Creationism Vs. Evolution: The Debate Is Live Tonight online at 7pm- http://www.npr.org

[alexey]

Doubt is fun. To be consistent, you might also try to doubt the doubting sometimes.

I should point out the idea everything is in doubt is a rational principle. In fact that was Descartes' idea, and he is the ultimate rationalist.

Of course Descartes realized that even if he doubted everything he could possibly doubt, one thing remained beyond doubt, that he was a thing that doubts, a thinking thing.

It looks like Descartes could not find any ground on which to doubt it. Similarly, I do find any ground to doubt whether the sun will come up tomorrow. If I had any reason to doubt it, then I would be doing something else right now.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito_ergo_sum

But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am, was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search

[s0crates]

Cartesian skepticism is not absolute skepticism.

There certainly are reasons to doubt the sun will rise tomorrow (maybe I'm a brain in a vat, dreaming, or living in the matrix). This sort of inquiry takes us far outside the domain of empirical science though.

[alexey]

Cartesian skepticism is not absolute skepticism.

There certainly are reasons to doubt the sun will rise tomorrow (maybe I'm a brain in a vat, dreaming, or living in the matrix). This sort of inquiry takes us far outside the domain of empirical science though.

That wiki quote suggests he does not assume that something is true. He writes that he sees no ground to doubt it.

Unfortunately I have not read Descartes.

Think of knowledge as an interconnected web. Everything is in question but it all depends on each other. I will start doubting my vision if I start running into things.

[s0crates]

That wiki quote suggests he does not assume that something is true. He writes that he sees no ground to doubt it.

Yeah, that's right. His meaning is that the cogito is beyond doubt, because if he tries to doubt everything that can possibly be doubted (mainly perceptions), the thinking still remains a certainty.

I don't mean to put Descartes up as a model for my view, just to point out his is pretty far from empiricism.

Unfortunately I have not read Descartes.

That is too bad. Did you ever take a philosophy class?

Think of knowledge as an interconnected web. Everything is in question but it all depends on each other. I will start doubting my vision if I start running into things.

If I understand you, you are advancing a view that is pretty big in epistemology. Usually it's called coherence theory. The basic idea is all your principles and facts have to be consistent with each other, none can contradict the others.

Whereas Descartes began with a foundational truth, coherence theorists hold that truths stand in support of each other.

I have to call it a night now , but as always I enjoy the dialogue.

[alexey]

Yeah, that's right. His meaning is that the cogito is beyond doubt, because if he tries to doubt everything that can possibly be doubted (mainly perceptions), the thinking still remains a certainty.

I understand that he does not keep it beyond doubt by assumption, belief, or faith. He keeps it beyond doubt because he sees no ground upon which to doubt it.

His position strikes me as justified confidence.

I don't mean to put Descartes up as a model for my view, just to point out his is pretty far from empiricism.

Can you accept that justified confidence may be sufficient for empiricism?

That is too bad. Did you ever take a philosophy class?

My background is in psychology and IT. I listened to the Great Courses overview of Philosophy and read a bit of William James, Wittgenstein, and some other things here and there. I try to follow developments in neuroscience, from a high level... Btw I recently found the "brain science podcast". It's great.

[AsburySkinsFan]

So no one is going to watch the video I posted?

[Vilandil Tasardur]

This conversation isn't really that hard to understand.

 

Science makes assumptions: most notably that the universe has some "order" and "laws" that are "constant" and can be understood and that the universe is not a random system that has no underlying "laws".

 

This isn't novel and isn't controversial.  Not even my use of the word assumptions.

 

When I put assumptions made by science into google, the top hit I get is a Cal Berkeley page.

 

I also get hits to other philosophical pages.

 

alexey is attempting to claim that he acts (he behaves) like information from science is accurate without assuming that assumption is true.

 

Of course, he also won't describe the process by which he makes those decisions while not assuming the assumption is true.

 

**EDIT**

I also want to point out that scientific evidence is not evidence that the underlying assumption is true.  You can't generate evidence that an assumption is true based on a method that requires the assumption to be true.

 

If you let "science" as a process loose on a random system, it will find "things".  Those things will be false positives though and not "true" in that somewhere/some time in the random system it will change and those "truths" will be changed.

You're quite right. I follow the conversation just fine (which is why I am enthralled by it). I just don't manage to form opinions, let alone replies, in real time before you guys have moved on. I keep my mouth shut because I'm still not sure who I agree with   .

[PeterMP]

I understand that he does not keep it beyond doubt by assumption, belief, or faith. He keeps it beyond doubt because he sees no ground upon which to doubt it.

His position strikes me as justified confidence.

Can you accept that justified confidence may be sufficient for empiricism?

My background is in psychology and IT. I listened to the Great Courses overview of Philosophy and read a bit of William James, Wittgenstein, and some other things here and there. I try to follow developments in neuroscience, from a high level... Btw I recently found the "brain science podcast". It's great.

 

You're shifting arguments.  Earlier there were jokes made by others about making progress, but from my perspective we had made progress because you had seemed to abandon this argument in this thread as compared to the last time we had this discussion though over the last page or so you are now shifting back to it (though the fact that you have reverted does not surprise me)..

 

This is an argument that I can assume the assumption is correct because there is evidence that the assumption is correct.

 

And therefore it isn't really an assumption.

 

This has two issues:

 

1.  In the context of the larger argument, as I've already pointed out many/most definitions faith are not based on faith having no evidence so if we say that you are now saying that you assume the assumption is true because of evidence that doesn't mean that it is not faith.  And as I've already stated (and I've told you in threads before) most people that I know that believe in god(s) will give you reasons for their belief.

 

Faith is not (necessarily) a belief without evidence.  It is a belief without proof.

 

2.  Why should you be confident, much less have justified confidence?  Did you create a random universe and carry out any sort of comparison to conclude that it is reasonable to be confidence?

 

And to me this is an indication of the larger point in that you can't put forward a consistent argument.  You don't actually have a point or an argument.

 

Except that you don't have faith (because faith is bad as you've stated in other threads).

 

You've simply gone back to playing word games where you are now substituting justified confidence for faith, even though I'll be shocked if you can offer any real distinction between them.

[alexey]

Peter,

I do not assume or have faith that I am right about anything. I act with awareness that everything I think could in reality be otherwise. Do you think this view forces me into permanent inaction?

On the second thought, maybe further discussion hinges on your willingness to explore distinctions between "faith" and "justified confidence". I do not know where you stand but I doubt that you consider those to be fully equivalent.

[alexey]

And even if you consider "faith" and "justified confidence" to be equivalent, maybe you could consider using the word "faith" in religious contexts and "justified confidence" in scientific contests anyway.

This way you will avoid unnecessary arguments with people who think there is a difference, and also you will not sound like Ken Ham.

[s0crates]

alexey- 

 

Maybe I can explain this a bit better now that I'm awake.  Descartes was doing what he called "first philosophy," the title of his masterpiece is Meditations on First Philosophy. First philosophy is an attempt to find foundational principles which are beyond doubt. Doing first philosophy requires a skeptical methodology, the only principles that can serve as foundations are those that survive all skeptical inquiry.

 

The methodological doubt is a rational exercise.  When Descartes asks if it is possible that reality is an illusion, hallucination, or dream, he asks a logical question: Is it logically possible that this is a dream or hallucination?  Could it be otherwise? Well, Descartes thinks this could be a dream, which puts all perception (or empirical knowledge) in doubt.

 

Not everything can be doubted though, according to Descartes.  There is at least one indubitable first principle.  The cogito, "I am a thing that thinks" (also doubts, feels, believes, and so on), is such a principle.  This indubitable first principle is clearly rational.  You can find no reason to doubt it.  

 

Notice that Descartes is the very opposite of an empiricist though. He would, for example, find grounds to doubt that the sun will rise tomorrow, because he believes he can rationally doubt his experience. His method of finding indubitable principles is the quintessence of rationality.  Even Descartes assumes the laws of logic.  Descartes is skeptical in his methodology, but not globally skeptical.

 

Cartesian skepticism is not absolute skepticism for at least two reasons: one simple, the other contextual.  The simple reason is that Descartes thinks at least one thing is beyond doubt.  The contextual reason is that Descartes' goal is to lay a sturdy foundation on which to erect the edifice of knowledge, he believes knowledge is possible.

 

And while I am on the subject of indubitable principles, I might add a couple more for illustration.  Consider this principle: square circles are impossible.  Or this one: murder is wrong.  These are rationally known if they are known at all, we do not know this by observation (empirically), but by thought.  Once you understand the concept square and the concept circle, you cannot doubt that square circles are impossible.  Likewise, once you understand what murder is (the intentional killing of the innocent), you cannot doubt it is wrong.  

 

All this has taken us pretty far from the question of the foundational principles of empirical science though, which is my primary concern.  At least it might help illustrate two distinctions that are key to my view: (1) That between methodological skepticism (falsification as method) and global/absolute skepticism (the belief that knowledge is impossible) and (2) that between empiricism (going by facts) and rationalism (going by principles).

 

As a side note, after reading through the last couple pages, I'm thinking you have associated my view too strongly with Peter's.  Although our view's have some commonalities, I do not think they are the same.  I only mention it because I fear it might prevent me from being understood. 

[PeterMP]

Peter,

I do not assume or have faith that I am right about anything. I act with awareness that everything I think could in reality be otherwise. Do you think this view forces me into permanent inaction?

On the second thought, maybe further discussion hinges on your willingness to explore distinctions between "faith" and "justified confidence". I do not know where you stand but I doubt that you consider those to be fully equivalent.

 

I do no think that it would force you into permanent inaction.  I think there is a good argument that even under such conditions some actions would be valid and relevant.

 

From my perspective, it seems to me that actions with lot's of variation in them (i.e. under the same conditions behaving differently) would make the most sense (but that's not a view I'm strongly tied too).

 

I suspect it is possible to define faith and justified confidence in away where there is no distinction and in a manner in which there is a distinction.

 

The questions I asked you in the previous post essentially are asking you to explain how justified confidence in this context is different than faith.

 

And the same going back to your idea of having a premise which you did not assume was true.

 

What is your thought process, how does that guide your actions, and how are they different than somebody that does assume it is true (i.e. has faith that is true)?

 

Where does your justified confidence come from?  Does your confidence (and commitment to it based on your actual actions/thought processes) actually match the strength of the evidence?  Do you act/think/behave like you are 100% sure that it is true, while the evidence does not support that conclusion?  Do you ever act/think/behave in a manner that is (more) consistent with it not being true?

[PeterMP]

Not everything can be doubted though, according to Descartes.  There is at least one indubitable first principle.  The cogito, "I am a thing that thinks" (also doubts, feels, believes, and so on), is such a principle.  This indubitable first principle is clearly rational.  You can find no reason to doubt it.  

 

In previous threads with respect to being skeptical, I've been asked are there things that I know.  My answer is there are some things that I know starting with I know that I exist.

 

I think therefore I am.

 

I don't think you can build from there to empiricism brings true knowledge though.

 

And I don't think Descartes would have made that argument either.

And even if you consider "faith" and "justified confidence" to be equivalent, maybe you could consider using the word "faith" in religious contexts and "justified confidence" in scientific contests anyway.

This way you will avoid unnecessary arguments with people who think there is a difference, and also you will not sound like Ken Ham.

1.  I don't like "giving away" words to people.  The definition of the word fits.

 

2.  I think your post has a bit of a twist in it in that the idea that the universe is rational isn't really a "scientific contests".  It isn't idea/position that science is in a position to judge or validate (or invalidate).

[alexey]

I do no think that it would force you into permanent inaction. I think there is a good argument that even under such conditions some actions would be valid and relevant.

...

I am ok with not having faith and taking actions you consider to be invalid or irrelevant for somebody who does not have faith.

I suspect it is possible to define faith and justified confidence in away where there is no distinction and in a manner in which there is a distinction.

The questions I asked you in the previous post essentially are asking you to explain how justified confidence in this context is different than faith.

If you use the "strong belief or trust" definition of faith, and the "the feeling or belief that one can rely on someone or something" definition of confidence, then you can see how confidence that you can rely on something may be different from faith that it is true.

[s0crates]

In previous threads with respect to being skeptical, I've been asked are there things that I know. My answer is there are some things that I know starting with I know that I exist.

I think therefore I am.

I don't think you can build from there to empiricism brings true knowledge though.

And I don't think Descartes would have made that argument either.

Yes and no.

Descartes is certainly not an empiricist. He doubts the very thing the empiricist assumes, the evidence of his senses.

He does think he can build up to objective knowledge from the cogito though. I find that part of his case much less persuasive myself.

I also prefer a different first principle then the cogito, as I think the cogito actually entails complete subjectivism, it leaves no room for the object. I want a first principle that solves the problem Descartes first principle leads to: for example, the mind-body problem and the problem of induction. Ortega's "I am I and my circumstances" is a possibility.

[s0crates]

I am ok with not having faith and taking actions you consider to be invalid or irrelevant for somebody who does not have faith.

If you use the "strong belief or trust" definition of faith, and the "the feeling or belief that one can rely on someone or something" definition of confidence, then you can see how confidence that you can rely on something may be different from faith that it is true.

When I say Peter's view is distinct from mine, this is part of what I have in mind.  

 

He insists on the term "faith," whereas I have all but abandoned it here, as I think it is more important to understand the concept that empiricism presupposes some rational principle, and this debate over the semantics of "faith" does not help us progress to that essential realization.  If anything, your understanding of the word "faith" causes you to misunderstand the key concept, it does not help you understand it.  Although Peter and I agree to an extent, I feel like he is working against me.

 

The key thing to understand here is that the confidence the empirical scientist has in the facts is based on some rational principle about the nature of the universe (although one that is almost always implicitly assumed and not explicitly stated), it must be.

[alexey]

Maybe I can explain this a bit better now that I'm awake. Descartes was doing what he called "first philosophy," the title of his masterpiece is Meditations on First Philosophy. First philosophy is an attempt to find foundational principles which are beyond doubt. Doing first philosophy requires a skeptical methodology, the only principles that can serve as foundations are those that survive all skeptical inquiry.

The methodological doubt is a rational exercise. When Descartes asks if it is possible that reality is an illusion, hallucination, or dream, he asks a logical question: Is it logically possible that this is a dream or hallucination? Could it be otherwise? Well, Descartes thinks this could be a dream, which puts all perception (or empirical knowledge) in doubt.

Not everything can be doubted though, according to Descartes. There is at least one indubitable first principle. The cogito, "I am a thing that thinks" (also doubts, feels, believes, and so on), is such a principle. This indubitable first principle is clearly rational. You can find no reason to doubt it.

...

I understand the need for that first principle in this framework. I may not agree with that requirement because I subscribe to cross-checking of principles, but I can work with it.

So if I accept that the first principle is required, can it be demonstrated that it must be necessarily believed, assumed, taken on faith? Can it be proved that one must have faith in it in order to use it?

 

And while I am on the subject of indubitable principles, I might add a couple more for illustration. Consider this principle: square circles are impossible. Or this one: murder is wrong. These are rationally known if they are known at all, we do not know this by observation (empirically), but by thought. Once you understand the concept square and the concept circle, you cannot doubt that square circles are impossible. Likewise, once you understand what murder is (the intentional killing of the innocent), you cannot doubt it is wrong.

...

These are constructs in philosophy, but they may not cleanly translate onto fallible humans. To oversimplify for demonstrating a point, there is no law preventing neurons that code for "square" and neurons that code for "circle" to fire at the same time.

I think some traditional problems in philosophy are not really problems anymore, but they are still being discussed because big names wrote about them and because all philosophers need jobs yet not all philosophers can do useful stuff.

This relates to the topic of the thread, actually. We emerged via evolution over millions of years by competition between organisms. Ability to detect, react, anticipate, was key to survival. The philosophers came along and claimed that doing these things requires faith about the nature of the universe, and that we cannot do that stuff without a proper metaphysical framework. I think that view is an anachronism from the time people didn't realize that competence can come without comprehension.

...I think it is more important to understand the concept that empiricism presupposes some rational principle, and this debate over the semantics of "faith" does not help us progress to that essential realization.

...

I would be in agreement if instead of "presupposes" you wrote something like "relies on".

You seem to assert not just that the principle is required, but that we must subscribe to a particular justification for why we are using it.

[s0crates]

I understand the need for that first principle in this framework. I may not agree with that requirement because I subscribe to cross-checking of principles, but I can work with it.

So if I accept that the first principle is required, can it be demonstrated that it must be necessarily believed, assumed, taken on faith? Can it be proved that one must have faith in it in order to use it?

These are constructs in philosophy, but they may not cleanly translate onto fallible humans. To oversimplify for demonstrating a point, there is no law preventing neurons that code for "square" and neurons that code for "circle" to fire at the same time.

I think some traditional problems in philosophy are not really problems anymore, but they are still being discussed because big names wrote about them and because all philosophers need jobs yet not all philosophers can do useful stuff.

This relates to the topic of the thread, actually. We emerged via evolution over millions of years by competition between organisms. Ability to detect, react, anticipate, was key to survival. The philosophers came along and claimed that doing these things requires faith about the nature of the universe, and that we cannot do that stuff without a proper metaphysical framework. I think that view is an anachronism from the time people didn't realize that competence can come without comprehension.

I would be in agreement if instead of "presupposes" you wrote something like "relies on".

You seem to assert not just that the principle is required, but that we must subscribe to a particular justification for why we are using it.

I'll take the last point first. The distinction between "presupposes" and "relies on" seems to me a very subtle one, perhaps even so subtle that it could be called a distinction without a difference (perhaps not, but I don't see the difference clearly). If you agree that empiricism relies on some rational principle, then I think we agree; that is what I've been trying to say. Maybe whatever disagreement there was really was just a matter of finding terms we're both comfortable with. Heh, maybe.

Now as to your point about philosophy having outlived its usefulness, I obviously think you are mistaken. I'm not even sure where to begin with that.

I agree philosophers are the product of millions (actually billions) or years of evolution, and we do some of the same things our genetic ancestors did. I think you go wrong when you equivocate an animal's doing with our knowing though. This is not a question of what we do, this is a question of what we know.

Do you think a principle like "murder is wrong" has outlived its usefulness? Do you think understanding the concept "justice" is no longer of value? Because I can promise you there is no experiment you can do in the laboratory that will help you with such concepts. Nothing I can see under the microscope or through the telescope will tell me murder is wrong. What of things like values, meanings, and purposes? These principles are not amenable to scientific methodology. Who is better equipped to deal with rational principles like these than the philosopher? Or do you contend that principles themselves are anachronism too?

That and some people enjoy philosophy. There's something to be said about philosophy as a game (Plato said this way before Wittgenstein). Some of us learn the rules because we like playing. So if it's nothing else, at least philosophy is fun.

I don't think philosophy will be lost to history. People are to thinking as cheetahs are to running. Humans are naturally inclined to philosophy. Thinking is what we do. 

[alexey]

I'll take the last point first. The distinction between "presupposes" and "relies on" seems to me a very subtle one, perhaps even so subtle that it could be called a distinction without a difference (perhaps not, but I don't see the difference clearly). If you agree that empiricism relies on some rational principle, then I think we agree; that is what I've been trying to say. Maybe whatever disagreement there was really was just a matter of finding terms we're both comfortable with. Heh, maybe.

I think we're very close. We can agree that one needs to use some kind of a principle to do empiricism. Can we agree that different people may use this principle for different reasons?

Specifically, when we use the principle, are we required to believe that it is the right principle, true principle, principle that reflects the nature of the universe, or anything like that? We can imagine many reasons for using the principle. Are they all "faith?"

 

Now as to your point about philosophy having outlived its usefulness, I obviously think you are mistaken. I'm not even sure where to begin with that.

I do not think that philosophy as a whole has outlived its usefulness. Philosophy is very important and useful, but I do have a few pet peeves with it.

It can be compared to politics, or other human endeavors for that matter, where climbing the ladder, getting attention, generating controversy, etc., works all too well and holds back things I care about.

 

I agree philosophers are the product of millions (actually billions) or years of evolution, and we do some of the same things our genetic ancestors did. I think you go wrong when you equivocate an animal's doing with our knowing though. This is not a question of what we do, this is a question of what we know.

Agreed. I certainly do not want to equivocate an animal's doing with our knowing. I was trying to make a different point.

The question "how do you know the sun will come up tomorrow" is a good question if it is a question about physics, cosmology, etc. I think we can and should handle those questions like humans.

On the other hand, this question may doubt the continuity of natural laws. Since there is no evidence upon which to doubt, the question itself is silly. It deserves the same answer as would be provided by a squirrel.

 

Do you think a principle like "murder is wrong" has outlived its usefulness?

It never really worked as intended, did it? So my answer is yes, and I think it was not useful to begin with.

I see plenty of better principles that do not get into the right/wrong weeds. For example, we can use a principle that action is better than words and use our knowledge to try and reduce violence.

 

Do you think understanding the concept "justice" is no longer of value? Because I can promise you there is no experiment you can do in the laboratory that will help you with such concepts. Nothing I can see under the microscope or through the telescope will tell me murder is wrong. What of things like values, meanings, and purposes? These principles are not amenable to scientific methodology. Who is better equipped to deal with rational principles like these than the philosopher? Or do you contend that principles themselves are anachronism too?

I am very intrigued with the concept of "emergence." Different properties emerging at different levels, etc. I can imagine science being being more applicable to some levels and maybe philosophy more applicable to others (at least for now ).

 

That and some people enjoy philosophy. There's something to be said about philosophy as a game (Plato said this way before Wittgenstein). Some of us learn the rules because we like playing. So if it's nothing else, at least philosophy is fun.

I don't think philosophy will be lost to history. People are to thinking as cheetahs are to running. Humans are naturally inclined to philosophy. Thinking is what we do.

Yes I think there is a lot of fun to have and a lot of work to do.

I just hope that philosophy as a field will continue to improve at doing its job.

As a parent, I do not have the "is-ought" problem, I have the "how to get them acting how they ought" problem. As a human being, I do not have the "why suffering is bad" problem or "why we should feed the hungry" problem. I have the problem of 3.1 million children dying of hunger every year (data from World Food Programme). And so on.

[s0crates]

Thanks for the thoughtful reply. I'm afraid my reply is a bit too abstract and speculative, but I hope it is clear enough.

I think we're very close. We can agree that one needs to use some kind of a principle to do empiricism. Can we agree that different people may use this principle for different reasons?

Specifically, when we use the principle, are we required to believe that it is the right principle, true principle, principle that reflects the nature of the universe, or anything like that? We can imagine many reasons for using the principle. Are they all "faith?"

I think I see your meaning. I've given the impression that our "assumed" rational principle is a law of nature, something indubitable and not tentative. I can see how you got that idea, but that is not what I intend to say. The confusion is my mistake.

Let me clarify: I mean to say the idea of a law of nature is a rational principle (which empiricism relies on), I do not mean to say the rational principle is a law of nature.

Of course you're right that rational principles are hypothetical, they should be subject to analysis and revision. They are not beyond doubt.

It is not this particular principle or that which is beyond doubt (although I think some are), it is the need of principles. Empiricism relies on principles which themselves are not empirical. What I mean to say is that empiricism is not sufficient unto itself. Effective yes, but incomplete.

I think that empiricism takes the principle that experience is the authority by which we can understand a law-like universe, but I don't think that principle is certain. In fact I think it stands in need of revision.

That is part of a larger point we might get into. What principle might be better?

I do not think that philosophy as a whole has outlived its usefulness. Philosophy is very important and useful, but I do have a few pet peeves with it.

I'm afraid I got a bit defensive on that one. Having re-read your post I see your meaning better. I agree some of the classic philosophical problems are confused. They stem from a fundamental misunderstanding in our basic principles, which as I said stand in need of revision. What I have called the assumption of empiricism is part of this problem in my mind.

To give an idea of the kind of philosophy I envision as an alternative: I think the subject-object distinction is fundamentally flawed, a mistake that we can trace to Descartes, and which we see remnants of today. There are some twentieth century philosophers who have devised what I think are better principles. A personal favorite is Whitehead's philosophy of organism, known today as process philosophy. The idea here is that reality is not subjects and objects, but events in process. A lot of my thinking is inspired by Whitehead.

Another candidate view I have already mentioned: Ortega's "I am I and my circumstances," an alternative to the cogito. His idea is that the starting point should not be subject-object, but life.

Agreed. I certainly do not want to equivocate an animal's doing with our knowing. I was trying to make a different point.

I shouldn't have attributed that view to you. I still maintain the fact squirrels don't do science illustrates the limits of the analogy though.

The question "how do you know the sun will come up tomorrow" is a good question if it is a question about physics, cosmology, etc. I think we can and should handle those questions like humans.

On the other hand, this question may doubt the continuity of natural laws. Since there is no evidence upon which to doubt, the question itself is silly. It deserves the same answer as would be provided by a squirrel.

That bit about the sun rising tomorrow is meant only to illustrate the nature of induction, that induction generalizes from observations. I don't mean to say the Sun not rising tomorrow is a real possibility (although Hume gives the impression that he considers it such).

It never really worked as intended, did it? So my answer is yes, and I think it was not useful to begin with.

If you are saying you don't believe in moral principles, then you've really opened a can of worms.

I see plenty of better principles that do not get into the right/wrong weeds. For example, we can use a principle that action is better than words and use our knowledge to try and reduce violence.

I actually like that principle, but doesn't the idea of a "better principle" suggest some standard of good and bad?

I am very intrigued with the concept of "emergence." Different properties emerging at different levels, etc. I can imagine science being being more applicable to some levels and maybe philosophy more applicable to others (at least for now ).

I also think emergence is interesting. Part of my view is that empirical science emerged from medieval theology, and I also ponder what the next paradigm shift will look like.

I repeat myself, but I think a more seamless integration of rational and empirical methods is needed, as well as an alternative to the subject-object distinction which I think has resulted in much of the silliness you find frustrating. The specifics are a bit technical, but my point here is I am not wed to any principle, in fact I'm looking for better ones.

Yes I think there is a lot of fun to have and a lot of work to do.

I just hope that philosophy as a field will continue to improve at doing its job.

I agree with this completely.

As a parent, I do not have the "is-ought" problem, I have the "how to get them acting how they ought" problem. As a human being, I do not have the "why suffering is bad" problem or "why we should feed the hungry" problem. I have the problem of 3.1 million children dying of hunger every year (data from World Food Programme). And so on.

I like the way you put this, you show understanding the empirical facts is necessary to realizing a better world.

I do not mean to deny the wonderful empirical insight that experience is a better authority than dogma, it has certainly worked better. The facts are as important as you imply.

My intent is to make room for the principles that are beyond the reach of empirical methods. The facts are the facts, the principles are how we deal with them. 3 million hungry people is a fact, and the solution will be based on other facts, but seeing 3 million hungry people as a problem in want of a solution is a principle.

[TradeTheBeal!]

This thread has gotten deep.

[s0crates]

This thread has gotten deep.

Ha! Alexey and I go back and forth like this sometimes. Our conversations can get pretty philosophical. We might be a bit off topic, and I don't think many read our dialogues, but I enjoy them.

[PeterMP]

When I say Peter's view is distinct from mine, this is part of what I have in mind.  

 

He insists on the term "faith," whereas I have all but abandoned it here, as I think it is more important to understand the concept that empiricism presupposes some rational principle, and this debate over the semantics of "faith" does not help us progress to that essential realization.  If anything, your understanding of the word "faith" causes you to misunderstand the key concept, it does not help you understand it.  Although Peter and I agree to an extent, I feel like he is working against me.

 

The key thing to understand here is that the confidence the empirical scientist has in the facts is based on some rational principle about the nature of the universe (although one that is almost always implicitly assumed and not explicitly stated), it must be.

 

If alexey does not get that principle at this point in time, he is not going to at this point in time.  Whether it is a problem with intellect or psychological, it isn't going to happen in this thread (and I'd guess not any time soon).

 

However, I think he gets that based on his responses and is then trying to create a mental framework in which that is present, but not significant or important with respect to behaviors and even the decision making process.

 

And I think that's what you see in this thread.

 

Where (at least from my perspective), his argument has shifted from:

 

I do not assume the assumption is true because I do not evaluate it, and it is just coincidental that my behavior is essentially inextinguishable from somebody that does assume the assumption is true (which is at least very similar to where we ended the other thread).

 

to:

 

I am going to evaluate the assumption and based on the evidence conclude that it is likely true and therefore it isn't really an assumption, but something that I can have justifiable confidence that it is true (which is where we actually started in the previous thread).

 

From my perspective, those are both fine methods for incorporating the assumptions required for science into a mental framework, but they don't work for alexey because of he's trying to then fit that idea into is already existing mental framework.

 

I think alexey has problem, and he's trying to create a mental framework for dealing with the problem without changing much of the rest of his mental framework, and he's trying to cycle (and recycle) through arguments to find the one that fits the best.

 

But I think he understands the problem (using your wording " that empiricism presupposes some rational principle").  He just hasn't found a solution that he likes and will allow him to do what he wants in the context of his larger frame work.

 

 

Empiricism relies on principles which themselves are not empirical. What I mean to say is that empiricism is not sufficient unto itself. Effective yes, but incomplete.

I think that empiricism takes the principle that experience is the authority by which we can understand a law-like universe, but I don't think that principle is certain. In fact I think it stands in need of revision.

That is part of a larger point we might get into. What principle might be better?

 

I'm not sure I like the concepts of "better" or "effective" used in the manner that I am at least inferring they are being used here:

 

How do you measure effectiveness?

From there, what makes a principle better (more effective)?

[s0crates]

If alexey does not get that principle at this point in time, he is not going to at this point in time. Whether it is a problem with intellect or psychological, it isn't going to happen in this thread (and I'd guess not any time soon).

However, I think he gets that based on his responses and is then trying to create a mental framework in which that is present, but not significant or important with respect to behaviors and even the decision making process.

And I think that's what you see in this thread.

Where (at least from my perspective), his argument has shifted . . .

I'm not comfortable ascribing all that to him.

I think he and I have come to understand each other better in our dialogue, and perhaps this involves some cognitive dissonance and shifting views on both our parts, but that is just the nature of this kind of discourse, it's dialectical. I don't take it as a failing on his part if his views "shift," in fact it's just the opposite really.

You may be right that there are some inconsistencies in his view, but I'd be more comfortable taking that up with him than discussing it in the third person. He is being reasonable, so I feel I owe him the courtesy of letting him state his own reasons.

But I think he understands the problem (using your wording " that empiricism presupposes some rational principle").

That is my view, and he has clearly taken it into consideration. What more could I really ask for? If he just said, "yup you're right," then that would be pretty lame.

I'm not sure I like the concepts of "better" or "effective" used in the manner that I am at least inferring they are being used here:

How do you measure effectiveness?

From there, what makes a principle better (more effective)?

Principles are inherently rational, even incorrect principles. They must at least be rational enough to be understandable. Yet clearly some are better than others. We might say the truth of our principles is a matter of degree. Some are true, some are false, many are approximately true.

What we aim for are true principles, but it takes a process of refining (and sometimes reinventing) our concepts to get there. Our concepts were once quite dogmatic, but we found better concepts in empirical science, but those concepts have problems too. So we need better concepts yet.

I want to be clear I have the utmost respect for the insight of empiricism, it has leveled mountains of superstition. When I point out the shortcomings of empirical method, I do not seek a regression to a previous paradigm. I'm looking for a progression to the next paradigm, one that can honor the insights of its predecessors in a coherent way without falling into the old traps.

[PeterMP]

I'm not comfortable ascribing all that to him.

I think he and I have come to understand each other better in our dialogue, and perhaps this involves some cognitive dissonance and shifting views on both our parts, but that is just the nature of this kind of discourse, it's dialectical. I don't take it as a failing on his part if his views "shift," in fact it's just the opposite really.

You may be right that there are some inconsistencies in his view, but I'd be more comfortable taking that up with him than discussing it in the third person. He is being reasonable, so I feel I owe him the courtesy of letting him state his own reasons.

That is my view, and he has clearly taken it into consideration. What more could I really ask for? If he just said, "yup you're right," then that would be pretty lame.

Principles are inherently rational, even incorrect principles. They must at least be rational enough to be understandable. Yet clearly some are better than others. We might say the truth of our principles is a matter of degree. Some are true, some are false, many are approximately true.

What we aim for are true principles, but it takes a process of refining (and sometimes reinventing) our concepts to get there. Our concepts were once quite dogmatic, but we found better concepts in empirical science, but those concepts have problems too. So we need better concepts yet.

I want to be clear I have the utmost respect for the insight of empiricism, it has leveled mountains of superstition. When I point out the shortcomings of empirical method, I do not seek a regression to a previous paradigm. I'm looking for a progression to the next paradigm, one that can honor the insights of its predecessors in a coherent way without falling into the old traps.

 

1.  I said much of the same thing to him directly in post 358.  I don't mind if people do shift arguments (it is a natural part of having such a conversation), but I think recognizing that people have shifted their arguments and even pointing it out to the person in case they didn't realize it has value in the context of moving the conversation forward.  And even to that post, he can respond. (I find the recycling of arguments somewhat frustrating, and when it gets to the point that I feel enough has been recycled and the conversation is not being productive, I will drop out of the conversation.)

 

2.  I wasn't trying to defend empiricism.  From my perspective, empiricism is only "better" in the context of cultural evolution in which the culture that embraced it most fully was able to supplant/dominate many/most other cultures and that was largely possible because they had embraced empiricism.  Much of that was through the (intentional and unintentional) decimation of other cultures and even today continued economic (in many cases) domination.

 

To me that's like saying animal X is better than animal Y where animal X played a predominant role in the extinction of animal Y.  From an evolutionary perspective that might be true, but I don't think I'm at all comfortable judging things in general and especially human culture/principles/philosophies based on evolution.

 

Now, I wouldn't necessarily lie all of that on the door step of empiricism, but I think separating it all isn't trivial.

 

You look at the numbers that alexey threw out where I'm guessing (I haven't looked at the issue of starvation for a long time, but when I did this was my impression and the situation doesn't seem to have changed much) much of the issue is not really a food production issue, but a food distribution issue that is not really tied to our ability to distribute, but our will to carry out the distribution, and I have to ask has empiricism raised as many mountains (or even more than) as it has flattened?

 

I think the idea that empiricism is (a predominant) part of some grand solution (i.e. better than many other things) is badly flawed and likely long term is a disservice to us as species and to the practice of empiricism itself.

 

(Note, I'm saying that it can/should be discarded, but that it has to be subservient to other ideas/principles).

 

**EDIT**

And from my perspective, I think this is where alexey and I REALLY disagree, and the "faith"/"not faith" argument is just a side show to that.  That while interesting isn't really all that relevant to me.  Which especially is why in the threads where it has come up, I've stepped away several times (as compared to some of the other threads where we've discussed some of his other ideas).