Slate: No Faith In Science

[alexey]

Peter,

I would say that "quality of the evidence" is not a subjective thing and that consistent reality-based evidence obtained via the scientific method is of the higher quality.

I would say this is true even if we remain silent on whether this is a simulation, etc.

We may even accept that reality is a simulation, but still say that as far as discovering how the simulation appears to work, some evidence is of higher quality than other.

You seem to suggest that "quality of the evidence" is a subjective thing and that not knowing "ultimate truths" equalizes scientific and non- scientific evidence. I see your point and disagree with it.

I wonder where you stand in the example I provided about animals, etc, having faith according to your model.

[PeterMP]

well, ****.

those other comments were good too, Peter.

 

Let me make a few points:

1.  I've never said that the assumptions that under lie science are false.  In fact, I said I believe they are true.  I have faith that they are true.

 

2.  In terms of why do I science, when I was in 5th grade I knew I wanted to do one of 3 things when I grew up, play football, write, or be a scientists.  I like looking at information/data and trying to draw conclusions.  Doing science allows me to do that and get paid for it.  I don't have a large issue with the data and the conclusions are based on an underlying assumption being true (in my experience there are two types of scientists- people that like the process of setting up experiments and collecting the data.  They like working with their hands and instruments and then getting a result that if they did a good job (and making some assumptions) will tell them they did a good job.  That's not me.  My wife is actually that way.  And there are people like me.  I'd be happy never do an experiment and have people just give me their data to look at and sit down and figure out what it means in the context of some larger picture.)

 

3.  Anybody that says that one form of faith requires proof and the other isn't correct.  You can't prove that antibiotics are effective.  That is a centeral tennet of science.  Science only has the ability to disprove ideas not to prove them.  Anybody that tells you there is scientific proof that antibiotics kill bacteria is either ignorant or being dishonest.  If the burden for any faith is proof, we are all out of luck.

 

4.  The Bible does not ask us to believe without evidence.  Thomas had evidence.  The Bible itself is evidence (I'm not going to claim it is good evidence).  Ask anybody that believes in God, and they will give you reasons.  If it was discovered tomorrow that quantum mechanics was not true and that the universe was not probabilistic in nature (it could still be chaotic so it might be easiest/best to describe things in terms of probabilities, but if you could account for all of the variables in the system and so the chaos, the system would be absolutely (and probablitically) predictable) that would affect my belief in God.  It is a false depiction of religion and people that believe in god.

 

5.  The other false depiction is that we believe absolutely without doubts.  I have doubts.  Everybody that I've ever had this type of conversation with has expressed to having doubts with me (and that includes two priest).  My wife and I talk about our doubts all the time.  I've had the oppurtunity to get to know a few Hindus well, they have expressed to me their doubts.  I know there are people out there that claim to not have doubts (and I wouldn't be shocked if somebody came into this thread and claimed to not have doubts), but I've never personally had this type of conversation with them.

 

6.  And most importantly because it is generally applicable, just because I can not say two things are not different does not mean they

are the same. I'm doing some experiments where I'm measuring two different outputs. The results come back looking like this:

output 1: 2.1 3.4 4.1

output 2: 4.2 4.4 6.7

 

Simple statistics tell me that I can not conclude they are different (p-value = 0.128 (two tailed test, two samples with equal variance done in Excel)). This does not mean they they are the same though. It just means that based on the data I have I can't say they are different.  I can draw no conclusions about whether they are different.  Just because I cannot conclude that two things are different is not good evidence that they are the same.

 

I hammer that last point home to my students so let me say it again, just because I do not have good enough evidence to conclude that two things are different is not good evidence that they are the same.

[PeterMP]

Peter,

I would say that "quality of the evidence" is not a subjective thing and that consistent reality-based evidence obtained via the scientific method is of the higher quality.

I would say this is true even if we remain silent on whether this is a simulation, etc.

We may even accept that reality is a simulation, but still say that as far as discovering how the simulation appears to work, some evidence is of higher quality than other.

You seem to suggest that "quality of the evidence" is a subjective thing and that not knowing "ultimate truths" equalizes scientific and non- scientific evidence. I see your point and disagree with it.

I wonder where you stand in the example I provided about animals, etc, having faith according to your model.

Yes, I know you do because that's what you believe, and if you wish to robustly make that argument, you are welcome to try.  I've asked you to repeatedly.

 

I've addressed the points through out this thread and the other one.  Your question related to when we obtain faith is addressed pretty well in post 108.

 

The idea of learning about this as a simulation was addressed in the other thread and post of this thread (and the question you've yet to answer even though I have asked you over two threads).

 

If you wish to go in circles, I will send you in circles.

 

**EDIT**

See post 62 for the point on learning about this if this is a simulation.

[alexey]

Peter,

I think you are well aware of available arguments that science is a better tool than some other tools for obtaining knowledge about this reality (or this simulation).

You are saying "cannot prove that antibiotics are effective". I understand what you mean when you say that. You want to redefine the word "proof" to say that it must point to "ultimate reality" and not patterns within the reality (or simulation) that we inhabit.

I disagree because I think clinical trial data about effectiveness of drugs presented to the FDA is called "proof".

[alexey]

To avoid word games, here is my point loud and clear:

"faith" in god and "faith" in reality are different kinds of faiths.

I understand that you can make a killer argument about their similarities. Are you arguing that they are similar, or that they are the same? Do you acknowledge existence of differences?

[PeterMP]

Peter,

I think you are well aware of available arguments that science is a better tool than some other tools for obtaining knowledge about this reality (or this simulation).

You are saying "cannot prove that antibiotics are effective". I understand what you mean when you say that. You want to redefine the word "proof" to say that it must point to "ultimate reality" and not patterns within the reality (or simulation) that we inhabit.

I disagree because I think clinical trial data about effectiveness of drugs presented to the FDA is called "proof".

 

In terms of science proving things, I will settle for saying that  I agree with the members of the National Academy of Sciences:

 

http://www.pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/climate_statement3.pdf

 

"All citizens should understand some basic scientific facts. There is always some uncertainty associated with scientific conclusions; science never absolutely proves anything. When someone says that society should wait until scientists are absolutely certain before taking any action, it is the same as saying society should never take action."

 

I've in the other thread said they come from different places so they are different.

 

My point in this thread is not they are completely identical or even really the same. My point is that in both cases there is large uncertainity about the probability either one is true.

 

And in that sense they are similar.

 

And that uncertainity makes it very hard to say that one is more likely than the other.

[alexey]

In terms of science proving things, I will settle for saying that ...

...

I've in the other thread said they come from different places so they are different.

My point in this thread is not they are completely identical or even really the same. My point is that in both cases there is large uncertainity about the probability either one is true.

And in that sense they are similar.

And that uncertainity makes it very hard to say that one is more likely than the other.

I can agree with that.

Looks like we agree on superiority of science for finding truths about this reality (or simulation), as well as on theology and science being uncertain about truths outside of this reality (or simulation)

[PeterMP]

I can agree with that.

Looks like we agree on superiority of science for finding truths about this reality (or simulation), as well as on theology and science being uncertain about truths outside of this reality (or simulation)

 

My post didn't say anything about simulations or realities or truth

 

Science is extremely powerful at providing as a method to talk about the quality of different pieces of evidence, assuming the underlying assumptions are true.

 

If you wish to have a conversation with respect to attempts to understanding things in the event that this is a simulation please go back and address the points made in post 62 (or even better the other thread where I laid out the issues in more detail).

[alexey]

Science is extremely powerful at providing as a method to talk about the quality of different pieces of evidence, assuming the underlying assumptions are true.

If you wish to have a conversation with respect to attempts to understanding things in the event that this is a simulation please go back and address the points made in post 62 (or even better the other thread where I laid out the issues in more detail).

When you ask "if this is a simulation, what have you really learned?" - the answer is, we learned about the simulation. The context changed but knowledge claims remain the same.

You are saying that scientific knowledge breaks down if we start using the word "simulation" to describe reality. I say that's just word games. Science studies the thing that we call reality, whatever it actually is.

And regardless of whether reality is a simulation, I think that science is superior to theology for studying it.

Yes you are right, nothing can give us access beyond the reality (or simulation), so science and theology are on equally uncertain ground there.

[PeterMP]

When you ask "if this is a simulation, what have you really learned?" - the answer is, we learned about the simulation. The context changed but knowledge claims remain the same.

You are saying that scientific knowledge breaks down if we start using the word "simulation" to describe reality. I say that's just word games. Science studies the thing that we call reality, whatever it actually is.

And regardless of whether reality is a simulation, I think that science is superior to theology for studying it.

Yes you are right, nothing can give us access beyond the reality (or simulation), so science and theology are on equally uncertain ground there.

 

From post 62:

 

"2.  What is the probability that information learned through the scientific method (e.g. g = m1*m2/r^2), will be true tomorrow?"

 

As I've already stated, the process of science itself does not require faith, but that isn't the argument the OP was making.

 

I'm not saying JUST that it breaks down if we start using the word simulation.

 

There are lot's of other possibilities.

[alexey]

Peter,

Looks like we agree that if you are asking a question about reality, within reality, then science is the best way to answer it.

You are asking questions that go beyond reality and seemingly suggesting that your position naturally comes out of that. I no longer understand what you are trying to articulate. Can you please clearly state any disagreements that you have with my position.

[PeterMP]

Peter,

Looks like we agree that if you are asking a question about reality, within reality, then science is the best way to answer it.

You are asking questions that go beyond reality and seemingly suggesting that your position naturally comes out of that. I no longer understand what you are trying to articulate. Can you please clearly state any disagreements that you have with my position.

(Take note, made post 62, you didn't respond to the question.  I pointed you to post 62, you didn't respond to the question.  I re-quoted part of post 62, and you didn't respond to the question.  But you expect me to answer your question.)

 

In that type of scenario, science gives you information that was true at that particular point in time and space.  That's it.

 

That information is not very useful with respect to future events.  It does not strongly support conclusions related to antibiotics like put forward in the OP.

 

If this is a simulation (then that simulation and the simulators are real and part of reality), then an as good if not better approach to learn about it might be philosophical discussions about who would simulate us and why.  This might lead us to more bigger picture truths that will stay the same.

 

If the God described in the Bible does exist (i.e. he is real and therefore part of reality), then studying the Bible becomes a good way to learn about this reality.

 

If you want to define "reality" as what is true right there where you are right now (e.g. the local conditions in time and space), you are right.

 

But then we get into a very odd situation where your reality is not the same as mine (which is something I'd be willing to entertain from a scientific standpoint (e.g. quantum mechanics says the position of the observer matters) and from a larger philosophical stand point).

 

But I don't think you really want to go there either because that just leads to more questions you won't want to answer.

[alexey]

(Take note, made post 62, you didn't respond to the question. I pointed you to post 62, you didn't respond to the question. I re-quoted part of post 62, and you didn't respond to the question. But you expect me to answer your question.)

In that type of scenario, science gives you information that was true at that particular point in time and space. That's it.

I'm sorry I thought we already discussed the second question. I will explain my position on all questions regarding probability of future not resembling the past, patterns not continuing, etc.

The word "probability" refers to frequencies of observed events. The very question is nonsensical. Can you meaningfully discuss probability of miracles?

Probability is contained to our reality (or simulation). It is nonsensical to discuss probability of stuff that is outside of our reality.

That information is not very useful with respect to future events. It does not strongly support conclusions related to antibiotics like put forward in the OP.

If this is a simulation (then that simulation and the simulators are real and part of reality), then an as good if not better approach to learn about it might be philosophical discussions about who would simulate us and why. This might lead us to more bigger picture truths that will stay the same.

...

Disease is a fact in our reality (or simulation), and so if effectiveness of antibiotics.

If our reality is a simulation, then simulated antibiotics still heal similated diseases. Nothing changes, you are just playing word games.

If the God described in the Bible does exist (i.e. he is real and therefore part of reality), then studying the Bible becomes a good way to learn about this reality.

Yes things get really easy that way. If its true then its true and if its real then its real.

...

If you want to define "reality" as what is true right there where you are right now (e.g. the local conditions in time and space), you are right.

But then we get into a very odd situation where your reality is not the same as mine (which is something I'd be willing to entertain from a scientific standpoint (e.g. quantum mechanics says the position of the observer matters) and from a larger philosophical stand point).

But I don't think you really want to go there either because that just leads to more questions you won't want to answer.

I am not interested in exploring the "your reality is not the same as mine" angle. I am sure you will not deny that the one reality (or simmulation) we all share definitely contains things that we call physical objects, but may or may not contain spirits.

[PeterMP]

The word "probability" refers to frequencies of observed events. The very question is nonsensical. Can you meaningfully discuss probability of miracles?

No, it doesn't.

"probability: the extent to which something is probable; the likelihood of something happening or being the case."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability

"Probability is a measure or estimation of likelihood of occurrence of an event.[1] Probabilities are given a value between 0 (0% chance or will not happen) and 1 (100% chance or will happen).[2] The higher the degree of probability, the more likely the event is to happen, or, in a longer series of samples, the greater the number of times such event is expected to happen."

From "A First Course in Probability" by Sheldon Ross the 5th edition on pg. 1(a book that I have sitting on my bookshelf at work):

"Here is a typical problem of interest involving probability. A communication system is to consist of n seemingly identical antennas that are to be lined up in linear order. The resulting system will then be able to recieve all incoming signals- and will be called functional- as long as no two consecutive antennas are deffective. If it turns out that exactly m of the n antennas are defective, what is the probability that the resulting system will be functional?"

The whole problem is stated in the future tense, nothing about about already observed events.

One way to estimate a probability is based on observed events, but that isn't the only way.

I've never observed a penny tunnel through an energy barrier, but using quantum mechanics, I can talk about the probability of it happening.

http://quantumtantra.com/penny.html

And the same thing would apply to people walking through a wall.

Now, the equations are based on previous events, but they are talking about the probability that it will happen in the future based on those equations (assuming that the assumptions that underlie science hold).

Probability is contained to our reality (or simulation). It is nonsensical to discuss probability of stuff that is outside of our reality.

Why?

Disease is a fact in our reality (or simulation), and so if effectiveness of antibiotics.

If our reality is a simulation, then simulated antibiotics still heal similated diseases. Nothing changes, you are just playing word games.

Nothing changes unless the simulators decide it changes, and then antibiotics don't work against the simulated disease.

Yes things get really easy that way. If its true then its true and if its real then its real.

You're right, and that is exactly what you are doing only the other way.

If the assumptions that underlie science are true then science is true.

If the Bible is true about the exsistence of God, then the Bible is true.

Which leads us back to do we have a good reason to say that one is more likely to be true than the other?

[alexey]

Peter,

All of our language, meaning, knowledge, etc is confined to reality. You cannot use language confined to reality to refer to things "outside" of reality. If you are speaking about things "outside" of our reality, you are actually saying nonsense and playing word games.

And if you want to start making sense and talk about reality, show me how your "simulators" or your "god" are a part of reality other than a concept in your mind. I only know those things as concepts in your mind.

When you speak of "god" or "simulators" that can influence physical objects, I no longer know what you mean by those words. I only know the meaning of those words when they are referring to concepts in your mind.

[PeterMP]

Peter,

All of our language, meaning, knowledge, etc is confined to reality. You cannot use language confined to reality to refer to things "outside" of reality. If you are speaking about things "outside" of our reality, you are actually saying nonsense and playing word games.

And if you want to start making sense and talk about reality, show me how your "simulators" or your "god" are a part of reality other than a concept in your mind. I only know those things as concepts in your mind.

When you speak of "god" or "simulators" that can influence physical objects, I no longer know what you mean by those words. I only know the meaning of those words when they are referring to concepts in your mind.

 

I've considered what to do with this post (especially in the context of the last few posts in this thread), and I've decided that I will respond, but it will also be the last post I make in this thread in response to you alexey.

 

1.  What you are asking me for in the context of science is called a mechanism.  Can I describe a mechanism by which these things can happen?  While I'd generally agree that an idea that is backed with a mechanism is more robust than one that is not, I'd caution agaisnt rejecting ideas simply because of a lack of ability to explain the idea in the context of a mechanism.  This type of thinking can lead to faulty conclusions.  The history of the idea of continental drift is a good example of this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_development_of_tectonophysics

 

2.  However, in this context, it isn't really a problem.  We now have a history of simulating things that in the context of the simulation behave like physical things.  There are multiple ways to do this in chemistry and physics the one that I'm most familiar with and have actually done myself is a molecular dynamics simulations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molecular_dynamics). 

 

In the context of the system, the atoms/molecules in the simulation behave like real molecules/atoms as best as we can get them to and want them to, but in a way that allows the simulator to interact with them, if desired (stop it, go back, make some change, go forward again, etc.).  From a purely mechanistic stand point, there is no reason why the same approaches wouldn't work on much larger scales (this is a bit of an assumption, but it is an assumption made by science- what we learn for one thing at one place in time is true for other things at other places and times.  Gravity is considered to be true independent of the scale of the item without testing every entity to determine if it actually is being affected by gravity).  The issue is computing power and time.

 

Now, from my perspective, the last two posts especially are troubling because they fly in the face of information that I've already given you.  I've already given you links to scientists discussing whether this is a simulation and how the idea could be tested.  You've claimed that we can't use words about this reality, which scientists and others use openly in the publised literature and do relatively complex statistics and make arguments based on high level physcial sciences (and like I said initially, I don't even really understand the one paper). 

 

You've suggested that not only that there is no mechanism by which these things can happen, but that the words don't even have meaning, but yet scientists are perfectly willing to accept it could happen, that it is worth thinking and talking about, and even publishing methods to test the possiblility.

 

And I've already given you this information:

 

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/science/121012/universe-computer-simulation-university-bonn-germany-matrix-beane

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/science/121012/universe-computer-simulation-university-bonn-germany-matrix-beane

 

http://es.redskins.com/topic/373255-belief-vs-knowledge/page-5#entry9623772

 

This is especially troubling given in the context of the previous post, which could easily be dismissed by reading the wikipedia page on probability, but aslo flies in the face of information that I've already given you where people that know a lot about probability do discuss the probability that this is a simulation and even draw conclusions:

 

http://www.simulation-argument.com/weatherson.pdf

 

(a link I've given you before as somebody that has a higher level of doubt that we are a simulation)

 

All in all, based on what I'd already given you should have been able to realize that your post didn't make much sense, and the other post didn't make sense if you took 2 minutes to read the wikipedia page on probability or thought about information I've already given you.

 

Given that, I think it is likely you are not even trying to incorporate the information that I'm giving you into your thought processes.  In my experience, being in a situation where you are given information and not incorporating it into your thought processes is not a good place to be, and I do not wish to a party of that.

 

I do want to make the point that to me this is not about religion mostly.  I think it is more likely that a belief of in god will be strong in the future than that science will continue to recieve strong support from the general public.

 

I'd like to point out that I think I've linked to one "source" on religion (an old post made by techboy) in these two threads.  I'd like to encourage you to some time in the future to read the sources I've included and if you can't use words like probability, prove/proof, evidence, and reality in the same manner as those sources do in these types of conversations, then to spend some time thinking about why that might be the case.

 

Have a good day.

[alexey]

1. What you are asking me for in the context of science is called a mechanism. Can I describe a mechanism by which these things can happen? While I'd generally agree that an idea that is backed with a mechanism is more robust than one that is not, I'd caution agaisnt rejecting ideas simply because of a lack of ability to explain the idea in the context of a mechanism. This type of thinking can lead to faulty conclusions. The history of the idea of continental drift is a good example of this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_development_of_tectonophysics

2. However, in this context, it isn't really a problem. We now have a history of simulating things that in the context of the simulation behave like physical things. There are multiple ways to do this in chemistry and physics the one that I'm most familiar with and have actually done myself is a molecular dynamics simulations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molecular_dynamics).

It is hard to discuss mechanisms of nonsense.

You feel like you can imagine "simulators" changing "reality" from the outside, but what are you really imagining, does it make sense, and what can you meaningfully say about it?

 

...

Now, from my perspective, the last two posts especially are troubling because they fly in the face of information that I've already given you. I've already given you links to scientists discussing whether this is a simulation and how the idea could be tested. You've claimed that we can't use words about this reality, which scientists and others use openly in the publised literature and do relatively complex statistics and make arguments based on high level physcial sciences (and like I said initially, I don't even really understand the one paper).

...

I see you acting like this paper supports your postions... but did those scientists dicuss probabilities of "simulators" stopping the "simulation"? Did they discuss impacts of their research on metaphysical foundation of sciences, people using faith, comparing scientific and theological knowledge, or any other points that you are making?

 

You've suggested that not only that there is no mechanism by which these things can happen, but that the words don't even have meaning, but yet scientists are perfectly willing to accept it could happen, that it is worth thinking and talking about, and even publishing methods to test the possiblility.

Please let me know if i am missing something, but I understand that scientists "accept it could happen" when it comes to reality being a simulation. From there, you seem to be drawing conclusions that they are not drawing.

Do they accept the implications you are asserting?

Do they accept a possibility of meaningful discussions about "simulators" pushing buttons to stop reality?

 

...

I do want to make the point that to me this is not about religion mostly. I think it is more likely that a belief of in god will be strong in the future than that science will continue to recieve strong support from the general public.

...

I take the opposite view. I think more and more people will realize that "unknowable being for which evidence is everything" is nonsense.

God is unknowable by definition, right? So even people who believe it and talk about it, they cannot know what they are talking about... Language games, a collection of properties, defined as unknowable, combined with a claim of being a real existing thing... Isn't that just nonsense? Hardly an attractive proposition to critical thinkers.

[alexey]

Peter,

If you would like to know more about academic foundations of my position, I invite you to explore the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. He had interesting things to say about doubting reality and language games.

If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

-- Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty

It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then removed all these doubts.

--Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 87

http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/wittgenstein/section4.rhtml

Wittgenstein does not try to refute skeptical doubts about the existence of an external world so much as he tries to sidestep them, showing that the doubts themselves do not do the work they are meant to do. By suggesting that certain fundamental propositions are logical in nature, Wittgenstein gives them a structural role in language: they define how language, and hence thought, works. “Here is a hand” is an ostensive definition, meaning that it defines the word by showing an example. That statement explains how the word hand is to be used rather than making an empirical claim about the presence of a hand. If we begin to doubt these sorts of propositions, then the whole structure of language, and hence thought, comes apart. If two people disagree over whether one of them has a hand, it is unclear whether they can agree on anything that might act as a common ground on which they can debate the matter. Communication and rational thought are only possible between people when there is some sort of common ground, and when one doubts such fundamental propositions as “here is a hand,” that common ground shrinks to nothing. Skeptical doubts purport to take place within a framework of rational debate, but by doubting too much, they undermine rationality itself, and so undermine the very basis for doubt.

Behind Wittgenstein’s belief that “here is a hand” is an odd proposition, either to assert or to doubt, lies his insistence on the importance of context. The very idea of doubting the existence of the external world is a very philosophical activity. A philosopher can doubt away, but it is impossible to live out this sort of skepticism.

[s0crates]

I think Wittgenstein's point is a good one. Doubt requires certainty. If you had no beliefs, then there would be nothing to doubt.

So he is basically saying belief is prior to doubt. In other words, we begin not with doubt, but with belief. He says that in order to play the game of doubting you have to accept the rules of the game first.

Now the rules we accept are like articles of faith. In order to play the game of science, for example, you have to accept the rule that the future will resemble the past.

But the whole argument was about whether empirical science relied on such belief. Wittgenstein, if anything, might be taken to mean that such belief is in fact necessary. I just find it odd that you would cite him when arguing that science has no element of faith to it.

[alexey]

I think Wittgenstein's point is a good one. Doubt requires certainty. If you had no beliefs, then there would be nothing to doubt.

So he is saying belief is prior to doubt. In other words, we begin not with doubt, but with belief. He might say that in order to play the game of doubting you have to accept the rules of the game first.

Now what rules we believe in are like an article of faith or an assumption. In order to play the game of science, for example, you have to except the rule that the future will resemble the past.

But the whole argument was about whether empirical science relied on such belief, which Wittgenstein , if anything, might say that science indeed begins with a basic belief system which is assumed or taken on faith, he might call this the rules of the game.

I just find it odd that you would sight him when arguing that science has no element of faith to it.

Interesting points. I revisited some material... There is indeed a notion of "belief" involved, but it seems to have a different flavor. You seem to describe something that can be assumed or not assumed, picked up or not picked up, etc. For Wittgenstein, it seems to be an integral part for any kind of language, meaning, reason, or rationality. There seems to be no meaning in even talking about rejecting it.

Here are some seemingly relevant passages from On Certainty:

153. No one ever taught me that my hands don't disappear when I am not paying attention to them. Nor can I be said to presuppose the truth of this proposition in my assertions etc., (as if they rested on it) while it only gets sense from the rest of our procedure of asserting.

218. Can I believe for one moment that I have ever been in the stratosphere? No. So do I know the contrary, like Moore?

219. There cannot be any doubt about it for me as a reasonable person. - That's it. -

220. The reasonable man does not have certain doubts.

btw here is my main beef with Peter:

231. If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.

These ones are interesting because instead of saying that we build up knowledge on assumptions, it suggests the other way around - assumptions from knowledge, foundations from experience.

246. "Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs." "This position I will hold!" But isn't that, precisely, only because I am completely convinced of it? - What is 'being completely convinced' like?

247. What would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands? Why can't I imagine it at all? What would I believe if I didn't believe that? So far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist.

248. I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.

249. One gives oneself a false picture of doubt.

250. My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it.

251. Doesn't this mean: I shall proceed according to this belief unconditionally, and not let anything confuse me?

252. But it isn't just that I believe in this way that I have two hands, but that every reasonable person does.

253. At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded.

254. Any 'reasonable' person behaves like this.

This one highlights some other disagreements that were voiced here:

286. What we believe depends on what we learn. We all believe that it isn't possible to get to the moon; but there might be people who believe that that is possible and that it sometimes happens. We say: these people do not know a lot that we know. And, let them be never so sure of their belief - they are wrong and we know it. If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far.

About "problem of induction":

287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions.

[s0crates]

Wittgenstein is famously subject to interpretation and misinterpretation.

Some people read it as foundationalism (we have foundational beliefs upon which all other beliefs rest), some read it as dogmatism (we simply have faith that our perception reflects reality), and still others read it as contextualism (that knowledge is context sensitive). Some think he is saying something altogether different. You could probably find textual support for each position.

I read him to be saying that some beliefs are beyond doubt, in the sense that we cannot make sense of the world if we doubt them. To ask for proof of those beliefs is nonsense. Some things we simply accept without proof, because those are the rules of the game, or because that is what we do.

To me those rules of the game are comparable to articles of faith. They are the assumptions we begin with.

But again, this is subject to interpretation.

[alexey]

...

I read him to be saying that some beliefs are beyond doubt, in the sense that we cannot make sense of the world if we doubt them. To ask for proof of those beliefs is nonsense. Some things we simply accept without proof, because those are the rules of the game, or because that is what we do.

To me those rules of the game are comparable to articles of faith. They are the assumptions we begin with.

But again, this is subject to interpretation.

To make a general statement, I think that in philosophy, like in politics, positions taken by people may sometimes reflect their chosen career path more than their actual convictions.

I see Wittgenstein not keeping some beliefs beyond doubt but saying that if one wants to present a doubt of fundamental beliefs, then one has to redefine the whole system for accepting/rejecting evidence. Otherwise it is impossible to make sense of the presented doubt. (231) You cannot discuss evidence unless you know the system for admitting it (250).

Suggestions of "doubt" without such a system paint a "false picture of doubt" (249)

In other words, we did not take those fundamental beliefs and used them to build a system, but those beliefs simply emerged as fundamental as we learned more and more. (248)

That's my understanding.

By the way, a few hundred years ago a belief in god may have been just as fundamental as a belief in future resembling the past. That fundamental belief got overturned as we learned more and improved our system of knowledge (as more and more people realize different abilities of different systems of knowledge - 286)

[s0crates]

I see what you mean alexey, and I think it is not only a reasonable interpretation of Wittgenstein, but it is also a reasonable response to skepticism.

The skeptics are not playing by the rules of the game, they are playing an entirely different game, and their questions are meaningless in the context of the game we are all playing.

I'm still unclear how this shows empirical science does not begin with some unprovable belief.

I agree we have to set rules of the game before we can see if the rules are being followed, or as you say "define a system for accepting or rejecting evidence." Yet the problem remains that the setting of those rules or defining of that system is something that is merely assumed or believed. The system is, in a way, self-referential, and beyond verification (think Gödel's incompleteness theorem).

Now perhaps Wittgenstein is right, and to ask for proof of such a thing is nonsense, but if there can be no proof, it seems to me we must rely on faith.

[alexey]

...

Now perhaps Wittgenstein is right, and to ask for proof of such a thing is nonsense, but if there can be no proof, it seems to me we must rely on faith.

Sure, but it seems to me then you must also accept that the squirrel is relying on faith as well:

287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions.

[s0crates]

I still don't see how it helps.

The squirrel has what is sometimes called animal-faith. The squirrel accepts what is given not only without doubt, but without even so much as a context where doubt would be possible.

Yet, if we are to say that science has roots in the same kind of animal-faith, the acceptance of what is given or revealed through perception, have we shown science is in no way reliant on a kind of belief? It may be nonsensical to doubt that belief, but it is a belief nonetheless, it is a faith in what is given.