Philosophical vs Methodological Naturalism

[PeterMP]

You can invest in whatever you like... but I feel morally obligated to voice my opinion if I see you investing in a scam.

e.g. "give us your money now and get returns after you die"

 

But if you think it is a scam, then you really aren't agnostic, are you?

 

Presumably, the reason you think it is a scam is based on knowledge.

 

You therefore are not without knowledge.

 

You make claims that only make sense in the context of having knowledge.

 

Your behavior (i.e. arguing against religion so fervently) is not consistent with your stated beliefs (agnostic with respect to the nature of existence).

And that's the point!

You have performance contradiction issues.

[alexey]

Why should we act like that the information that science has found will be true tomorrow?

Why not?

But if you think it is a scam, then you really aren't agnostic, are you?

Presumably, the reason you think it is a scam is based on knowledge.

You therefore are not without knowledge.

You make claims that only make sense in the context of having knowledge.

Your behavior (i.e. arguing against religion so fervently) is not consistent with your stated beliefs (agnostic with respect to the nature of existence).

And that's the point!

You have performance contradiction issues.

I have enough knowledge to say i think it's a scam but not enough knowledge to say i know it's a scam.

[PeterMP]

Why not?

Why doesn't the same logic apply to God?

I have enough knowledge to say i think it's a scam but not enough knowledge to say i know it's a scam.

Okay.

But then you really aren't without knowledge. You claim to have some knowledge. You aren't agnostic as you've used agnostic in other threads in the past, even when talking about God, and have stated you wanted it used in this thread.

[alexey]

1) Is the default position to believe or not to believe in god?

2) I can be without knowledge that the proposition is true but with knowledge that I should act like the proposition is true.

[s0crates]

I suppose I am making a kind of a Pascal's Wager also. My money is on loving my neighbor.

I'm putting my money there too.

One of the problems with Pascal's wager is it seems equally valid for many different religions, and it gives us no way of choosing between them.

The good news is most of those religions teach something like love or selflessness, so you can kind of hedge your bets there.

[s0crates]

Unprovable non-natural stuff is a core part of any system by which people live their lives.

It certainly seems so. The proposition "murder is wrong" is not testable, for example.

Why should we act like that the information that science has found will be true tomorrow?

Suppose I say we shouldn't. We should try to falsify that information. We should test it. How do you feel about that answer?

It isn't provable, and it isn't science.

That certainly seems like the usual view of science, but suppose I say science doesn't actually prove anything. The real test of whether something is scientific is if it is falsifiable, not provable.

Math, geometry, and other deductions can be proven. Inductive (empirically based) claims can only be disproven.

It seems to work as an answer to the riddle of induction, although we would have to cease speaking of empirical proof, instead saying things like, "Darwin's theory has yet to be falsified."

[alexey]

Unprovable non-natural stuff is a core part of any system by which people live their lives.

It certainly seems so. The proposition "murder is wrong" is not testable, for example.

I seems this "unprovable stuff" can be of very different kinds. For example:

1) assertion of an objective fact.

2) statement of a personal preference.

I see an objective assertion "god exists" to be much more problematic than a subjective "I prefer to treat the world as naturalistic".

"murder is wrong" can refer to an objective fact (wrong according to an objective standard) or a subjective preference (wrong according to my personal preference).

[PeterMP]

It certainly seems so. The proposition "murder is wrong" is not testable, for example.

Suppose I say we shouldn't. We should try to falsify that information. We should test it. How do you feel about that answer?

That certainly seems like the usual view of science, but suppose I say science doesn't actually prove anything. The real test of whether something is scientific is if it is falsifiable, not provable.

Math, geometry, and other deductions can be proven. Inductive (empirically based) claims can only be disproven.

It seems to work as an answer to the riddle of induction, although we would have to cease speaking of empirical proof, instead saying things like, "Darwin's theory has yet to be falsified."

 

I don't agree with this, but that doesn't really matter with respect to the point in this thread.

 

Let's alter alexey's argument from supernatural and non-provable to what he really means.

 

And that means science and let's define science as things that have been falsified.

 

Can we falsify that tomorrow is going to look like today?

 

We can't do that until tomorrow when it is today.  So the point remains.

 

Why should we act like God exist?

 

Why should we act like that tomorrow will look like today?

 

They are both unfalsifiable positions.

[PeterMP]

1) Is the default position to believe or not to believe in god?

 

1.  What does it matter what the default position is?  Does everybody's default position have to be the same?

 

I asked why we should believe that tomorrow will look like today.  It is not a conclusion that is provable or naturalistic in origin.

 

You said 'Why not?'.

 

Why is it a problem if some people apply the same logic to God?  Why shouldn't some people apply the same logic to God?

 

However, I am actually now actually answer your question because I think it is  more broad point.  We should not act (only) like the world is only natural in case it isn't (especially at a population level (i.e. everybody))).  If we only act that way and it isn't, we are going to be unprepared.  I want people acting like and seriously considering their actions in the case of a non-natural world essentially as a buffer and reserve of knowledge that they can share with the rest of us in case it isn't.

 

Very simply, I want their to be variation in the population because even things like evolution tell us that variation in the population good.

 

In addition, we shouldn't because it can end up treating people in what I consider an immoral manner if it is not and we assume that it (only) is.

 

(I actually like the Terminator movies because they touch on these issues in the context of science only (though unintentionally I would guess).  We see what is the immoral treatment of Sarah Connor due to a close minded manner of looking at reality.  We also see a population that is not (well) prepared for what happens because of a lack of variation in how they looked reality.)

 

So, I've answered the question. 

 

Now, your turn. You've asked why shouldn't we act like tomorrow will be like today. I ask why is it a problem if some people apply the same logic to God.

 

2) I can be without knowledge that the proposition is true but with knowledge that I should act like the proposition is true.

With respect 2, that's not what you said in the post before.  You aren't putting coherent argument in the same thread and on the same page.  But it doesn't even really change the point.

 

You've gone back to talking about you.  I don't really have an issue with that.  The problem is that you don't treat it just with respect to you.

 

You want everybody to act like God does not exist.

 

Are you claiming you have knowledge that everybody should act like God is not real?

 

What knowledge is that?

[alexey]

1. What does it matter what the default position is? Does everybody's default position have to be the same?

My view is that the default position should be lack of any belief.

Some people disagree:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presuppositional_apologetics

Presuppositionalism is a school of Christian apologetics that believes the Christian faith is the only basis for rational thought.

 

I asked why we should believe that tomorrow will look like today. It is not a conclusion that is provable or naturalistic in origin.

Here is how I get "tomorrow will be like today" from my default position:

1) Start with lack of any belief (default).

2) Add a belief that "tomorrow will be like today" has been reliably observed.

Why is it a problem if some people apply the same logic to God? Why shouldn't some people apply the same logic to God?

How would they apply the same logic, and from what default position?

 

However, I am actually now actually answer your question because I think it is more broad point. We should not act (only) like the world is only natural in case it isn't (especially at a population level (i.e. everybody))). If we only act that way and it isn't, we are going to be unprepared. I want people acting like and seriously considering their actions in the case of a non-natural world essentially as a buffer and reserve of knowledge that they can share with the rest of us in case it isn't.

Very simply, I want their to be variation in the population because even things like evolution tell us that variation in the population good.

I can agree that some (but not all!) variation is beneficial.

I think benefits of variation should be analyzed case by case.

 

Now, your turn. You've asked why shouldn't we act like tomorrow will be like today. I ask why is it a problem if some people apply the same logic to God.

Here is how I get "tomorrow will be like today" from my default position:

1) Start with lack of any belief (default).

2) Add a belief that "tomorrow will be like today" has been reliably observed.

How would you apply this logic to god?

 

You want everybody to act like God does not exist.

Are you claiming you have knowledge that everybody should act like God is not real?

What knowledge is that?

"act like god does not exist" means different things to different people.

I want to promote critical thinking. I have knowledge of its benefits.

[s0crates]

Alright I'm putting on my Karl Popper hat again.

I don't know tomorrow will be like today.

I have a highly corroborated theory (one that has yet to be falsified) that says the laws of physics are the same every day. I couldn't falsify that theory today, but tomorrow we put the theory to the test again and see if we can falsify it then.

[s0crates]

I don't agree with this, but that doesn't really matter with respect to the point in this thread.

Let's alter alexey's argument from supernatural and non-provable to what he really means.

I don't know if this is what he really means, but I suggest that Popper's theory is a highly plausible version of something like alexey's position.

And that means science and let's define science as things that have been falsified.

Not exactly, the idea is that a scientific theory is falsifiable (not falsified). We should repeatedly try to falsify a scientific theory (test it empirically with an eye for any disconfirming evidence). If we can't falsify it despite repeated attempts we give it the high credence of a theory that has yet to be falsified (despite being the sort of theory which would be easily falsifiable if it was wrong).

Can we falsify that tomorrow is going to look like today?

Of course, tomorrow we'll test it again, see if it continues to hold up.

We can't do that until tomorrow when it is today. So the point remains.

How so? I thought the point is that inductive generalizations are uncertain, and I've agreed with that.

Why should we act like God exist?

Why should we act like that tomorrow will look like today?

They are both unfalsifiable positions.

I disagree. The former claim is unfalsifiable. The latter isn't.

The key question is: what would disprove the position in question?

I can't think of any way to disprove the God hypothesis, whereas disproving tomorrow will look like today only involves checking tomorrow against today.

[PeterMP]

Alright I'm putting on my Karl Popper hat again.

I don't know tomorrow will be like today.

I have a highly corroborated theory (one that has yet to be falsified) that says the laws of physics are the same every day. I couldn't falsify that theory today, but tomorrow we put the theory to the test again and see if we can falsify it then.

 

That's right, but you end up in the same place tomorrow.

 

Why should I act like Tuesday will be like Monday on Monday?

 

Why I should I be worried about getting fired on Tuesday on Monday?

 

I can't falsify that Tuesday will be like Monday until Tuesday, but I don't think you really want to suggest that people should act like it won't matter if they have have a job on Tuesday tomorrow.

 

**EDIT**

I'm also not sure about the idea of a highly corroborated theory in terms of the present looking like the future.  I've written before on things like cold fusion.  One explanation is that the laws of physics were different.  Isn't that then evidence for the laws of physics being different on that place/day?

 

Here is how I get "tomorrow will be like today" from my default position:

1) Start with lack of any belief (default).

2) Add a belief that "tomorrow will be like today" has been reliably observed.

 

Add a belief of that what I expect if God exist has been reliably observed.

 

(Realistically, you are playing games with reliable.  What is reliable?  What is your measure for reliable?  And what makes that reliable?  These are of course all sorts of question that I've asked you multiple times before that you invariably avoid.

 

And a strong claim of reliable is not consistent with being agnostic.)

[alexey]

Add a belief of that what I expect if God exist has been reliably observed.

Are you adding (3) to my (1) and (2)?

(Realistically, you are playing games with reliable.  What is reliable?  What is your measure for reliable?  And what makes that reliable?  These are of course all sorts of question that I've asked you multiple times before that you invariably avoid.

 

And a strong claim of reliable is not consistent with being agnostic.)

In the past I used the second law of thermodynamics (2LT) to demonstrate what I mean by "reliable".

I can have knowledge about reliability of 2LT while being agnostic about the true nature of the universe.

[alexey]

s0crates,

Thank you for providing the Karl Popper angle... I need to explore it further but it does sound very appealing.

The only possible disagreement I have is that I see consistent lack of falsification as a kind of confirmation. Although I'm sure he addresses that point.

[s0crates]

s0crates,

Thank you for providing the Karl Popper angle... I need to explore it further but it does sound very appealing.

His argument has its virtues. I like that he defends empiricism (quite capably) against the problem of induction where so many empiricists avoid it. It has a kind of rational consistency that I find appealing.

The only possible disagreement I have is that I see consistent lack of falsification as a kind of confirmation. Although I'm sure he addresses that point.

That seems to be the issue people have with it, he basically admits we can't prove anything empirically.

His way of dealing with it is to say repeated lack of falsifying evidence "corroborates" but it doesn't ever "confirm." We go by highly corroborated theories in practice.

Still, you might demand confirmation, not this measly corroboration. As my old prof said, "**** corroboration if it ain't sayin' nothin'!"

[s0crates]

Popper hat still on . . .

That's right, but you end up in the same place tomorrow.

Yeah. We are constantly trying to refute our best theories. That's science.

Why should I act like Tuesday will be like Monday on Monday?

Not because you know the basic laws of nature will still hold, but because you haven't been able to falsify the basic laws of nature through repeated testing.

**EDIT**

I'm also not sure about the idea of a highly corroborated theory in terms of the present looking like the future. I've written before on things like cold fusion. One explanation is that the laws of physics were different. Isn't that then evidence for the laws of physics being different on that place/day?

I don't really know about cold fusion (I'm told that there is no such thing), but inasmuch as your example is meant to show a case where the laws of physics didn't hold, I would respond this way:

If the theory of physics we have can't explain some observation, then that theory is falsified. Somebody needs to come up with a theory that accounts for the new observations, then we can try to falsify that one.

So science makes progress (it just never proves anything).

[PeterMP]

Not because you know the basic laws of nature will still hold, but because you haven't been able to falsify the basic laws of nature through repeated testing.

 

I think we are having a communication issue.  I understand Popper's argument.  I'm trying to make a more general statement about generally assuming information derived from the scientific method is true, whether it is based on falsification or not.

 

I don't think Popper's point of view helps you there.  I don't think that the end result is significantly different than if we assume that science proves things.

 

I haven't been able to falsify anything about tomorrow.  Why I should I assume only that one case?

 

Back to the idea of the system could be random, I haven't been able to falsify that the system is random.  Why should I discount it?

 

Now, you are right that's a prediction that can't be falsified using science and so Popper says it isn't science, and I agree.

 

Your argument gets you into a circular argument.  I should assume that science is true because a method that can only find that science is true (i.e. repeated testing, where science is based on repeated testing) says it is.

 

Using that method, I can only find evidence for or against things that are science.

 

But if I want to put science into a larger framework that allows me to say without waiting for tomorrow I should act like what is true today will be true tomorrow, I need something else.

 

The idea that I should only discount things that have not been falsified based on repeated measurements is not based on any actual metrics and is not an idea that originates from science and is not science itself.

 

It may turn out that is a good approach to the problem or not, and at least currently, there is no measure of if that is a good or idea or not.

 

Popper is applying an idea based on falsification that cannot be easily and nonsubjectively falsified.

[PeterMP]

Are you adding (3) to my (1) and (2)?

Historically in western culture at least, it was 1, then mine, and then yours so I would leave them like that. Based on Christian ideas people predicted that the system would be highly naturalistic and naturalism would be a good method to understand it.

In the past I used the second law of thermodynamics (2LT) to demonstrate what I mean by "reliable".

But that's not a metric.

In a previous thread, with respect to God you asked:

Where is the evidence? I see personal experience, tradition, and speculation.

When you make claims like you have about the 2nd law of themodynamics being highly reliable where I've asked the question in the context of what is reliability and how do you measure it, I'm left asking why doesn't the same question hold.

What evidence do you have that it is highly reliable (in place and time), what metric are you measuring that by other than your experience?

Humans have a high tendency to see patterns and assign causative agents even where they don't exist. You have no metric for how reliable the 2nd law of thermodynamics is time and place.

It is based only on your experience.

What happens if somebody else's experience leads them to conclude that the 2nd law of thermodynamics is not as reliable as you do?

I can have knowledge about reliability of 2LT while being agnostic about the true nature of the universe.

I don't think this is really true. If the 2nd law of thermodynamics is really highly reliable that indicates something about the nature of the universe. If the 2nd law of thermodynamics is highly reliable, then something approximating the axiomatic assumption is true.

[alexey]

That seems to be the issue people have with it, he basically admits we can't prove anything empirically.

His way of dealing with it is to say repeated lack of falsifying evidence "corroborates" but it doesn't ever "confirm." We go by highly corroborated theories in practice.

I see it corroboration as a form of confirmation...

Looks like the meaning is laid out, and we're discussing language preferences.

[alexey]

Historically in western culture at least, it was 1, then mine, and then yours so I would leave them like that. Based on Christian ideas people predicted that the system would be highly naturalistic and naturalism would be a good method to understand it.

Start with lack of any belief (default).

Add a belief of that what I expect if God exist has been reliably observed.

I think belief in god was the default position historically/culturally.

Regardless, is this the best argument you can produce with the "what if the same argument was applied to god"?

In a previous thread, with respect to God you asked:

Where is the evidence? I see personal experience, tradition, and speculation.

When you make claims like you have about the 2nd law of themodynamics being highly reliable where I've asked the question in the context of what is reliability and how do you measure it, I'm left asking why doesn't the same question hold.

Where is the disagreement? Why are you pretending that you do not know 2LT is reliable?

Just ask the question and you see why it does not hold. Same thing will happen, you will end up with something unimpressive like:

Add a belief of that what I expect if God exist has been reliably observed.

What evidence do you have that it is highly reliable (in place and time), what metric are you measuring that by other than your experience?

Humans have a high tendency to see patterns and assign causative agents even where they don't exist. You have no metric for how reliable the 2nd law of thermodynamics is time and place.

It is based only on your experience.

Please stop pretending like you don't know that 2LT is highly reliable.

What happens if somebody else's experience leads them to conclude that the 2nd law of thermodynamics is not as reliable as you do?

Nothing happens if that somebody is just pretending.

I don't think this is really true. If the 2nd law of thermodynamics is really highly reliable that indicates something about the nature of the universe. If the 2nd law of thermodynamics is highly reliable, then something approximating the axiomatic assumption is true.

I understand the dichotomy you are describing here.

We seem to be dealing with something like this:

(evidence for 2LT) => (2LT is highly reliable) => (universe is natural)

You are stopping at the first link and I'm at the second. I like my position better because I think it would be silly to deny that 2LT is highly reliable.

[PeterMP]

I've thought of a better way to articulate my position on Popper.
 
I think Popper is right that science works by falsification.  In that context, then science is only something that can be falsified.
 
Should intelligent design be taught in a science class room?
 
Only in the context that its supporters can put forward clear testable hypothesis that can be used to falsify it (which to my knowledge has not happened).
 
Darwin's theory of natural selection did and (largely) has not be falsified.
 
(I've written similar things in threads about intelligent design and creationism to YEC.)
 
In the context of this conversation though, Popper's argument would have to be extended to that we should give high(er) credence to things that make falsifiable prediction.
 
The problem is that isn't something that makes a falsifiable prediction.

In the context of this conversation applying Popper's logic to the idea of falsification would result in me not accepting it as science.

Science relies on something that is not supported by science.

[PeterMP]

I think belief in god was the default position historically/culturally.

Regardless, is this the best argument you can produce with the "what if the same argument was applied to god"?

I already answered your question, why not in detail.

 

Where is the disagreement? Why are you pretending that you do not know 2LT is reliable?

Just ask the question and you see why it does not hold. Same thing will happen, you will end up with something unimpressive like:

Add a belief of that what I expect if God exist has been reliably observed.

Please stop pretending like you don't know that 2LT is highly reliable.

The human brain has a high tendency to assert causes to things that do not need a cause and see patterns where there are none.

You see things that your brain tells you should have causes. You see a pattern.

You wish to assign causes and assert the pattern is real, but you can give no clear metric to say that is the case.

You can give no clear metric that the system is not real.

Yet you want to criticize other people in similar situations.

 

I understand the dichotomy you are describing here.

We seem to be dealing with something like this:

(evidence for 2LT) => (2LT is highly reliable) => (universe is natural)

You are stopping at the first link and I'm at the second. I like my position better because I think it would be silly to deny that 2LT is highly reliable.

I do not understand what point you are making here generally in terms of the links.

[alexey]

The human brain has a high tendency to assert causes to things that do not need a cause and see patterns where there are none.

You see things that your brain tells you should have causes. You see a pattern.

You wish to assign causes and assert the pattern is real, but you can give no clear metric to say that is the case.

You can give no clear metric that the system is not real.

Yet you want to criticize other people in similar situations.

"there is evidence for god"

"there is evidence for the second law of thermodynamics"

Similar situations but with important differences.

I do not understand what point you are making here generally in terms of the links.

Alexey's position:

(evidence for 2LT) => DEFINITELY => (2LT is highly reliable)

(2LT is highly reliable) => MAYBE => (universe is naturalistic)

Peter's position:

(evidence for 2LT) => MAYBE => (2LT is highly reliable)

(2LT is highly reliable) => DEFINITELY => (universe is naturalistic)

[PeterMP]

"there is evidence for god"

"there is evidence for the second law of thermodynamics"

Similar situations but with important differences.

Alexey's position:

(evidence for 2LT) => DEFINITELY => (2LT is highly reliable)

(2LT is highly reliable) => MAYBE => (universe is naturalistic)

Peter's position:

(evidence for 2LT) => MAYBE => (2LT is highly reliable)

(2LT is highly reliable) => DEFINITELY => (universe is naturalistic)

 

Yes, there are differences, but there are more similarities than many people think and want to admit.

 

Peter's position:

The system appears to be highly natural, but I'm a little dubious due to my inability to actually measure how natural it is.  Due to that, I would not argue that it is silly for somebody to believe they have had an experience that is contradictory to the 2nd law of thermodynamics.

 

alexey's position:

The system will be the same tomorrow as it is today, indicating that it is natural, even though I can offer no metric in support of that.  I am going to call people silly that think they might have had an experience that calls into question the reliability of the 2nd law of thermodynamics despite my inability to clearly articulate a measure of how reliable it is.