What is God?

[Jumbo]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God

[s0crates]

PeterMP-

I think you have a profound historical insight here:

"Science doesn't make the prediction that studying nature will reveal information about nature.

But theological scholars well [before] the development of science did make that prediction based on their belief in and image of God.

That's a powerful prediction that has been found to be true. "

As Whitehead said, "Modern science is an unconscious derivative of medieval theology."

Consider, for example, the idea of a law of nature and the idea of determinism. These ideas are strikingly similar to the ideas of God's laws and God's plan.

This is no proof of God's existence, but it is deeply suggestive.

[PeterMP]

I think you get my meaning.

Dennett seems to be working on the false assumption that admitting the proposition "consciousness is real" somehow involves something supernatural. It's an unconscious product of our Cartesian intellectual heritage which has forced he and others to draw the preposterous conclusion that there is no such thing as consciousness, because they wrongly assume that admitting that there is consciousness would be to admit something spooky.

 

Atheists seem to have decided that if "consciousness" can be well explained through science then that will some how be a severe strike against religious belief.

 

They further seem to believe that theist are fighting them over advancing a scientific understanding of consciousness.

 

I just don't see it.  Maybe it is the theistic circles I travel in, but even beyond that I don't see it.

 

The right doesn't like what the CDC has to say about guns.  They pass a law that makes it difficult for the CDC to fund research on gun ownership.

 

They don't like the results of climate science.  Large numbers of web sites promoting pseudo science related to climate change pop up.  They sue and threaten to investigate climate scientists (i.e the old AG of Virginia) and talk about cutting funding to climate research (currently happening in Congress).

 

I'm not saying there aren't some right wing Bible literalists that are worried about it, but I certainly don't see it, and it doesn't appear to be very wide spread.

 

I'd be more worried if it turned out that consciousness didn't (appear) to have a good naturalistic explanation.

[s0crates]

Atheists seem to have decided that if "consciousness" can be well explained through science then that will some how be a severe strike against religious belief.

They further seem to believe that theist are fighting them over advancing a scientific understanding of consciousness.

. . .

I'd be more worried if turned out that consciousness didn't (appear) to have a good naturalistic explanation.

To put it plainly: They think that the word "consciousness" means "soul stuff." So if they admit I'm a conscious being, they imagine they are forced to say I have a soul.

Conversely, they think that proving consciousness is not real proves that there is no such thing as the soul.

I think this is the easiest way to understand what guys like Dennett are doing.

This comes from Descartes, who did treat consciousness this way (among other things, he thought the mind was immortal).

I think we need to reject the Cartesian assumptions here if we're going to make any progress. There is no seperate spiritual realm where the consciousness exists, but it does exist nonetheless.

I think Searle basically has it right. "Consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by an objective process in the brain." The thing preventing these guys from admitting this is the tacit assumption of the Cartesian definitions of mind and matter.

[PeterMP]

I do not understand:

what you mean by "explainable" and "unexplainable"

how you would classify something that is potentially explainable or potentially unexplainable

how you decide whether a particular explanation is good enough to make something explainable or explained

(e.g. explanation: the brain makes the mind. Is the mind explained now?)

How did you arrive to this conclusion?

Anything that is unknown is potentially explainable and unexplainable.

It is possible that we will be able to explain it and just can't yet, or it is possible that there is no way to explain it and we will never be able to explain it (and as such it is unexplainable).

To my knowledge there is no (natural/mathematical) law that says consciousness has to be explainable (by/to us). The advancement of scientific knowledge is not guaranteed.

 

I think that humans have natural curiosity.

I don't think anybody doubts that.

But that doesn't mean that every prediction that people make is right.

Independent of humans having natural curiosity, Augustine could have been wrong.

 

Let's do that.

Yes, in a sense that upon learning about deterninism s0crates will retain his ability to place an order at a restaraunt.

I believe that more accurate models of reality help people to improve their lives... so I think people's lives will change for the better.

One reason is because it will improve people's ability to think through questions of freedom, choice, punishment, etc.

I am sharing these views as information only. I am not trying to convince you of anything. I will gladly discuss my reasons some other day.

I'm sorry, I thought you were trying to make a point that was specific to determinism. Not something that would be equally true for non-determinism and for the most part is true about general information.

I don't like the idea or concept of a deterministic system.

However, if the system is deterministic and we discover that it is, like any other information, it will change people's behavior.

And in some sense, it will "improve" their lives like information in general does.

(where we are using the word "improve" very loosely because you don't really want to support the argument that most people don't consider what the current research suggest is going to happen in a deterministic vs. deterministic system "better.)

 

Interesting question. I trace the assumption of determinism through all layers of emergence... but the relationship between determinism and the emergent phenomena is different at different levels of emergence.

Dennett seems to say: consciousness is real and it's a bag of tricks. How about that?

Emergent natural systems are determinant.

Hemoglobin is a protein. It is made of 2 different polypeptide molecules (really big molecules, but still just molecules) and two copies of each molecule (2 alpha molecules and 4 beta molecules) as well as some other non-protein molecules.

The molecules as a system act differently than they do individually.

https://books.google.com/books?id=l50tdUNgZZgC&pg=PA374&lpg=PA374&dq=cooperativity+hemoglobin+emergent+property&source=bl&ots=isc3dWn4-w&sig=oN7yHUEk2y-F3kSQ6SpdxcU6kOE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=1pBSVdq2B8HbsATdh4CQDA&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=cooperativity%20hemoglobin%20emergent%20property&f=false

Hemoglobin though is still a deterministic system. There is nothing about emergence that escapes determinism.

Atoms are emergent systems.

Appealing to emergence doesn't change anything with respect to determinism.

So I'll ask again, do you think at the macro-level (i.e. at the human level), the system is deterministic or not?

 

The macro system is absolutely (partly) the result of emergent properties, but that is not evidence of or sufficient for determinism or non-determinism.

[alexey]

Translation:

"Folk psychological concepts" or "traditionally well-regarded mental states" include things like pains, pleasures, desires, beliefs, and intentions. I think we should eliminate those from our ontology; that is I thinks they are not real.

Translation:

Obviously my view is absurd, ...

Translation:

I agree with any view that denies consciousness is real.

Jeez man that's harsh.

I think your interpretation of his view is plausible. It's just that what you think he says isn't what he actually says.

Reading through your comments again, I think your view is much more plausible than Dennett's. You admit consciousness is real and, as yet, it is unexplained. You also think consciousness is explainable in objective (perhaps emergent) terms. I think that's probably right.

I'm not really sure why you've suddenly committed yourself to Dennett's less plausible view, that consciousness is an illusion, explainable entirely in reductionistic objective terms, and what's more, he's explained it!

Why adopt the view of the guy who calls his book "Consciousness Explained" when your own view is so much better?

Interestingly enough, I find it hard to find any areas where my perspective differs from Dennett's.

I said, the proposition "consciousness is an illusion" commits a category mistake. Illusions involve a "seeming," and "seeming" necessarily involves consciousness (indeed "seeming" is basically what consciousness is).

How about: "consciousness is not what it feels like"

Take Dennett's magic trick example. It seems like the magician saws a women in half, but in reality he doesn't. That is, it looks to me like he sawed her in half. I cannot describe the illusion without reference to how it looks to me.

The whole concept of an illusion presupposes some kind of first-person ontology.

The magic trick exists, but it is a trick - it is not really what it feels like.

[alexey]

So I'll ask again, do you think at the macro-level (i.e. at the human level), the system is deterministic or not?

I operate with an assumption that the system is deterministic at all levels. Although at that high level, at least for now, it is effectively indeterministic.

[s0crates]

Interestingly enough, I find it hard to find any areas where my perspective differs from Dennett's.

How about: "consciousness is not what it feels like"

Of course Dennett's ontology would not allow him to make that claim, because what he is denying is the reality of "feeling like."

This is a case where you and Dennett seem to differ. He thinks there is no subjective ontology, whereas you've allowed for one.

The magic trick exists, but it is a trick - it is not really what it feels like.

Im not really clear what you mean.

Let's consider a particular "magic trick" for example: I feel "the angst of modern man under postindustrial capitalism." What is that feeling really?

Would you say my subjective feeling of angst is not real, it is merely an illusion? (as Dennett does).

Or would you say my subjective feeling of angst is real, but it is explainable in objective terms? (as Searle does).

Or would you say something else entirely?

[alexey]

Your angst is real in that it exists. Dennett would not deny it, I think. The question is whether you have a correct understanding about what it is and how it works.

[alexey]

Of course Dennett's ontology would not allow him to make that claim, because what he is denying is the reality of "feeling like."

This is a case where you and Dennett seem to differ. He thinks there is no subjective ontology, whereas you've allowed for one.

I do not think that Dennett is denying the reality of "feeling like".  He may be denying that there is more than brain activity to "feeling like"...  is that what you mean?

[s0crates]

I do not think that Dennett is denying the reality of "feeling like". He may be denying that there is more than brain activity to "feeling like"... is that what you mean?

Either you have misunderstood Dennett, or you have endorsed behaviorism. I have to believe it is the former. So let me explain (again).

Dennett says, "necessarily, if two organisms are behaviorally exactly alike, they are psychologically exactly alike." Just think about this for a minute; you'll see it cannot be true.

How would I explain a woman faking orgasm on this account? Isn't her behavior the same in both the real and fake cases?

Normally I'd say what's different in the real and fake cases is what it feels like to her. But Dennett specifically says I cannot make that distinction.

You see?

EDIT: Or try this example:

http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/01/09/376084137/trapped-in-his-body-for-12-years-a-man-breaks-free .

But at age 12, his life took an unexpected turn. He came down with a strange illness. The doctors weren't sure what it was, but their best guess was cryptococcal meningitis.

He got progressively worse. Eventually he lost his ability to move by himself, his ability to make eye contact, and then, finally, his ability to speak.

His parents, Rodney and Joan Pistorius, were told that he was as good as not there, a vegetable. The hospital told them to take him home and keep him comfortable until he died.

But he didn't die. "Martin just kept going, just kept going," his mother says.

His father would get up at 5 o'clock in the morning, get him dressed, load him in the car, take him to the special care center where he'd leave him.

"Eight hours later, I'd pick him up, bathe him, feed him, put him in bed, set my alarm for two hours so that I'd wake up to turn him so that he didn't get bedsores," Rodney says.

That was their lives, for 12 years.

Joan vividly remembers looking at Martin one day and saying: " 'I hope you die.' I know that's a horrible thing to say," she says now. "I just wanted some sort of relief."

And she didn't think her son was there to hear it.

But he was.

"Yes, I was there, not from the very beginning, but about two years into my vegetative state, I began to wake up," says Martin, now age 39 and living in Harlow, England.

He thinks he began to wake up when he was 14 or 15 years old. "I was aware of everything, just like any normal person," Martin says.

But although he could see and understand everything, he couldn't move his body.

. . .

How do you explain being "locked in" like this kid if you accept Dennett's definition of consciousness?

To be explicit: Dennett says, "necessarily, if two organisms are behaviorally exactly alike, they are psychologically exactly alike." Yet this kid was behaviorally identical to someone who is unconscious (indeed doctors thought he was), but he was nonetheless conscious.

And that isn't an isolated case. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Locked-in_syndrome

I just don't think behaviorism is going to hold up. I'm surprised to see you endorse it.

[s0crates]

Keep going, guys. We're almost at the answer to "What is God?"

Are you kidding me?

I've spent three pages trying to establish the proposition "consciousness is real," if you can believe that point would be in dispute.

[PokerPacker]

Question for discussion: Can man develop a computer with a conscious Artificial Intelligence

[alexey]

Either you have misunderstood Dennett, or you have endorsed behaviorism. I have to believe it is the former. So let me explain (again).

Dennett says, "necessarily, if two organisms are behaviorally exactly alike, they are psychologically exactly alike." Just think about this for a minute; you'll see it cannot be true.

How would I explain a woman faking orgasm on this account? Isn't her behavior the same in both the real and fake cases?

Normally I'd say what's different in the real and fake cases is what it feels like to her. But Dennett specifically says I cannot make that distinction.

Looks like you understand "behaviorally alike" as displaying the same external movements. Dennett, on the other hand, appears to describe a wider view that includes "behavioral dispositions and capacities":

Now we must deal with the leftovers: what makes it true that people have the real mental states is facts about their behavioral dispositions and capacities

http://cogprints.org/272/1/msgisno.htm

I wonder where you would draw a line between behavior and neural activity.

...

To be explicit: Dennett says, "necessarily, if two organisms are behaviorally exactly alike, they are psychologically exactly alike." Yet this kid was behaviorally identical to someone who is unconscious (indeed doctors thought he was), but he was nonetheless conscious.

...

I just don't think behaviorism is going to hold up. I'm surprised to see you endorse it.

Necessary distinctions can be made if behavioral capacities are taken into the account.

To put it crudely, behaviorism for you seems to exclude the metal life, while for Dennett behaviorism seems include the mental life as a kind of behavior.

[alexey]

Question for discussion: Can man develop a computer with a conscious Artificial Intelligence

I know two interesting ways to approach this question:

Exact replication - let's say humans invented the technology for atom-perfect copying. They scanned a person's brain, and printed another one.  The printed brain has the same activity, the printed person has the same behavior, memories, etc.  Is the printed person conscious?  What if the printing process was not atom-for-atom, but it replaced individual cells with tiny robots that work just like cells? 

 

Slow adoption - let's say humans invented brain attachments that add functionality to the brain (e.g. picture perfect memory).  As the technology improved, humans gradually started to replace their actual brain parts with functionally same (or better) artificial parts.  Eventually the whole brain was replaced with artificial parts.

 

In both examples you end up with an artificial brain that you may or may not call conscious - depending on your personal opinion.

[s0crates]

Question for discussion: Can man develop a computer with a conscious Artificial Intelligence

Good question.

I think the answer is we cannot do it yet. We don't know how the brain does it, so we aren't really in a position to get a computer to do it.

I tend to think merely simulating the thinking process on a computer won't work. There is more than inputs and outputs involved. You might design a machine that says "ow" when you hit it, but that alone doesn't establish that the machine feels pain.

Consciousness is a biological process like digestion. You wouldn't feed a computer simulation of digestion a pizza; so why would we think a computer simulation of consciousness is actually conscious?

I think the A.I. people are making interesting contributions to how we understand intelligence, but actual A.I. is a long way off. "Watson" is about as good as we can do, and I don't think anybody would mistake that for intelligence.

This is fun and somewhat related:

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room

[PokerPacker]

I know two interesting ways to approach this question:

Exact replication - let's say humans invented the technology for atom-perfect copying. They scanned a person's brain, and printed another one.  The printed brain has the same activity, the printed person has the same behavior, memories, etc.  Is the printed person conscious?  What if the printing process was not atom-for-atom, but it replaced individual cells with tiny robots that work just like cells? 

 

Slow adoption - let's say humans invented brain attachments that add functionality to the brain (e.g. picture perfect memory).  As the technology improved, humans gradually started to replace their actual brain parts with functionally same (or better) artificial parts.  Eventually the whole brain was replaced with artificial parts.

 

In both examples you end up with an artificial brain that you may or may not call conscious - depending on your personal opinion.

I was thinking more in terms of a Von Neumann Machine type computer with an AI software. Maybe it has some FPGA peripherals that allow it to re-arrange hardware for new tasks to somewhat emulate the human brain's plasticity.

[Jumbo]

Question for discussion: Can man develop a computer with a conscious Artificial Intelligence

 

 

No. It's impossible. Now stfu.

 

 

[alexey]

I was thinking more in terms of a Von Neumann Machine type computer with an AI software. Maybe it has some FPGA peripherals that allow it to re-arrange hardware for new tasks to somewhat emulate the human brain's plasticity.

Makes sense... I think whether or not a machine like that can be considered conscious is a matter of personal preference and legal implications.

For me, the question is whether the machine is able to emulate the brain (or whatever processes are implicated in consciousness). If the machine is able to replicate those processes well enough, I personally have no problem calling it conscious... Although I would be careful when it comes to granting rights, personhood, or other legal properties to such a machine. I am perfectly fine with somebody disagreeing with this, however, and saying that consciousness is only for meat machines that are made out of human cells.

[s0crates]

Makes sense... I think whether or not a machine like that can be considered conscious is a matter of personal preference and legal implications.

For me, the question is whether the machine is able to emulate the brain (or whatever processes are implicated in consciousness). If the machine is able to replicate those processes well enough, I personally have no problem calling it conscious... Although I would be careful when it comes to granting rights, personhood, or other legal properties to such a machine. I am perfectly fine with somebody disagreeing with this, however, and saying that consciousness is only for meat machines that are made out of human cells.

You seem to think that a machine that passes the Turing Test will be conscious (typical behaviorist/functionalist thinking).

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test

I have my doubts about that. The relevant question isn't whether the machine's inputs and outputs match that of a conscious being, but whether it feels like anything to be the machine.

This debate will be huge if we ever get a machine that can pass the Turing test, but we're not anywhere close to that yet.

[alexey]

You seem to think that a machine that passes the Turing Test will be conscious (typical behaviorist/functionalist thinking).

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test

I have my doubts about that. The relevant question isn't whether the machine's inputs and outputs match that of a conscious being, but whether it feels like anything to be the machine.

This debate will be huge if we ever get a machine that can pass the Turing test, but we're not anywhere close to that yet.

Does it feel like anything to be s0crates? Can you prove it?

I do not see a good reason to deny duck-hood to something that looks like a duck and quacks like a duck. How would you set up a test whether it feels like a duck also?

[PeterMP]

My understanding is that the Turing test is pretty much largely rejected as a measure of consciousness today.

 

What people think would be key is the ability to take in information and make predictions generally (I can make a computer that is designed to take in specific information and make specific predictions, but that's not what the human brain does.  It takes in lot's of different types of information and makes predictions).

 

The Loebner prize and similar efforts, which is discussed in the wiki link that s0crates already posted, shows the short comings of the Turing test.

 

The things that do well there are just chatter bots, and I don't know anybody that considers a chatter bot conscious.

[s0crates]

My understanding is that the Turing test is pretty much largely rejected as a measure of consciousness today.

I think that's right. I'd add that the considerations that led to its rejection are the same as those that led to the rejection of behaviorism (and should likewise lead to the rejection of functionalism).

[PokerPacker]

You seem to think that a machine that passes the Turing Test will be conscious (typical behaviorist thinking).

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test

I have my doubts about that. The relevant question isn't whether the machine's inputs and outputs match that of a conscious being, but whether it feels like anything to be the machine.

This debate will be huge if we ever get a machine that can pass the Turing test, but we're not anywhere close to that yet.

I'm not talking about a Siri type machine that is programmed to act sassy, but an AI that starts with just a kernel and alters its programming through its experiences and shapes it. For example, what if the AI was programmed without knowledge of any human language but could be taught to understand English much like a child learns through observation?

[s0crates]

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=HPslVpj2QLw