Jump to content
Washington Football Team Logo
Extremeskins

The public is backing Bush


Kilmer17

Recommended Posts

I think they should replace the name "Bush" with just something about taking out Iraq. After Powell's excellent job yesterday, even Dem's I saw interviewed said stuff like "He put the facts out there and Iraq is still lying".

I just hope this time if we get into it with them, we fully take them out. Not a repeat of a decade ago.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Originally posted by Bandit

I just hope this time if we get into it with them, we fully take them out. Not a repeat of a decade ago.

No chance fo a repeat. The mission and the message this time are too inextricably tied in to Saddam and his regime. We won't stop short.

The real challenges will be 1) preventing / limiting use of WMD's on our soldiers and other countries; 2) preventing the destruction of Iraq by Saddam's regime, especially oil wells; and 3) rebuilding a stable regime that is accepted by the Iraqi people and is acceptable to the region and the world.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

see, this is where it sucks. We know what he would do if War happened. But if we go to War...we've got to come over the hill with the band and eveything, letting them know we're on the way.

If I woke up tomorrow and found out that during the night we just took out Saddam, his government and secured the oil wells around the country....who would really be upset? The French and Russians could get it for cheaper now. I would hope we'd just stop using their oil and focus on something cleaner.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I still cant shake what someone said about the usefulness of the UN (maybe it was gbear). It serves it purpose AFTER the war has begun.

It's an instant open avenue to talk and reach ceasefires.

Not that it matters with Iraq, but in the future it might have some use.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Originally posted by Kilmer17

I would hope when this is all over, we tell the French to bite us. Dont sell them a drop.

Or sell it to them for 3 times the price so we can lower prices here.

That could actually be good for the French economy as it would most assuredly send them into a tizzy and sales of red wine and cigarettes would skyrocket!

:laugh:

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Originally posted by redman

The real challenges will be 1) preventing / limiting use of WMD's on our soldiers and other countries; 2) preventing the destruction of Iraq by Saddam's regime, especially oil wells; and 3) rebuilding a stable regime that is accepted by the Iraqi people and is acceptable to the region and the world.

Redman, I'm not picking on you, I agree with you 100%.

I just wanted to make note of you post for Art's benefit.

:cheers:

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Code,

Why would you highlight a thoughtful post by Redman for me? Redman gets it. I get it. I might change if we can't prevent or limit the use of WMDs against our troops that we properly prepare our troops to fight through it with appropriate training.

But, you've no need to highlight for my consumption a view no one disagrees with. That's PRECISELY what we should be hoping for if not being able to guarantee.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Originally posted by Bandit

If I woke up tomorrow and found out that during the night we just took out Saddam, his government and secured the oil wells around the country....who would really be upset?

What makes you think that that won't be our basic approach?

We're going to massively bombard Iraq using hundreds of cruise missiles, and dozens of stealth bombers and fighters, and heavy bombers like the B-1 and B-52. At the same time, we'll move in quickly to secure oil fields around the country using light infantry like the 82nd Airborne and air cover. Our covert ops guys will be working with the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South to mount local attacks against the Iraqi military and leadership. Our special forces will also be patrolling the Iraqi desert, particularly in the west, hunting down scud launchers and looking especially for WMD activity. Within hours or days, the mechanized infantry and armor will be rumbling up to Baghdad.

I think this is the general plan. There will of course be other features as well.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Kilmer, that was me. The more I watch of this drama, the more convinced I am that the UN won't serve any useful prupose in this until we start needing an endgame. It's hard to use an institution of peace to build a consensus for war.

I do wonder what will happen if we try to get a second resolution. In some ways, I hope we don't propose it unless we are sure to get it passed. From what was said yesterday, I think we could get the number of votes, but the vetos could be a problem.

I just worry because if we try for a resolution, it get's vetoed, and we go anyway, then I think the UN looks much weaker. If it looks too weak, how much good is it as a peacekeeping institution. If the UN isn't even perceieved as having the backing of everyone, how much good will it be in future peacekeeping duties?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Originally posted by Art

Code,

Why would you highlight a thoughtful post by Redman for me? Redman gets it. I get it. I might change if we can't prevent or limit the use of WMDs against our troops that we properly prepare our troops to fight through it with appropriate training.

But, you've no need to highlight for my consumption a view no one disagrees with. That's PRECISELY what we should be hoping for if not being able to guarantee.

I highlighted it because I have been saying that the biggest concerns with Iraq were pretty much what Redman posted, You have said the concern for a terrorist attack was the main priority.....

You have scolded me continuously about how our concerns are not with Iraq's neighboring countries or the oil fields, that they are because an Iraqi citizen may bring a WMD to our country. I'm curious to hear you back track and talk circles on this one.:D And don't say that these are only the challenges presented by goin in.... these are the challenges today, right now, that is why we want to go in.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Code,

Well if this isn't amusing as all hell.

You do realize, Code, that the objectives of going to war with Iraq are something I agree completely with Redman on. Do you realize the CAUSE of going to war is that we are concerned with Iraq having weapons of mass destruction and handing those weapons over to terrorists?

Are you really this utterly daft that you haven't followed the conversation at all? Do you REALLY not understand that the reason we want to go into Iraq is for fear of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction being used against us in a terrorist style attack?

I am actually curious as to how you are confused.

This isn't a hard conversation. There is a reason for wanting to go into Iraq. There are objectives we are hopeful of accomplishing when we go into Iraq. Those are two different items of discussion, are they not?

Do you even realize Redman was discussing the objectives of war, not the cause of war? What's wrong with you son? Do you realize that all people probably hope for similiar objectives and that all people realize those objectives aren't the cause? I can't even believe you'd phrase this as a circular comment.

So. Let me outline it for you.

1. We want to go into Iraq because of our concern as to the possible use of weapons of mass destruction against us by the nation of Iraq. Under that heading, there is the obvious statement and truism that the nation of Iraq has failed to live under the terms of the surrender it signed which simply makes more vital and reasoned our concern at their continued efforts to develop more and more sinister weapons such as the ones we're talking about. Our concern over the possibility of a 9-11 type attack tipped with chemical, or biological or nuclear weapons supplied by Iraq are the driving force and worry we as a people and we as a country are presently concerned with.

2. EVERYTHING Redman says is NOT A SINGLE reason we are going in or a single thing we are worried about causing us to go in. ONCE we go in for the REASON we are going in, we want to limit our exposure to the types of things Redman outlined. Do you not understand this? Perhaps the reason you believe this argument is circular is because you are too friggen dimwitted to follow simple statements.

Cause and effect you dip. The possibility of military action is caused by something. The effect of our action will cause something else and those are things we must attempt to limit. Do you think we're going into Iraq because of the reasons Redman outlined? Or do you think what Redman outlined was to describe the hopes we may have when we go into Iraq?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Originally posted by redman

What makes you think that that won't be our basic approach?

We're going to massively bombard Iraq using hundreds of cruise missiles, and dozens of stealth bombers and fighters, and heavy bombers like the B-1 and B-52. At the same time, we'll move in quickly to secure oil fields around the country using light infantry like the 82nd Airborne and air cover. Our covert ops guys will be working with the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South to mount local attacks against the Iraqi military and leadership. Our special forces will also be patrolling the Iraqi desert, particularly in the west, hunting down scud launchers and looking especially for WMD activity. Within hours or days, the mechanized infantry and armor will be rumbling up to Baghdad.

I think this is the general plan. There will of course be other features as well.

Features such as the early capture of one or two airbases by an airborn assault. :cool:

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Here's a good synopsis of the lightening attack that I described above, from globalsecurity.org:

Attacking Iraq - Rapid Decisive Operations

By mid-2002, problems with the two operational concepts the US had been considering to oust Saddam Hussein led some military planners to focus on a new option that was a middle ground between a small-scale campaign employing air strikes and local-opposition forces and an overwhelming invasion of troops. What is required is a concept of operations that is both rapid and decisive -- rapid, unlike OPLAN 1003, and decisive, unlike the Downing Plan. This would combine air power with a force of between 50,000 and 75,000 ground troops. The US could deploy such a force in Kuwait in about two weeks, with troops flown into the region and married up with prepositioned equipment stored in countries such as Qatar and Kuwait, and on the Indian Ocean Island of Diego Garcia. They would be supported by as many as five aircraft carriers.

The new plan - nicknamed the "inside out" or "Baghdad first" - was characterized as a reversal of the 1991 Gulf War strategy, involving a striked at the heart of Saddam's regime and then attacking outwards. Such an "inside-out" assault on Iraq would aim at crippling Saddam's command by striking Baghdad first. Such a strike could be launched quickly, with as much surprise as remains possible, reportedly requiring around 70,000 US troops and at the most involve 100,000 troops. The concept of operations is to conduct what used to be called a coup de main, with a rapid seizure of key installations in Baghdad and elsewhere, involving focused airs trikes combined with a rapid advance of ground forces from Kuwait to Baghdad. According to some reports, the operation would probably include intense air attacks, followed by a combined airborne and ground assault on strategic targets. Some reports suggested that this would involve attacking Baghdad and a few key bases and arms depots by airborne assault alone, but this later reports appear to reflect a mis-understanding of the initial reports.

In mid-November 2002 it was reported that the US war plan for Iraq called for 60,000 to 80,000 ground troops to launch an invasion. The ground assault would reportedly come after 10 days of intensive air strikes to take down air defenses, command and communication centers, and troop concentrations. As many as 250,000 soldiers, Marines, airmen and sailors will be deployed to the region, but many of the ground troops will be held back at bases in Turkey, Kuwait and Qatar as reserve forces in case the initial invasion met unexpected resistance.

This plan, unlike the 1991 conflict which focused primarily on military assets and troops, would emphasize decapitating the Iraqi regime by targeting Saddam's institutional power base, including presidential palaces, military and security police facilities and bases. Particular attention would be given to Hussein's hometown of Tikrit while targets such as bridges and other infrastructure targets would be avoided. Most Iraqi troops would be exempted from attack provided they did not put up any resistance or demonstrate any attempt to impede US operations; thus leaving open the door for these troops possible defection. Some Iraqi units located in the no-fly zones and with a potential for defection have reportedly escaped bombing.

Under this concept of operations, the air campaign element would be significantly more intense than prior air campaigns previously conducted thus far. Hundreds of systems ranging from bombers, cruise missiles and fighter aircraft would be involved in a massive display of firepower focused initially on antiaircraft systems and any potential chemical or biological weapons delivery systems.

One option reportedly being circulated within US Air Force circles would involve using 16 B-2 stealth bombers on the very first night of the campaign to conduct surgical strikes against deeply buried and hardened target such as bunkers housing communications facilities or weapons. This would amount to using almost the entire fleet of operational B-2 bombers; something not even done during the air campaigns over Kosovo and Afghan. Each aircraft would deliver 16 earth-burrowing high-explosive 2,000-pound bombs. The plan reportedly calls for the aircraft to fly from both their home base at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, and from the British isle of Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously, Navy ships and B-52s would also launch cruise missiles against presidential palaces and intelligence facilities.

One major concern associated with the air campaign centers around how to proceed with neutralizing Iraqi chemical and biological weapons. The possibility that Israel might retaliate to an Iraq Scud attack, raising the prospect of escalation to the whole of the Middle East region is one additional reason behind this focus.

Bombing shallow bunkers housing chemical or biological weapons could adversely release these agents into the open where they could cause great harm accross the region. Reconnaissance assets such as the Predator and the Global Hawk UAVs would be tasked with helping to monitor sites suspected of housing Weapons of Mass Destruction.

As of mid-September 2002, a consensus appeared to be emgerging favoring destroying the means of delivery (missiles and unmanned aircraft) while leaving untouched the actual weapons until after the main objective of regime change has been achieved. It is hoped that through the use of increased reconnaissance and surveillance assets as well as other means, that the US military will fare better at tracking down Scud launchers this time around than it did during the 1991 Gulf War. WMDs stored in deeply buried bunkers, on the other hand, would be neutralized using deep-penetrating incendiary bombs able to create sustained high temperatures to neutralize both biological and chemical weapons.

Estimates of the duration of the air campaign prior to the ground campaign being launched range from a day or two to more conservative estimates of 10 days to two weeks.

The ground campaign would start in Kuwait, but avoid getting boggd down in southeastern Iraq, in the spongy marshland between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Instead, the main force would advance towards Baghdad through the desert which covers western Iraq and much of the south.

As of mid-2002, the United States had one brigade set of equipment in Kuwait, another in Qatar, and two afloat on ships at Diego Garcia. This equipment is sufficient for one full heavy division [three brigades] plus a fourth heavy brigade. It was announced in mid-2001 that two additional brigade sets are to be withdrawn from Europe, though it was not clear when this would happen, or where they would be re-deployed to. For various reasons, it would be sensible to deploy these two brigade sets to Kuwait, and this could have already happened without drawing attention to this fact. This equipment may have been deployed to Camp Arifjan, the new facility that it now replacing Camp Doha in Kuwait.

As of mid-2002, CENTCOM CINC, US Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks had already briefed President Bush on a range of possibilities and options though officials stressed that no decision had yet been made.

By the end of August 2002, the US had moved equipment, which had been stored in Qatar and Europe, to Kuwait. The US had enough equipment in Kuwait -- three brigade sets -- to support about 15-25,000 troops in Kuwait. It would take only a few days to bring in the soldiers to man the tanks, artillery pieces and armored personnel carriers now in place. ["Bush Faces Complex Gauntlet On The Path To War With Iraq" By David S. Cloud and Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal September 5, 2002 Pg. 1]

The Marine Corps has equipment for one Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Diego Garcia, allocated to CENTCOM, as well as two other brigades afloat in the Mediterranean and Pacific. These other two brigades could be allocated to CENTCOM if required.

All of the afloat pre-positioned equipment could be brought ashore at Kuwait within two weeks of a decision to deploy [given sailing times from Saipan in the Pacific]. And given the normal movement of these ships, it is quite possible that this deployment would not be noticed until the ships started unloading in Kuwait. Only a few days are required between the time each ship docks and the time the equipment is drawn by troops and is combat ready.

Approximately 250 aircraft sorties would be required to deploy the 17,000 Marines and Sailors associated with the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. A similar number of sorties would be required to deploy troops and equipment associated with the 101st Airborned Division, and a few hundred more could deploy the troops of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division. Presumably the two military airbases and one civilian airport in Kuwait could handle these hundreds of sorties in about a week's time.

Thus, a week or ten days after it became evident that the United States was mounting a major deployment to Kuwait, there would be upwards of 50,000 US troops on the ground. Based on the rate of advance achieved during Desert Storm, approximately one week would be required for this force to advance to Baghdad.

Any CENTCOM operation would likely be centered on at least three diviions (2 heavy divisions of 16,000 troops each and one lighter Marine division to tie down Iraqi forces and be held in reserve). The 1st Cavalry Division (Ft. Hood, TX), the 3rd Infantry Division (Ft. Stewart, GA) and the 101st Airborne Division (Ft. Campbell, KY) are likely to play a significant role in the ground campaign. A fourth Army division, such as the 4th Infantry Division, would also be tasked in reserve with reinforcing the ground effort should the need arise while parts of the 101st Airborne Division with some Special Forces units might possibly operate in northern Iraq from bases in Germany and Turkey.

Another option would involve assembling the bulk of the attacking force far from the theater of operations such as in Europe or Turkey and then have them deploy quickly into Iraq once the attack beigns. Yet one more option would involve moving troops about as stealthily as possible to Saudi Arabia where its state-controlled media and large number of airports would play a pivotal role. It is believed in Pentagon circles that Jordan would allow low-profile Special Operations missions against Iraqi missiles to be staged from within its borders.

An attack from Turkey would not resemble the assault from the south. The irregular hills and 8,000 foot peaks of the Zagros mountain range would make an attack using armored forces improbable. Only one railway and three major roads could be used to cross the mountains. Rather, what is more likely to occur is that Special Forces would be inserted via Turkey. They would arrive by helicopter near Kirkuk which is the site of an Iraqi airbase and major oil fields, refinery and petrochemical plant. Forces would also be inserted near an air base at Mosul.

Iraqi resitance would be comprised of regular army, two fighter squadrons of Iraq's I and V Corps and by the Republican Guard's Northern Corps located at Mosul.

Once the airfields are taken and secured US cargo aircraft would begin to arrive, off-loading armored personnel carriers and other equipment. Additional ground reinforcements would also arrive including helicopters such as Apaches and Black Hawks. The operations would be expected to last only a few days.

The biggest uncertainty with any invasion plan revolves around the issue of how Iraqi troops and the civilian population would respond to any US military offensive. If the Iraqis decide to resist and retreat into major urban zones, the conflict could drag on and fighting get bogged down. Optimistic assessments paint the picture of the military turning against Saddam, though this assessment is not backed up by historical precedents. Moreover, US troops are unlikely to rely too much on local support as operations in Afghanistan have shown how unreliable local forces can be in both the planning and conduct of any operation.

Resistance is likely to be encountered in cities, particularly Baghdad. Elite Iraqi units, especially the Special Republican Guard reportedly trained for urban fighting, are likely to put fierce resistance in such an urban terrain where U.S. military advantages, such as airpower and aerial reconnaissance, are far less effective.

A civilian population welcoming of an invasion would provide support, intelligence and avoid costly and time-consuming urban fighting. Large-scale opposition to US troops would however turn the operation into a worst-case scenario.

According to some reports, rumors have circulated to the effect that new secret weapons might be used during the course of operations, including some designed to scramble the electronics of computer and communication systems using directed energy.

It is estimated that an attack could be launched 45 to 60 days after the order is given by the US President, with the war taking as little as a week or as much as two or three months.

There are of course other plans that have been discussed. However, based upon the amount of troops who will apparently be in the region by early/mid March, when I think we'll attack, this concept seems to closely resemble what we're going to do.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Originally posted by codeorama

Art, so you say that the ONLY reason we are in this is because of the threat of WMD used in a terrorist attack against the US....

What ever dude.... You keep believing that.

Now I don't know if you're being facetious or serious. If serious, what are the other reasons you think we'll be there?
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Originally posted by codeorama

Art, so you say that the ONLY reason we are in this is because of the threat of WMD used in a terrorist attack against the US....

What ever dude.... You keep believing that.

Code, there are hundreds of reasons we are thinking and talking about going into Iraq. Among them are lesser reasons like, we don't like Saddam and probably want to finish the job we should have finished a while back. We probably even want cheap access to their oil, perhaps as we setup a future attack on Saudi Arabia allowing us the leverage to do so. We may even want to go in just because we have older weapons that need to be exploded and new stuff to drive them in all weather making them very smart.

No matter what the dozens upon dozens of reasons we are interested in going into Iraq for, the fact is NONE of those reasons is we want to keep our troops from exposure to weapons of mass destruction. That's not a cause of going into Iraq you moron. That's an effect. We are going in for a reason and we must attempt to protect our people from what Iraq's response may be.

Or, are you saying we are so fearful of the possibility of Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction on our troops that we have put our troops within reach of those weapons and the cause of going into Iraq is because we fear him using those weapons on our troops, thereby we've decided to put our troops in his nation, almost certainly assuring it?

Do you even realize how this fails to even survive a passing glance at in terms of making a judgement for thought or reason. Seriously Code, if you think we're going into Iraq out of fear our solders could be hit by weapons of mass destruction, you need to be quiet. You need to go to the main Redskin board and NEVER speak off the topic of the Redskins again.

You think it's reasonable to think a cause of why we are going into Iraq is because we think they are going to spontaneously uncap their oil wells? Are you really this completely out of touch?

Everything Redman spoke to was a concern we have ONCE we go in. Not a single thing he mentioned was a cause for us to go in. We know that going into Iraq we want an end game of a stable regime and country and we'll be responsible for helping rebuild. We know that going into Iraq we have to fear our troops are in danger and we must do what we can to protect them. We know that by going into Iraq they will uncap their wells and perhaps spray the region with what they have in their last dying breath.

But not a single bit of that is why we're going into Iraq.

And, it's not about belief, Code. This is as factual a measurement as saying gravity exists, or 2+2=4. It's not a theory, or a concept. It's a complete impossibility that we are going into Iraq because we fear our soldiers being exposed to WMDs and that we've decided the most sure way to avoid that is to put our solders within range and assure they enter the country and have those weapons used against us.

Do you not see how it's impossible for that to be a cause because if that was a cause, our response would be to not go in. It would be to stay away. They can't hit us so we would avoid the area. If that was even a mild hint at why we wanted to deal with Iraq our soldiers would NEVER go near the Middle East. But, that's not a cause. It's an effect and a concern based on our actions and intentions.

Seriously though dude, you are so far lost here you NEED to shut up. You are hurting yourself here. You are exposing yourself for a person who simply is woefully out of touch and who is far too simple minded to even appreciate the issue he's gotten himself far to engaged in discussing.

For your own good, shut up.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Art,

I resent you calling anyone else simple minded, I though that was my role! :)

On the war in Iraq, I sure hope all of you hawks know what you're doing.

Are you sure we will be more safe if we invade Iraq without the UN?

Are you sure that occupying Iraq won't be almost impossible?

Are you sure by us attacking a Muslim county we won't lose all of our Muslim allies or worse help generate another group of terrorists?

I am not a blame America person, (I would like to screw the French too, they've needed to shut up for a long while now) The risks lifted above would not be our "fault" but would be a fault of the tenor of the religion itself. The point is we may be causing ourselves more harm than the obvious good of getting rid of that madman in Bagdad.

At the end of the day I would hate to have us lose American lives and actually be less secure!

War should always be the last resort. If we are sure it's the last resort than let's roll. Either way as soon as the war begins the opposition needs to shut up until the war is over.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Jack,

Iraq is not a Muslin country. I also dont think that the fundamentalists can get any more mad at us.

Also, we have the support of over 50 nations by the last count. If France vetoes any resolution it doesnt mean the UN isnt behind us.

And I agree, war should be the last resort. Unfortunately, we've reached that point.

And yes, we did use to support Saddam. Just like we used to support Stalin, and were enemies with Italy, and fought Mexico.

Things change.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Jack,

I don't know that even you've ever been seen to be this blind :).

But, to answer your questions, I'd say the following:

"Are you sure we will be more safe if we invade Iraq without the UN?"

Why wouldn't we be? We have dozens of nations with us in any attack. They will be there to assist in the rebuilding as well. What possible advantage does having the U.N. with us mean? Does the U.N. have a military, or do countries within the U.N. have them? The U.N. is a bunch of old diplomats impressing each other with big words. So, yeah, I kind of like it :). But, it's useless and won't protect us or defend us or make us safer if individual members of the U.N. aren't with us. Individual members, dozens of them, are with us. The majority of Europe, for example.

Actually, an interesting twist to ask now is whether having France and Russia involved might be more harmful to us than helpful anyway. The phrase too many chiefs and not enough indians comes to mind. France and Russia would kind of think they are equal partners here and add to the people we have to care about when deciding what to do during and after the conflict. Their military is so outstriped by ours that functional pairings are impossible and they'd actually slow down the pace we can generate to attack. Afterward they'd prance around like kings -- kind of like on the U.N. -- and we'd have to pretend like we care again. I think we're better off without both than with them, but, my guess is both will be there when the time comes :).

"Are you sure that occupying Iraq won't be almost impossible?"

In what way? Last time we were in the area people threw us parties and thanked us. We're not talking about going into a place that isn't at least kind of interested in being helped.

"Are you sure by us attacking a Muslim county we won't lose all of our Muslim allies or worse help generate another group of terrorists? "

I guess I can only as a simple thing. Since when did Iraq become Muslim? There are Muslims in the country, but it's not a theocracy like Iran or Afghanistan. It's not led by Muslim rule. It's a largely secular leadership, like Saudi Arabia. Also, if I had $100 for every time someone proposed the possibility of the Arab/Muslim Street rising up in response to something we've done, I'd be a millionaire and we've never seen it happen.

Here's a funny story about the truth of our concern with the Arab/Muslim Street rising up against us. My cousin is in the Air Force. For years he and his buddies always thought the Israelis were bad mamma jammas. They kicked so much butt in the Middle East that they were always kind of viewed as perhaps the best military in the world and even our troops respected them.

Then we went into the Gulf and my cousin said the entire American military figured out why they seemed so good. The opposition is so bad. Will it spawn more terrorists? I don't know. A whole lot will be killed during the bombing so perhaps it'll just be even afterward and the thing we'll save in the balance will be they don't have a nation who may be of the mind to help them anymore.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Archived

This topic is now archived and is closed to further replies.

  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
×
×
  • Create New...