Philosophical vs Methodological Naturalism

[s0crates]

I'm not sure I really understand the question alexey.

I guess I'd say that I don't think distinguishing philosophical naturalism from methodological naturalism does the work you want it to do.

It isn't clear to me why we should pretend the universe is law-like in its operations in order to do science while denying the universe actually is law-like in its operations. That just sounds fishy to me. I think you can do better than that, which is why I introduce Popper.

It seems to me you want to do science without committing yourself to the view that the universe is law-like in its operations. I think Popper's philosophy of science as falsification does that effectively and avoids the incoherence of the strategy you've employed here.

I don't mean to give your hard time, I'm actually trying to help. I think you can have a philosophy that is consistent with your methodology (and avoids dogmatic pitfalls you seek to avoid), and I imagine that would be more intellectually satisfying.

[alexey]

I'm not sure I really understand the question alexey.

I guess I'd say that I don't think distinguishing philosophical naturalism from methodological naturalism does the work you want it to do. It isn't clear why we should pretend the universe is law-like in its operations in order to do science while denying the universe actually is law-like in its operations. That just sound fishy to me. I think you can do better than that, which is why I introduce Popper.

It seems to me you want to do science without committing yourself to the view that the universe is law-like in its operations. I think Popper's philosophy of science as falsification does that effectively and avoids the incoherence of the strategy you've employed here.

I don't mean to give your hard time, I'm actually trying to help. I think you can have a philosophy that is consistent with your methodology, and I imagine that would be more intellectually satisfying.

When I refuse to hold any beliefs about the true nature of the universe, I neither accept nor deny that it is actually law-like in its operations... yet I do commit to treating the universe "as if" it were law-like in its operations.

I am making a personal decision about how I should act in relation with the universe. I do not accept or deny any claims about the true nature of the universe.

Please share any problems you may see with this.

[PeterMP]

Words like "knowledge" and "certainty" mean so many different things - objective, subjective, relative, absolute, etc.

For the purpose of this conversation, let's define somebody who is "agnostic about the true nature of reality" as somebody who claims no knowledge about the true nature of reality, thus admitting uncertainty about it. Does this work for you?

In the end, I wonder how would you be able to distinguish between a "philosophical naturalist" who is certain about the true nature of reality and a "methodological naturalist" who is agnostic about the true nature of reality by observing their behaviors.

 

You will have to explain to me why it even makes sense to be a methodological naturalist only or primarily in the context of not having knowledge about reality.

 

This is the point I was making before you tried to switch meanings of agnostic on me.

 

I can't easily (I think this is a point that might come out later, but I'll see if the conversation evolves there.  I've actually been conducting a small test of the seriousness of your agnosticism in this thread, but for now I'll set aside because you are missing the larger point so I'm going to focus on that) tell the difference between a philosophical naturalists and somebody that practices ONLY methodological naturalism.

 

 But that just leads to the questions you didn't answer before.

 

Given all the things you could practice, why would you choose to practice only methodological naturalism?

 

You said it makes sense to them, my questions remains.

 

Why?

 

If you have no knowledge of reality, why would you choose to be that one specific thing only?

 

(and that's where you went to the certainty definition of agnostic)

 

From my perspective, the issue isn't between differentiating between the two things.  The issue is that your agnostic (with respect to the true nature of reality) person that only practices methodological naturalism has cognitive performance issues.

 

If I have no knowledge of whether any individual investment vehicle is going to increase or decrease over the length of the time of the investment I'm making, why should I choose to invest all money in only S&P 500 index funds?

 

From my perspective, that's essentially what you are doing in terms of gaining knowledge and methodological naturalism.

[s0crates]

When I refuse to hold any beliefs about the true nature of the universe, I neither accept nor deny that it is actually law-like in its operations... yet I do commit to treating the universe "as if" it were law-like in its operations.

I am making a personal decision about how I should act in relation with the universe. I do not accept or deny any claims about the true nature of the universe.

Please share any problems you may see with this.

It just seems silly to me. You say I don't believe x, but I commit to acting like I believe x. That is, in a way, incoherent.

Why go through such cognitive gymnastics when you can instead treat science itself as a system of disbelief (thus dissolving the apparent incoherence)?

What Popper's falsificationism does is remove the need to assume the universe is law-like (or indeed to assume anything) from scientific method. He makes science about NOT assuming anything.

I just think he says what you want to say (call it scientific agnosticism) in a way that isn't so problematic.

Edit to clarify: Popper wants to say observation/experimentation cannot tell us what's true, they can only tell us what's false. If we can't show something is false (say that the universe is law-like), then we go by it (act "as if" it were true) until it is demonstrated to be false. Isn't that what you want to say?

I feel like Popper's insight has been on the tip of your tongue for weeks (but you've bogged yourself down with your current strategy).

[alexey]

It just seems silly to me. You say I don't believe x, but I commit to acting like I believe x. That is, in a way, incoherent.

Why do you find it so surprising and problematic?

As knowledge increases, I think it is normal and expected for the "action" threshold to be much lower than "belief" threshold.

In other words, it is a good idea to call 9-11 if you are experiencing heart attack symptoms even if you are agnostic as to whether you are actually having one.

[s0crates]

Why do you find it so surprising and problematic?

As knowledge increases, I think it is normal and expected for the "action" threshold to be much lower than "belief" threshold.

In other words, it is a good idea to call 9-11 if you are experiencing heart attack symptoms even if you are agnostic as to whether you are actually having one.

I don't know. In that case I'm inclined to say "I believe I may be having heart attack" (based on my symptoms), and "I should call 911" (in accordance w/ what I believe, that I might be having a heart attack).

What would be weird is if I didn't believe I might be having a heart attack (or some other life threatening ailment), but I called 911 anyway.

I think your position in this thread is more analogous to the latter case. In the first case the belief corresponds to the action, in the second case it doesn't.

--------

This is somewhat tangential, but perhaps we are getting hung up on the word "belief" here. I'm just now remembering you don't use the word "belief" in an ordinary way.

A belief is something I think is true (as opposed to something I know is true, which is knowledge, or something I take unquestioningly to be true, which is faith).

[alexey]

I don't know. In that case I'm inclined to say "I believe I may be having heart attack" (based on my symptoms), and "I should call 911" (in accordance w/ what I believe, that I might be having a heart attack).

What would be weird is if I didn't believe I might be having a heart attack (or some other life threatening ailment), but I called 911 anyway.

I think your position in this thread is more analogous to the latter case. In the first case the belief corresponds to the action, in the second case it doesn't.

I have no problem saying that I believe the universe might be naturalistic and that philosophical naturalism may be true...

This is somewhat tangential, but perhaps we are getting hung up on the word "belief" here. I'm just now remembering you don't use the word "belief" in an ordinary way.

A belief is something I think is true (as opposed to something I know is true, which is knowledge, or something I take unquestioningly to be true, which is faith).

i cannot contrast thinking and knowing something to be true - everything that is thought seems to be connected to something that is known... I see belief as something that I assert to be true, either based on knowledge or on faith.

[s0crates]

Belief is something held to be true. But you can have a false belief.

Knowledge is a belief that actually is true (and justified, not a lucky guess).

In philosophers' jargon we call this the JTB theory of knowledge. Knowledge is justified true belief.

[alexey]

Makes sense, so belief is something held to be true, could be knowledge, faith, etc.

So... Do you see problems with me believing that the universe may be naturalistic, knowing that it has been acting naturalistic, therefore treating it like it is naturalistic, but being agnostic about whether it is actually naturalistic?

[s0crates]

Makes sense, so belief is something held to be true, could be knowledge, faith, etc.

So... Do you see problems with me believing that the universe may be naturalistic, knowing that it has been acting naturalistic, therefore treating it like it is naturalistic, but being agnostic about whether it is actually naturalistic?

So you believe in philosophical naturalism but you don't know its true? That seems sensible enough, although your distinction in this thread seems a bit superfluous then.

If you didn't believe in philosophical naturalism but practiced methodolical naturalism, that would be silly. I thought that was your position.

Edit: For reference, this is the part that threw me off (and what my earlier objection was meant to address):

Scientists are not required to have a philosophical naturalism belief system . . .

[alexey]

So you believe in philosophical naturalism but you don't know its true? That seems sensible enough, although your distinction in this thread seems a bit superfluous then.

If you didn't believe in philosophical naturalism but practiced methodolical naturalism, that would be silly. I thought that was your position.

You keep trying to box me in!

How about this:

I do not believe that philosophical naturalism is true. I believe that the best strategy for me is to treat the universe as if the philosophical naturalism is true.

[s0crates]

Gotta take a break alexey. You can bet I'll pick this back up later. As always, I enjoy our talks.

Check out the Popper stuff. I think you'll like it.

[PeterMP]

Edit to clarify: Popper wants to say observation/experimentation cannot tell us what's true, they can only tell us what's false. If we can't show something is false (say that the universe is law-like), then we go by it (act "as if" it were true) until it is demonstrated to be false. Isn't that what you want to say?

I feel like Popper's insight has been on the tip of your tongue for weeks (but you've bogged yourself down with your current strategy).

 

I would make two points:

 

1.  I don't think Popper's approach claims to make predictions in of to itself.  I don't think that because something is falsified there is a claim that it will remain falsified.

 

2.  How do you show the universe is law like vs. a random system where you have false positives?  It is possible to have things that are contradictory in nature and not be able to falsify either one.

[alexey]

...

2.  How do you show the universe is law like vs. a random system where you have false positives?  It is possible to have things that are contradictory in nature and not be able to falsify either one.

Is that a realistic goal to set? Can this be achieved in any way?

I wonder what you think about this:

I do not believe that philosophical naturalism is true. I believe that the best strategy for me is to treat the universe as if philosophical naturalism is true.

[PeterMP]

Is that a realistic goal to set? Can this be achieved in any way?

I wonder what you think about this:

I do not believe that philosophical naturalism is true. I believe that the best strategy for me is to treat the universe as if philosophical naturalism is true.

 

1.  No, I don't think it is a realistic goal, and I think s0crates knows it has issues because there are unrealistic goals and therefore using the approach as a guiding principle for life has issues:

 

And to anticipate a likely reply: Falsification works as a method, not as a worldview.

 

2.  I don't mind this type of thinking, but the problem is that you don't end up there.

 

You don't end with this is the best strategy for you.  That is more consistent with an agnostic view point.

 

But that's not just what you do.  You actively, regularly and aggressively attack other view points as much as you can in the context of the rules.

 

To extend my analogy with respect to investing, the person claims that they are agnostic with respect to how to invest, but they only invest in the S&P 500, but they also run proselytizing about how good it is to invest only in the S&P 500.

 

That's not consistent with an agnostic point of view (and you butcher what science is and can do in the process).

 

You're not just living your life by that principle.  You are all in and want everybody else to be all in with you.

[s0crates]

I would make two points:

1. I don't think Popper's approach claims to make predictions in of to itself. I don't think that because something is falsified there is a claim that it will remain falsified.

That's just it. Popper thinks good science proposes a theory that makes predictions. Predictions are testable, and hence falsifiable. Every prediction a theory makes is an attempt to falsify the theory. If the theory makes no predictions (isn't falsifiable) then it isn't scientific.

It's really an ingenuous answer to the problem of the induction. Science doesn't claim to know the future based on observation, it seeks to falsify predictions about the future based on observation.

Scientific progress is a process of refutation, not verification.

2. How do you show the universe is law like vs. a random system where you have false positives? It is possible to have things that are contradictory in nature and not be able to falsify either one.

Popper would say an unfalsifiable theory is not a scientific theory.

[PeterMP]

Popper would say an unfalsifiable theory is not a scientific theory.

 

I agree, but from my perspective that present (or past) falsification will hold tomorrow is an unfalsifiable theory on the grand level.

 

How do you do you falsify tomorrow?

 

It can't be done with science alone and so is not a scientific theory.

 

It is something independent of science.

[alexey]

But that's not just what you do. You actively, regularly and aggressively attack other view points as much as you can in the context of the rules.

To extend my analogy with respect to investing, the person claims that they are agnostic with respect to how to invest, but they only invest in the S&P 500, but they also run proselytizing about how good it is to invest only in the S&P 500.

You can invest in whatever you like... but I feel morally obligated to voice my opinion if I see you investing in a scam.

e.g. "give us your money now and get returns after you die"

[Zguy28]

You can invest in whatever you like... but I feel morally obligated to voice my opinion if I see you investing in a scam.

e.g. "give us your money now and get returns after you die"

As well you should. But that is a gross mischaracterization of religion in general based on presupposition.

[endzone_dave]

alexey,

 

Your knowledge of Christianity is very lacking.  You shouldn't post about it.  If the best you can characterize it is that it is a scam, you should leave the topic alone.

[alexey]

Unprovable Supernatural stuff is a core part of the doctrine of Christianity.

Yes I do know that there is much more to Christianity.

[s0crates]

If people around here were required not to discuss things they know little about, then it would be awfully quiet.

[s0crates]

You can invest in whatever you like... but I feel morally obligated to voice my opinion if I see you investing in a scam.

e.g. "give us your money now and get returns after you die"

Interestingly, speaking strictly in the prudential sense of an investment, you might make the case that faith in God is a good bet. Blaise Pascal, a brilliant mathematician (and scientist) in his day, famously argues this way:

First, if I believe God exists, and God in fact does exist, then I will gain infinite happiness. However, if I believe God exists, and God in fact does not exist, then I will have no payoff.

Second, if I do not believe God exists, and God in fact does exist, then I will gain infinite pain. However, if I believe God does not exist, and God in fact does not exist, then I will have no payoff.

Thus, I have everything to gain and nothing to lose by believing in God, and I have everything to lose and nothing to gain by not believing in God. On these grounds, one would be foolish not to believe.

http://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/notes-pascal.html

It's the prospect of infinite reward/loss that makes the math work.

If I told you you could invest $1 today with a minimal chance of winning an infinite supply of money, or not invest $1 today with a minimal chance of losing all your money forever, well I think the choice would be obvious.

There are of course some well known objections to Pascal's wager (I doubt you'll need to look them up).

[alexey]

Interestingly, speaking strictly in the prudential sense of an investment, you might make the case that faith in God is a good bet. Blaise Pascal, a brilliant mathematician (and scientist) in his day, famously argues this way:

...

It's the prospect of infinite reward/loss that makes the math work.

If I told you you could invest $1 today with a minimal chance of winning an infinite supply of money, or not invest $1 today with a minimal chance of losing all your money forever, well I think the choice would be obvious.

There are of course some well known objections to Pascal's wager (I doubt you'll need to look them up).

I suppose I am making a kind of a Pascal's Wager also. My money is on loving my neighbor.

[PeterMP]

Unprovable Supernatural stuff is a core part of the doctrine of Christianity.

Yes I do know that there is much more to Christianity.

 

Unprovable non-natural stuff is a core part of any system by which people live their lives.

 

Why should we act like that the information that science has found will be true tomorrow?

 

It isn't provable, and it isn't science.

 

Yet you don't seem to harp on that at all, and you don't even seem comfortable admitting it no matter how many times it is explained to you, and not just by me because s0crates has tried too, and I've given you other sources, and you've even posted sources in this thread that make the point.