Philosophical vs Methodological Naturalism

[alexey]

Not really the past, but only the present.

Yes, and it is a link that I've given you before:

http://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/basic_assumptions

"There is consistency in the causes that operate in the natural world. In other words, the same causes come into play in related situations and these causes are predictable. For example, science assumes that the gravitational forces at work on a falling ball are related to those at work on other falling objects. It is further assumed that the workings of gravity don't change from moment to moment and object to object in unpredictable ways. Hence, what we learn about gravity today by studying falling balls can also be used to understand, for example, modern satellite orbits, the formation of the moon in the distant past, and the movements of the planets and stars in the future, because the same natural cause is at work regardless of when and where things happen."

This is essentially the same conversation we've had in the context of the axiomatic assumption. You can say that I'm not going to make the axiomatic assumption and appeal to coherentism and say the evidence that past predicts the future and the present predicts the past and future is good evidence, but that model was not tested using science.

You get predictions by using methodological naturalism + the scientific method. The link you quoted supports this.

This is an unreasonable burden of proof.

You are asking to him to disprove an infinite number (all mental states) of possibilities.

I am merely asking to demonstrate the claimed contradiction in a logically valid way.

[Zguy28]

You may be right that good and evil become subjective in a godless world. Let me ponder that a bit.

If there is no higher purpose, then maybe there is no purpose whatsoever. Maybe we become nihilists.

Then why not just kill ourselves? However you answer that question becomes the meaning of life (if there is no God-given meaning). If somebody answers I don't kill myself because I love my family, then that love is his meaning of life. But that is not nihilism, that is liberation. Even if nothing matters in the grand scheme of things, if something matters to you, then something matters.

If life is inherently meaningless, perhaps it can still have a meaning that we give it. Without a God-given moral order, maybe we can have a man-made moral order.

If God is dead, then we can respond in two ways: we can be nihilists or we can embrace the radical freedom. I prefer the latter response.

I actually have grave doubts about such subjectivism, but I like to think about these things. I do think it is better to have a moral order as a human artifact than no moral order whatsoever.

Again, or not. Without objectivity, I agree that meaning may be said to be found in whatever I say is meaningful. But its all relative and subjective to the individual or group. And it can change. So perhaps it was never the meaning to begin with?

If one became a nihilist, why would that be better or worse? Would it be evil? How do you judge?

For the extreme example, the Nazi's I'm sure had a moral code, but I bet most folks don't consider it good. Yet I'm sure they did. If there be no objective meaning to life, who am I to judge them, except based on whether I feel like it or not in the moment?

 

I think naturalism ultimately leads to Solomon's conclusion: "I have seen all the things that are done under the sun; all of them are meaningless, a chasing after the wind."

[MartinC]

I think naturalism ultimately leads to Solomon's conclusion: "I have seen all the things that are done under the sun; all of them are meaningless, a chasing after the wind."

But that still might be all there is :-) You make and find your own meaning.

[alexey]

Again, or not. Without objectivity, I agree that meaning may be said to be found in whatever I say is meaningful. But its all relative and subjective to the individual or group. And it can change. So perhaps it was never the meaning to begin with?

If one became a nihilist, why would that be better or worse? Would it be evil? How do you judge?

For the extreme example, the Nazi's I'm sure had a moral code, but I bet most folks don't consider it good. Yet I'm sure they did. If there be no objective meaning to life, who am I to judge them, except based on whether I feel like it or not in the moment?

 I think naturalism ultimately leads to Solomon's conclusion: "I have seen all the things that are done under the sun; all of them are meaningless, a chasing after the wind."

I am in favor of addressing your questions via philosophy rather than pretending they don't exist via religion.

[PeterMP]

You get predictions by using methodological naturalism + the scientific method. The link you quoted supports this.

I am merely asking to demonstrate the claimed contradiction in a logically valid way.

 

Quote the part that you think says that.

 

It doesn't say you ONLY have to use those things.

 

Science (i.e. the scientific method) gives you knowledge from knowledge you can make predictions.

 

Science (i.e. the scientific method) assumes predictability.

 

You need the assumption and the knowledge. You also need decisions about the model. The knowledge comes from the scientific method.

 

The assumption (or if you want to switch to the coherent model whatever other term you want to use in terms of assumption) is not part of the scientific method, and it was not derived by the scientific method (you have switched here from the scientific method, which is what we were talking about before to just science.  The term science is a less specific term, which can be used in a manner that is synonymous with the scientific method, but it doesn't have to be so the issue might be the fact that you've switched words).

 

Let's consider you claim to be agnostic with respect to the existence of God.  You claim to be agnostic with respect to the nature of the universe.

 

Yet, you behave very differently with respect to those two things.

 

Why is that?

 

"I am not even hedging against known possibilities such as a super-volcano, meteor strike, nuclear war, deadly viral outbreaks."

Going back to this idea, I want to point out that this not necessarily require that you have cognitive performance issues with respect to these things in isolation.  A cognitive performance issue with respect to science is enough because science tells you that these things should be rare.  In that case, then it doesn't make sense to devote (many) resources to them.

 

In the context of not being sure of the validity of science, then that doesn't make sense, and the probability of these things happening has to be altered, and it likely makes much more sense to devote resources to them.

 

But you don't. Your behavior says that you believe the science.

[alexey]

Quote the part that you think says that.

http://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/basic_assumptions

The process of science builds reliable knowledge about the natural world.

...

The process of building scientific knowledge relies on a few basic assumptions that are worth acknowledging

Let's consider you claim to be agnostic with respect to the existence of God. You claim to be agnostic with respect to the nature of the universe.

Yet, you behave very differently with respect to those two things.

Why is that?

Methodological naturalism.

 

"I am not even hedging against known possibilities such as a super-volcano, meteor strike, nuclear war, deadly viral outbreaks."

Going back to this idea, I want to point out that this not necessarily require that you have cognitive performance issues with respect to these things in isolation. A cognitive performance issue with respect to science is enough because science tells you that these things should be rare. In that case, then it doesn't make sense to devote (many) resources to them.

In the context of not being sure of the validity of science, then that doesn't make sense, and the probability of these things happening has to be altered, and it likely makes much more sense to devote resources to them.

But you don't. Your behavior says that you believe the science.

{A, B, C} - set of belief systems that produce behaviour like mine.

Peter's claim: this set only contains "believe the science".

Burden of proof: demonstrate that the set only contains "believe the science".

[PeterMP]

http://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/basic_assumptions

The process of science builds reliable knowledge about the natural world.

...

The process of building scientific knowledge relies on a few basic assumptions that are worth acknowledging

I'm struck by the fact that neither one of those sentences uses the word prediction. That they both use the word knowledge, which is the term I've used through out this conversation.

(And again, there is a difference between testing a model based on the predictions it makes and actually making a prediction too.)

One is consistent with the scientific method and one is not.

 

Methodological naturalism.

This is related to the process of carrying out science.

Not living your life.

 

{A, B, C} - set of belief systems that produce behaviour like mine.

Peter's claim: this set only contains "believe the science".

Burden of proof: demonstrate that the set only contains "believe the science".

How many things are are in the set?

Give me a list and a description so I can start working through them.

[alexey]

I'm struck by the fact that neither one of those sentences uses the word prediction. That they both use the word knowledge, which is the term I've used through out this conversation.

It says "reliable knowledge".

How do you interpret that?

How many things are are in the set?

Give me a list and a description so I can start working through them.

Let's start with two

1) Non-existent belief system - lack of a belief system.

2) Methodological naturalism - a "belief system" so simple that you may not even classify it as such.. yet your point hinges on demonstrating that methodological naturalism is insufficient to produce behavior.

[PeterMP]

It says "reliable knowledge".

How do you interpret that?

Let's start with two

1) Non-existent belief system - lack of a belief system.

2) Methodological naturalism - a "belief system" so simple that you may not even classify it as such.. yet your point hinges on demonstrating that methodological naturalism is insufficient to produce behavior.

 

I don't read it as knowledge that in of to itself that makes a prediction of the future or past when they explicitly state after that those require an assumption to be made.  I suspect they mean reliable in the context of the assumption.  If the assumption is true, the knowledge is reliable.

 

Actually, it doesn't.  My point hinges on it doesn't make sense to ONLY use methodological naturalism to gain knowledge.

 

It isn't a specific behavior that is the issue.  It is the combination of behaviors that is an issue.

 

In the context of being agnostic about the nature of existence, SOMETIMES behaving as if science is true is fine.

 

You didn't address my point above about it only being related to the scientific method.

 

But, let's say somebody DID ONLY behave in the context of methodological naturalism (which would mean the ONLY ever did science).

 

The question would become, why did they choose that?  They could have chosen all sorts of other things to base their behavior on, why choose that?

 

I'll ask you again.

 

In the context of you being agnostic with respect to nature of existence, how does it make sense to spend so much of your time here arguing about the value/power/nature of science?

 

**EDIT**

Why don't you make a big wheel with a bunch of belief systems/possibility natures of existence and spin it every day , and then behave consistent with that system selected by the spinner for that day?

 

One of your options could be methodological naturalism.

 

Note, this would result in the hedging behavior I described earlier.

[alexey]

I don't read it as knowledge that in of to itself that makes a prediction of the future or past when they explicitly state after that those require an assumption to be made. I suspect they mean reliable in the context of the assumption. If the assumption is true, the knowledge is reliable.

You came up with the "if the assumption is true" part. The source just says "reliable knowledge."

But, let's say somebody DID ONLY behave in the context of methodological naturalism (which would mean the ONLY ever did science).

Why is that?

Yes methodological naturalism is required for science... but that does not mean science is required for methodological naturalism.

The question would become, why did they choose that? They could have chosen all sorts of other things to base their behavior on, why choose that?

Because it makes sense to them.

I'll ask you again.

In the context of you being agnostic with respect to nature of existence, how does it make sense to spend so much of your time here arguing about the value/power/nature of science?

Two reasons:

1) I enjoy discussing these topics

2) I do not have any beliefs and I am eager to explain how that works.

Why don't you make a big wheel with a bunch of belief systems/possibility natures of existence and spin it every day , and then behave consistent with that system selected by the spinner for that day?

One of your options could be methodological naturalism.

Interesting idea.

Note, this would result in the hedging behavior I described earlier.

You did not describe any behaviors as to how you expect a "pure methodological naturalist" to hedge. My curiosity remains unsatisfied.

Your assertion that my behavior is different from that of a "pure methodological naturalist" remains unsupported.

[s0crates]

It is not enough to say that philosophical naturalism produces the same behavior. You also need to demonstrate that philosophical naturalism is the only way to do it.

I don't think so. All I'm trying to do is point out a disconnect between belief and practice.

It obviously isn't impossible for people to behave in a way that is inconsistent with the beliefs they profess, but there is something fishy about such behavior.

Consider Jefferson for example, who owned slaves, while announcing to the world the self-evidence of the truth that all men are equal. We ordinarily call that hypocrisy.

Now the methodological naturalist who denies philosophical naturalism doesn't make such a glaring mistake, but his error is of the same sort, the action is inconsistent with the avowed belief.

I see you trying to make a very strong point here - that only a particular internal mental state can produce a particular external behavior.

That's roughly the idea, although I rarely use categorical words like "only." It is suspicious to deny something in theory but affirm it in practice. You might accuse somebody who does that of not actually believing what they say they believe.

What if I tell you, "there is no such thing as the truth"? Am I trying to convince you of the truth of that statement? If so, I must not actually believe it is true. You see?

[s0crates]

2) I do not have any beliefs and I am eager to explain how that works.

I think you might find Karl Popper's philosophy of science helpful. Roughly, his idea is that science only falsifies beliefs, it cannot confirm them.

http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/popper_falsification.html

Science as Falsification.

. . .

These considerations led me in the winter of 1919-20 to conclusions which I may now reformulate as follows.

It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory — if we look for confirmations.

Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory — an event which would have refuted the theory.

Every "good" scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.

A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.

Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.

Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.")

Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers — for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a "conventionalist twist" or a "conventionalist stratagem.")

One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.

. . .

I get the impression that you mean to say something close to what he says. To my mind, he gives one of the most plausible answers to the problem of induction.

I'm curious to hear if you agree with him.

[s0crates]

Again, or not. Without objectivity, I agree that meaning may be said to be found in whatever I say is meaningful. But its all relative and subjective to the individual or group. And it can change. So perhaps it was never the meaning to begin with?

If one became a nihilist, why would that be better or worse? Would it be evil? How do you judge?

For the extreme example, the Nazi's I'm sure had a moral code, but I bet most folks don't consider it good. Yet I'm sure they did. If there be no objective meaning to life, who am I to judge them, except based on whether I feel like it or not in the moment?

I tend to think morality is objective for reasons a lot like you give here. Subjectivism leads to absurdities. (I often play with ideas I don't completely buy, it's fun, and sometimes it leads to new insights).

But between subjectivism and nihilism, I do find subjectivism better.

I mostly agree with the criticism of subjectivism you give in this post though.

[alexey]

s0crates,

Unfortunately I cannot compose a proper reply today.

One quick note... I understand the word "belief" can be problematic because it does not have a specific neurological or philosophical correlate.

I see belief as a kind of thought, and you seem to be making claims that a particular kind of thought is required for a particular kind of behavior, e.g.:

 

I don't think so. All I'm trying to do is point out a disconnect between (some kind of thought) and practice.

It obviously isn't impossible for people to behave in a way that is inconsistent with the (kinds of thoughts) they profess, but there is something fishy about such behavior.

[PeterMP]

You came up with the "if the assumption is true" part. The source just says "reliable knowledge."

I did, but that does not discount the fact that the source explicitly says that knowing things in other places (space and satellites), in the past (the formation of the moon), and the future (where the planets will be) based on science requires an assumption.

Your hung up on a single word that is not in the section related to the discussion.

We've already discussed this in detail. The scientific method does not conclude that the future will look like the present. To do that, you have to make the axiomatic assumption or make the argument that such a model is the most coherent model.

This is basic philosophy of science stuff. Read about induction and Hume.

Why are we going in a circle?

Why is that?

Yes methodological naturalism is required for science... but that does not mean science is required for methodological naturalism.

Earlier in this thread you told me you thought methodolgical naturalism was synonymous with the scientific method, and while that's not quite right as I explained, you've now completely changed your point of view even beyond what I've explained.

But now they are not synonomous, and they are not what I explained, but A requires B, but B does not require A.

I honestly think now you are just making stuff up and not even bothering to actually ask yourself if it makes sense in the context of the larger discussion.

You aren't even trying to make coherent arguments with respect to this thread, much less your larger belief system.

Because it makes sense to them.

Why? Of all the possibilities why does that one make sense?

Two reasons:

1) I enjoy discussing these topics

2) I do not have any beliefs and I am eager to explain how that works.

You also have firm belief that actions, especially by things like our government, should be based on evidence where you consider evidence to come from repeatable processes/activities (e.g. science).

And I have no problem starting to quote your old posts to back up those points.

And in the context of these conversations, given what I've told you, you could still be part of them. You'd just take on different sides of the conversations different days.

You are here doing what you do because it is important to you not just because you enjoy it, and your post on multiple topics over a long period of time show that.

If you aren't going to be honest, there isn't really a reason to have this conversation.

Interesting idea.

You did not describe any behaviors as to how you expect a "pure methodological naturalist" to hedge. My curiosity remains unsatisfied.

Your assertion that my behavior is different from that of a "pure methodological naturalist" remains unsupported.

I don't expect a pure methodological naturalist to hedge.

But I also wouldn't say that their actions match their words with respect to being agnostic.

I expect that somebody that is truly agnostic with respect to the nature of the existence to not act ONLY like a pure methodoligcal naturalist.

Let's say you know somebody that some who got a lot of unexpected money, and they were talking about investing it.

You asked them what their investment philosophy was.

They told you that they were an agnostic investor.

You asked them what they actually did with their money. How did that work?

They told you they only invested in the S&P 500 index funds.

You asked, why.

They told you they thought it was reasonable.

Would you believe they were really an agnostic investor?

Realistically, what they are doing is not consistent with being an agnostic investor.

It might be reasonable to invest in S&P 500 index funds, but if that is ALL they do what they are actually doing in practice is saying it is the MOST reasonable way to invest their funds- that is over the time course of their investment they expect the S&P 500 will go up the most.

If the S&P 500 is one reasonable way to invest your money out of all possibilities, then it makes sense to invest in a diversified portfolio.

If you think the S&P 500 might go down, which would seen to be consistent with respect to being an agnostic investor, then it doesn't make sense to put all of your money in the S&P 500.

Your person that ONLY practices methodological naturalism because they think it is reasonable is doing the same thing.

The investor that invests only in a S&P 500 index fund is not acting like an agnostic investor.

The person that only practices methodological naturalism is not acting agnostic with respect to the nature of our existence.

The person that says they are agnostic with respect to the existence of nature, but only practice methodological naturalism is not going to hedge, but they also have issues with cognitive performance.

[alexey]

...

We've already discussed this in detail. The scientific method does not conclude that the future will look like the present. To do that, you have to make the axiomatic assumption or make the argument that such a model is the most coherent model.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_theory

As with most (if not all) forms of scientific knowledge, scientific theories are inductive in nature and aim for predictive power and explanatory force

http://www.project2061.org/publications/sfaa/online/chap1.htm

Science Explains and Predicts

Earlier in this thread you told me you thought methodolgical naturalism was synonymous with the scientific method, and while that's not quite right as I explained, you've now completely changed your point of view even beyond what I've explained.

I view the scientific method as a subset of methodolgical naturalism.

Why? Of all the possibilities why does that one make sense?

Probably the same reason why you became a scientist.

I expect that somebody that is truly agnostic with respect to the nature of the existence to not act ONLY like a pure methodoligcal naturalist.

Let's say you know somebody that some who got a lot of unexpected money, and they were talking about investing it.

You asked them what their investment philosophy was.

They told you that they were an agnostic investor.

You asked them what they actually did with their money. How did that work?

They told you they only invested in the S&P 500 index funds.

You asked, why.

They told you they thought it was reasonable.

Would you believe they were really an agnostic investor?

Realistically, what they are doing is not consistent with being an agnostic investor.

What is an "agnostic investor"? What is he agnostic about? What do you expect an "agnostic investor" to do with their money?

If you think the S&P 500 might go down, which would seen to be consistent with respect to being an agnostic investor, then it doesn't make sense to put all of your money in the S&P 500.

Agnosticism is lack of certainty.

I see you conflating lack of certainty with lack of knowledge here.

The person that only practices methodological naturalism is not acting agnostic with respect to the nature of our existence.

What mismatches do you see, other than lack of unspecified hedging behavior?

[endzone_dave]

1) I enjoy discussing these topics

2) I do not have any beliefs and I am eager to explain how that works.

 

 

I'm going to sound a little bit like a Matrix movie but people need a purpose.  I think a person can go for a while without having any defined purpose other than to exist but then it gets old and those people will start to search for one.  Even when a person has a purpose, if it isn't tied to the right thing, their life still doesn't seem full.  If their purpose is to be a rich as possible or to have as much fun as possible, they often begin to have problems.  I think that's why so many people are drawn to Christianity.  It's not so they can believe in something they can't see, it's so they can have a purpose that revolves around helping others and leading a disciplined life.  Then you start to see how much better your life is and you want to believe in every bit of it.

[PeterMP]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_theory

As with most (if not all) forms of scientific knowledge, scientific theories are inductive in nature and aim for predictive power and explanatory force

http://www.project2061.org/publications/sfaa/online/chap1.htm

Science Explains and Predicts

This part of the post has multiple problems some of which I've addressed already in this thread:

 

The assumption (or if you want to switch to the coherent model whatever other term you want to use in terms of assumption) is not part of the scientific method, and it was not derived by the scientific method (you have switched here from the scientific method, which is what we were talking about before to just science.  The term science is a less specific term, which can be used in a manner that is synonymous with the scientific method, but it doesn't have to be so the issue might be the fact that you've switched words).

Some of which are related to finding a source that says what you want without worrying about the whole content of the source and/or intentionally leaving out information, either of which represents intellectual dishonesty.

From your second link:

http://www.project2061.org/publications/sfaa/online/chap1.htm

"Science presumes that the things and events in the universe occur in consistent patterns that are comprehensible through careful, systematic study."

A presumption is an assumption that is stated a head of time. They are talking about the axiomatic assumption in that quote. Science (generally not specifically the scientific method, which is specifically what we were talking about initially) works and can be used to do things like make predictions, but only in the context of an assumption.

You need science (using the term very broadly again, which is not how the conversation started where I explicitally differentiated between processes (i.e. the scientific method) and explanations) + the assumption (which is not from the scientific method) to make good predictions (and again you can go the other route to coherentism, but coherentism is not science either so you've still added something else in).

 

In other words, your link verifies the link I posted.  It isn't as explicit, but the same concept of an assumption that is not science itself being required is what your link is talking about.

 

If you bothered to read a little about induction and Hume, like I suggested, you'd understand why the first link doesn't support your point of view either.

 

I view the scientific method as a subset of methodolgical naturalism.

This is not what you stated earlier, and I do not think this is what methodological naturalism is, but I've already explained what I think methodolgical naturalism is in this thread, and I see no reason to repeat it.

 

Probably the same reason why you became a scientist.

That doesn't answer the question, and you know it.

 

Agnosticism is lack of certainty.

I see you conflating lack of certainty with lack of knowledge here.

I did some looking. There are definitions that support that view, but there are others that are more broad and support the idea that agnostic is simply without knowledge.

Now, I'd say we had a simple mix up over the definition of a word where you were using one definition, and I was using another, but it isn't hard to find posts that you've made like this:

 

I am an agnostic atheist because because I do not have knowledge about god and I do not form beliefs without knowledge.

So either you've moved on what the word agnostic is, what your beliefs are, or your switching from definition to definition based on what you have to do to support your argument at that time in that thread.

[alexey]

...

A presumption is an assumption that is stated a head of time. They are talking about the axiomatic assumption in that quote. Science (generally not specifically the scientific method, which is specifically what we were talking about initially) works and can be used to do things like make predictions, but only in the context of an assumption.

We can focus on thoughts/beliefs/philosophy needed to use predictions if we agree that (methodological naturalism + science) can make predictions.

 

I did some looking. There are definitions that support that view, but there are others that are more broad and support the idea that agnostic is simply without knowledge.

Yes, agnosticism is not having knowledge about the thing in question... but only that specific thing.

This is why, when you provided an example about the "agnostic broker", I asked: what is that "agnostic investor" actually agnostic about?

 

So either you've moved on what the word agnostic is, what your beliefs are, or your switching from definition to definition based on what you have to do to support your argument at that time in that thread.

This is why when discussing agnosticism we should remember what we are being agnostic about.

Trying to address my questions would help you understand my points.

Would you be able to detect between a "philosophical naturalist" who is certain about the true nature of existence and a "methodological naturalist" who is agnostic about the true nature of existence by observing their behaviors? If so, how?

I'm going to sound a little bit like a Matrix movie but people need a purpose.  I think a person can go for a while without having any defined purpose other than to exist but then it gets old and those people will start to search for one.  Even when a person has a purpose, if it isn't tied to the right thing, their life still doesn't seem full.  If their purpose is to be a rich as possible or to have as much fun as possible, they often begin to have problems.  I think that's why so many people are drawn to Christianity.  It's not so they can believe in something they can't see, it's so they can have a purpose that revolves around helping others and leading a disciplined life.  Then you start to see how much better your life is and you want to believe in every bit of it.

Why not find meaning and purpose that revolves around helping others and leading a disciplined life without the religion.

[s0crates]

More on Karl Popper's philosophy of science:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/#SciKnoHisPre

Popper is unusual amongst contemporary philosophers in that he accepts the validity of the Humean critique of induction, and indeed, goes beyond it in arguing that induction is never actually used in science. However, he does not concede that this entails the scepticism which is associated with Hume, and argues that the Baconian/Newtonian insistence on the primacy of ‘pure’ observation, as the initial step in the formation of theories, is completely misguided: all observation is selective and theory-laden—there are no pure or theory-free observations. In this way he destabilises the traditional view that science can be distinguished from non-science on the basis of its inductive methodology; in contradistinction to this, Popper holds that there is no unique methodology specific to science. Science, like virtually every other human, and indeed organic, activity, Popper believes, consists largely of problem-solving.

Popper accordingly repudiates induction and rejects the view that it is the characteristic method of scientific investigation and inference, substituting falsifiability in its place. It is easy, he argues, to obtain evidence in favour of virtually any theory, and he consequently holds that such ‘corroboration’, as he terms it, should count scientifically only if it is the positive result of a genuinely ‘risky’ prediction, which might conceivably have been false. For Popper, a theory is scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable event. Every genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, and one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory. In a critical sense, Popper's theory of demarcation is based upon his perception of the logical asymmetry which holds between verification and falsification: it is logically impossible to conclusively verify a universal proposition by reference to experience (as Hume saw clearly), but a single counter-instance conclusively falsifies the corresponding universal law. In a word, an exception, far from ‘proving’ a rule, conclusively refutes it.

Every genuine scientific theory then, in Popper's view, is prohibitive, in the sense that it forbids, by implication, particular events or occurrences. As such it can be tested and falsified, but never logically verified. Thus Popper stresses that it should not be inferred from the fact that a theory has withstood the most rigorous testing, for however long a period of time, that it has been verified; rather we should recognise that such a theory has received a high measure of corroboration. and may be provisionally retained as the best available theory until it is finally falsified (if indeed it is ever falsified), and/or is superseded by a better theory.

Popper has always drawn a clear distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied methodology. The logic of his theory is utterly simple: if a single ferrous metal is unaffected by a magnetic field it cannot be the case that all ferrous metals are affected by magnetic fields. Logically speaking, a scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable. Methodologically, however, the situation is much more complex: no observation is free from the possibility of error—consequently we may question whether our experimental result was what it appeared to be.

I'm still very curious to hear your thoughts on this idea of science as falsification alexey. It seems to me like something you'd like.

I always admired his courage to meet Hume's challenge where so many ignore it, and I think he may even be right.

[alexey]

More on Karl Popper's philosophy of science:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/#SciKnoHisPre

I'm still very curious to hear your thoughts on this idea of science as falsification alexey. It seems to me like something you'd like.

I always admired his courage to meet Hume's challenge where so many ignore it, and I think he may even be right.

This makes a lot of sense to me... but at this point my background on the problem of induction is not strong enough to put it all together.

I find very appealing the idea of placing problem-solving at the root, rather than philosophical justifications.

I generally have a hard time mapping the "problem of induction" as well as the "is-ought problem" to actual problems outside of academic philosophy.

[PeterMP]

We can focus on thoughts/beliefs/philosophy needed to use predictions if we agree that (methodological naturalism + science) can make predictions.

In what manner are you using the word science. Are we using the word science as information, the method, some combination of things, with or without the assumptions?

Science is to vague of a term for this discussion.

Though, I don't think the idea of methodolical naturalism helps you at all.

 

Yes, agnosticism is not having knowledge about the thing in question... but only that specific thing.

Before you said:

"I see you conflating lack of certainty with lack of knowledge here."

Is agnosticism a lack of knowledge or a lack of certaintity?

If we define it as a lack of certainty, I don't know anybody that says they believe in God that is not agnostic. I know priests that admit they have doubts (i.e. they are not certain). I know priests that would be labeled as agnostic using the certainty requirement.

That changes the conversation.

This is why, when you provided an example about the "agnostic broker", I asked: what is that "agnostic investor" actually agnostic about?

 

This is why when discussing agnosticism we should remember what we are being agnostic about.

Trying to address my questions would help you understand my points.

Would you be able to detect between a "philosophical naturalist" who is certain about the true nature of existence and a "methodological naturalist" who is agnostic about the true nature of existence by observing their behaviors? If so, how?

Why not find meaning and purpose that revolves around helping others and leading a disciplined life without the religion.

I used the term agnostic investor. I meant it in the context of they did not have knowledge of about the nature of different investments (e.g. they don't that the S&P 500 is going to go up or down with respect to the relevant time frame of the investment and similar things for other mechanisms of investing (e.g. other stock, bonds, ect.)

It doesn't make sense for me to answer your other questions unless I understand what you are asking. I thought you'd clarify your position based on my last post.

When you say something/somebody is agnostic are they without certainity or without knowledge?

When you say you are agnostic with respect to the existence of God and that you are agnostic with respect to the nature of the universe, do you mean two different things?

Are you in one case saying without knowledge (as indicated by the quote I pulled out of the other thread) or without certainty (what you are using in this thread)?

Or do you mean the same thing and if so which?

More on Karl Popper's philosophy of science:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/#SciKnoHisPre

I'm still very curious to hear your thoughts on this idea of science as falsification alexey. It seems to me like something you'd like.

I always admired his courage to meet Hume's challenge where so many ignore it, and I think he may even be right.

For what it is worth, I think Popper is more right than he is wrong, but I believe you've said something before like falsification works well as a tool for knowledge, but not so much as a guiding principle for living life.

[alexey]

Is agnosticism a lack of knowledge or a lack of certaintity?

If we define it as a lack of certainty, I don't know anybody that says they believe in God that is not agnostic. I know priests that admit they have doubts (i.e. they are not certain). I know priests that would be labeled as agnostic using the certainty requirement.

...

Are you in one case saying without knowledge (as indicated by the quote I pulled out of the other thread) or without certainty (what you are using in this thread)?

Or do you mean the same thing and if so which?

Words like "knowledge" and "certainty" mean so many different things - objective, subjective, relative, absolute, etc.

For the purpose of this conversation, let's define somebody who is "agnostic about the true nature of reality" as somebody who claims no knowledge about the true nature of reality, thus admitting uncertainty about it. Does this work for you?

In the end, I wonder how would you be able to distinguish between a "philosophical naturalist" who is certain about the true nature of reality and a "methodological naturalist" who is agnostic about the true nature of reality by observing their behaviors.

[s0crates]

This makes a lot of sense to me... but at this point my background on the problem of induction is not strong enough to put it all together.

Maybe I can explain.

Induction makes a general conclusion from a set of specific observations (empirical method). For example:

I have seen hundreds of swans, every swan I've seen has been white. Therefore I draw the conclusion that all swans are white.

The problem is that I cannot verify that conclusion. The generalization "all swans are white" does not follow as a matter of necessity, no matter how many white swans I observe. All it would take is the observation of one swan that isn't white to falsify my claim, and since I haven't observed every swan, I cannot verify my generalization.

Incidentally:

http://www.publicdomainpictures.net/view-image.php?image=8248&picture=black-swan&large=1

So that's the problem of induction. You can't verify a conclusion based on repeated observations.

Now Popper's answer is to agree with that. He says that empirical science doesn't verify its conclusions at all. It only attempts to falsify them.

The more white swans I observe, the more credence we give to the theory "all swans are white," but what scientific method is really about is trying to find a swan that isn't white so as to falsify that theory.

Science progresses this way, through attempts to falsify. If repeated attempts to falsify a theory fail, Popper says the theory is highly "corroborated" but never "confirmed." Corroboration is not conformation. (e.g. The theory "the sun will come out tomorrow " is highly corroborated, not confirmed).

If a theory isn't falsifiable, then it's not scientific. If somebody attempts to verify his theory, then he is doing science wrong. If we do manage to falsify a theory, then that's progress in science.

Edit: When you said you were eager to explain your general agnosticism as a scientist, my mind jumped immediately to Popper. His view seems to me consistent with most of the things you say (and provides a very plausible answer to those who challenge you), which is why I thought you'd like it.

The only trouble with this is that scientists in general seem eager to verify/confirm (seemingly not you though), if they go with Popper's approach, they'll have to change that. Perhaps you could say that would be all the better for science.

[alexey]

Maybe I can explain.

Induction makes a general conclusion from a set of specific observations (empirical method). For example:

I have seen hundreds of swans, every swan I've seen has been white. Therefore I draw the conclusion that all swans are white.

The problem is that I cannot verify that conclusion. ...

...

Now Popper's answer is to agree with that. He says that empirical science doesn't verify its conclusions at all. It only attempts to falsify them.

...

Edit: When you said you were eager to explain your general agnosticism as a scientist, my mind jumped immediately to Popper. His view seems to me consistent with most of the things you say (and provides a plausible answer to those who challenge you), which is why I thought you'd like it.

Thank you for the helpful explanation! I now have a new reference point in philosophy and a good base to proceed with further investigation.

Let me try to make a point with an example. Let's say thing X demonstrates behavior Y.

It seems you and Peter have been arguing for this:

(thing X is the kind of thing that does Y) therefore (we should expect Y from thing X)

While I have been arguing for this:

(thing X has been demonstrating behavior Y) therefore (we should expect Y from thing X)

Is that still induction? I'm not actually making any general conclusions about thing X. I am only making a conclusion about how I should treat it.