membrane then when it is absent.

 

(We now have a something that is called a glutamate receptor.)

 

And I have more emergent properties.  To see the full potential of the changes, I have to have a membrane, a proteins, Na+, and glutamate.

 

Neither one of them alone or even in pairs can create the same conditions.

 

But I can describe it all based on the movement of molecules.

 

And realistically, I can get into the nitty gritty details of how the protein interacts with the Na+, how the glutamate interacts with the protein and how it changes the structure of the protein (causes the protein to move).

 

Or I can forget all of that stuff and just look at the Na+ depending on what I'm trying to do.

 

But its all just movements of molecules.

[alexey]

I suppose whether volition can be explained as a movement of particles depends on whether you consider "it's all movement of particles" to have sufficient explanatory power.

Based on your elaborate example, I don't think you would consider the "it's all movement of particles" explanation to be good enough.

[PeterMP]

I suppose whether volition can be explained as a movement of particles depends on whether you consider "it's all movement of particles" is a good enough explanation.

Based on your elaborate example, I don't think you would consider "it's all movement of particles" to be a good enough explanation.

 

Can you give an example of a mechanism that wouldn't be the movement of particles?

[alexey]

Can you give an example of a mechanism that wouldn't be the movement of particles?

i am not denying the movement of particles. I am questioning whether movement of particles is a sufficient explanation for complex emergent phenimena.

[PeterMP]

i am not denying the movement of particles. I am questioning whether movement of particles is a sufficient explanation for complex emergent phenimena.

 

Can you provide a process that you think might be involved that can't be described as the movement of particles?

[alexey]

Can you provide a process that you think might be involved that can't be described as the movement of particles?

We are talking about explaining things.

Do you have kids? Do you explain everything as movements of particles to them? Why not?

[PokerPacker]

Does theoretical physics count as a science on that definition? Do Einstein's thought experiments count as experiments, or is that more like philosophy?

You're getting into some tough territory here. I would say that theoretical physics is not pure science, nor is it philosophy. I'd say, though that it is a part of the scientific process. It asks a question, does background research on the question, and creates a mathematical model to form a hypothesis. The hypothesis, however, is still untested at this point; it does have mathematical backing, so it isn't nothing, but it still hasn't been used to make predictions and test if they hold up. This leads to theoretical particles like Tachyons which supposedly travel faster than the speed of light (great for science fiction, so Star Trek: TNG used them all the time) and disrupts causality. Until we can create a real Tachyon and observe its faster-than-light non-causal nature, though, we stick by the laws of physics stating that objects cannot break the speed of light and the universe is a causal system.

So is it philosophy? No, I'd say it's not as it does use mathematical models to back its hypotheses, but it's not a full science unto itself as it still needs experimental science to prove its hypotheses.

What kind of experiments did Darwin do for the Origin of Species? Newton for the Principia?

Perhaps I stressed the word "experiment" a little too much, while leaving out an important part of the definition of the scientific method which helps to separate philosophy from science. And that is that the hypothesis stage is creating a falsifiable hypothesis, which in physical sciences is typically tested through experimentation. The ability of a hypothesis to make predictions is important, and that is what Darwin did. He predicted that, based on the shape of some flowers on the Galapagos Islands, that there would be a bird whose beak matched the shape of the flower in order to drink the necter from it (if I recall correctly; maybe he saw the bird first and then predicted the flower?). I'd say that discover alone did not prove natural selection as an experiment typically does for physical sciences, however it did put it on the map and it has continued to be tested and stand up to the tests.

What kind of sciences are the social sciences?

I don't want to get too deep into this one as my focus really is more on physical sciences. But my understanding of social sciences is that they do perform experiments, both quantitative and qualitative, and they form mathematical models to be able to make predictions, however they also deal with an evolving landscape as society changes. I, myself, have taken part in a few economic experiments. Even though the experimenters were not allowed to discuss the experiment with us even after the fact, by their methodology, I feel pretty confident in determining what they were seeking to understand in most of the experiments, such as the effect of personal interests in the reporting of a study, and individual short-term benefits versus overall group long-term benefits.

[s0crates]

So theoretical physics is essentially more like mathematics than the observational sciences? I tend to agree.

But then let me ask you this: do you think the method of math is more like logic/reason (deductive) or more like observation/experimentation (inductive)?

Now having considered the way of knowing in math, consider also the object of knowledge (roughly number). What type of thing is a number? Is it a reasoned abstraction (like a logical principle or term), or is it an observed object (like a tree or a brain)?

Getting to the point, it seems to me there are ways of knowing (and remember science comes from a Latin word for knowledge) besides Baconian method.

(I also think Darwin made many logical deductions, but the example of theoretical physics is perhaps the clearest example of what I'm trying to suggest).

PS I agree that scientific hypotheses must be falsifiable, but it is unclear to me why logical principles aren't also falsifiable (e.g. the axioms of Euclidean geometry).

[PeterMP]

I saw a person doing "string theory" work give a talk last year.  It was sort of a general audience talk and the somebody put the question directly to him what he considered his work, and he said it was math not science yet.

 

They had to generate some actual testable hypothesis, which realistically is going to require some new equipment/techniques.

[DCSaints_fan]

What would be cool is if they talked about the real problems with some aspects of evolution, such as how/when New World monkeys got to South America 

[PeterMP]

What would be cool is if they talked about the real problems with some aspects of evolution, such as how/when New World monkeys got to South America 

 

That's more a geology issue than an evolution issue.

 

How far apart were Africa and S. America and what was the nature of the Atlantic Ocean millions of years ago?

 

Continental drift theory tells us they were much closer and it is possible there was still some connection(s).

 

But that's a geology issue and not an evolution issue (and realistically one that I suspect will never be answered.  It isn't like somebody is going to start funding searches at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean for evidence of pieces of land that look they might have been on the surface and could have supported terrestrial live millions of years ago.)

[planter]

Desire to promote critical thinking and work against bad arguments.

Evolution is science. It's mysteries solved by observation, investigation, and analysis, not discourse by theologians, philosophers, and the Texas School Board.

[s0crates]

Evolution is science. It's mysteries solved by observation, investigation, and analysis, not discourse by theologians, philosophers, and the Texas School Board.

What do you think philosophy is? What are its objects? What are its methods?

For that matter, what do you think science is? What are its objects? What are its methods?

[alexey]

s0crates,

Volition is a thing we have, like consciousness, and it allows us to hold people responsible for their actions. Does volition alleviate your concerns with determinism?

[s0crates]

s0crates,

Volition is a thing we have, like consciousness, and it allows us to hold people responsible for their actions. Does volition alleviate your concerns with determinism?

 

Depends what you mean by the terms "volition" and "consciousness." Generally speaking, my concern is that reductive/eliminative materialism isn't compatible with those ideas as they are usually understood . . . 

 

EDIT: Basically, how does matter (mindless, purposeless, and operating according to mechanical laws) explain mindful beings operating according to their own purposes?

 

I think we need to rethink matter.

[alexey]

Depends what you mean by the terms "volition" and "consciousness." Generally speaking, my concern is that reductive/eliminative materialism isn't compatible with those ideas as they are usually understood . . .

EDIT: Basically, how does matter (mindless, purposeless, and operating according to mechanical laws) explain mindful beings operating according to their own purposes?

I think we need to rethink matter.

To lift some language from Wikipedia, by "volition" I mean something like "the cognitive process by which an individual decides on and commits to a particular course of action" and by "consciousness" I mean something like "sentience, awareness, subjectivity, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system of the mind."

Those terms seem like a good starting point because few people will deny that we have "volition" and "consciousness". While these things are clearly "not what we think they are", few people would deny their existence. Therefore terms like "volition" and "consciousness" allow us to discuss the nature of these phenomena without getting distracted by claims they are an illusion.

How should I interpret your questions? Are you hinting at limits of reductive/eliminative materialism, or are you suggesting we should do away with the whole materialist/naturalist approach altogether?

[s0crates]

To lift some language from Wikipedia, by "volition" I mean something like "the cognitive process by which an individual decides on and commits to a particular course of action" and by "consciousness" I mean something like "sentience, awareness, subjectivity, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system of the mind."

I'm okay with those definitions.

Regarding volition, does it make sense to say "an individual decides on and commits to a particular course of actions" in a world where there is only one possible course of actions?

Regarding consciousness, if it is "subjective," "feeling," etc. (what Descartes calls "thinking"), then how does that connect with this objective unfeeling matter that is supposed to be the only stuff that exists on the materialist worldview?

 

Those terms seem like a good starting point because few people will deny that we have "volition" and "consciousness".

Actually a lot of people do (e.g. Daniel Dennett, Patricia Churchland).

I do agree it seems foolish to deny something so obvious upon introspection.

 

While these things are clearly "not what we think they are", few people would deny their existence.

Yeah this is the basic problem.

 

Therefore terms like "volition" and "consciousness" allow us to discuss the nature of these phenomena without getting distracted by claims they are an illusion.

Again, I'm afraid a lot of people have bitten the "consciousness is an illusion" bullet because of their commitment to the materialist worldview (and, to their credit, desire for a coherent worldview).

I'm with you, I think we should admit what we don't know and/or can't explain.

 

How should I interpret your questions? Are you hinting at limits of reductive/eliminative materialism, or are you suggesting we should do away with the whole materialist/naturalist approach altogether?

More the former than the latter. This is what got me started, everybody jumped on Nagel for saying reductive materialism is probably false.

It may be false in the way Newtonian physics is false (which we might expect as it is very Newtonian), practically useful, but actually wrong.

[alexey]

I'm okay with those definitions.

Regarding volition, does it make sense to say "an individual decides on and commits to a particular course of actions" in a world where there is only one possible course of actions?

I think it does make sense if you leave the "cognitive process" part in there. Volition is a cognitive process.

 

Alexey - Those terms seem like a good starting point because few people will deny that we have "volition" and "consciousness".

Actually a lot of people do (e.g. Daniel Dennet, Pateicia Churchland).

What led you to believe that Daniel Dennett and Patrecia Churchland deny that we have "volition" and "consciousness"?

 

Again, I'm afraid a lot of people have bitten the "consciousness is an illusion" bullet because of their commitment to the materialist worldview (and, to their credit, desire for a coherent worldview).

Unfortunately the word "illusion" conflates two very different meanings: an illusion can be something that does not exist, or something that exists, but is wrongly perceived.

This may be the reason why you brought up Dennett and Churchland - indeed they claim volition and consciousness are wrongly perceived, but they do not deny their existence.

 

I'm with you, I think we should admit what we don't know and/or can't explain.

Neuroscience is much farther along than Deepak Chopra would have you believe. How open are you to moving from "we do not know the answer to the hard problem of consciousness" to "there is no hard problem of consciousness?"

 

More the former than the latter. This is what got me started, everybody jumped on Nagel for saying reductive materialism is probably false.

It may be false in the way Newtonian physics is false (which we might expect as it is very Newtonian), practically useful, but actually wrong.

I am seeing a huge gap between saying that "reductive materialism is insufficient" and saying that "materialism/naturalism is false"

We can agree that the "movement of atoms" explanation is insufficient. This may mean:

1) Movement of atoms produces something more than just movement of atoms (emergent properties)

2) Something happens that cannot be produced by movement of atoms (magic)

Where do you stand on this?