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FEB. 12: Academic Freedom Day


skinsfan51

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The mathematical odds of evolution happening go WAY beyond 635 billion to 1. Dr. David Berlinksi, an "expert" by most measurements, knows how insane it is. He called it "perfectly absurd." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L-UCo7JQm-A&feature=related

I hate to keep doing this but....

"Berlinski is a Senior Fellow of the Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture...."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Berlinski

Are we noticing a pattern yet?

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So what does a scientists do when the evidence, as he/she sees it, points without a doubt to a Designer? Ignore it? Suppress it? Deceive their own selves into thinking that they are somehow misunderstanding the evidence? What? In light of what you said above what do you do with evidence that says, "Designed"?

How does evidence say designed?

That is my issue. Scientists today are not willing to openly and objectively consider the evidence without first layout out some prerequisites that will determine the outcome. That is NOT true science.

The only pre-condition I am laying out is that the explanation for the phenomonea has to be able to be disproved, and whether you like it or not that THE most basic element of science.

If you propose that God created all live and the Universe in seven days, I can't disprove that and that means it isn't science. Science advances by disproving things.

Once people believed that babies happened because during sex men inject tiny babies into women, which then grew in the women. Today we have collected a large amount of data that disagrees with that and support our view of how babies happen so we say the older view is false.

Now, you might not like science, but science is what science and if you include things that can't be disproved science will not continue to advance.

In terms of evolution, we have a theory that works well and well explains what we see and has been validated by making predictions (DNA) and even by detailed lab experiments looking at the rise of new traits, and despite being pretty old hasn't been disproved.

That's a pretty good theory.

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I hate to keep doing this but....

"Berlinski is a Senior Fellow of the Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture...."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Berlinski

Are we noticing a pattern yet?

Oh, oh, I see a pattern! It's a list of supremely qualified, real scientists who dare to question the establishment. But I'm sure you'd debate him and make him look like a little boy, right? :rolleyes:

Berlinski's an agnostic. So what's his motive for proving ID? He doesn't believe the Bible. He's just honest with the facts.

Let's look at his qualifications to discuss the mathematical probabilities of evolution:

David Berlinski was born to Jewish-German refugees from Nazi Germany who immigrated to New York City, and German was his first spoken language.[3] He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton University[4] and was later a postdoctoral fellow in mathematics and molecular biology at Columbia University. He has taught philosophy, mathematics, and English at Stanford, Rutgers, the City University of New York, the University of Washington, the University of Puget Sound, San Jose State University, the University of Santa Clara, the University of San Francisco, and San Francisco State University.

He has also taught mathematics at the Université de Paris. He has been a research fellow at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria and the Institute des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques (IHES) in France. He currently lives in Paris.

He has written works on systems analysis, the history of differential topology, theoretical biology, analytic philosophy, and the philosophy of mathematics. Berlinski is best known for his books on mathematics and the history of mathematics written for the general public. These include A Tour of the Calculus (1997) on calculus, The Advent of the Algorithm (2000) on algorithms, Newton's Gift (2000) on Isaac Newton, and Infinite Ascent: A Short History of Mathematics (2005). Another book, The Secrets of the Vaulted Sky (2003), compares astrological and evolutionary accounts of human behavior.

He's not exactly a born-again Christian. I just appreciate his honesty to look at the evidence without bias. That's science.

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The mathematical odds of evolution happening go WAY beyond 635 billion to 1. Dr. David Berlinksi, an "expert" by most measurements, knows how insane it is. He called it "perfectly absurd." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L-UCo7JQm-A&feature=related

Why start with a cow?

Why not a hippo or a manatee?

We know that evolution happens as well as we know essentially about anything else happenning on the DNA level.

We have "observed" evolution.

(HA- I didn't even know this:

"Despite their physical resemblance to pigs and other terrestrial even-toed ungulates, their closest living relatives are cetaceans (whales, porpoise, etc.). The common ancestor of whales and hippos split from other even-toed ungulates around 60 million years ago. The earliest known hippopotamus fossils, belonging to the genus Kenyapotamus in Africa, date to around 16 million years ago."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hippopotamus

Yes, let's obtusely start with a transformation that is difficult to imagine when there is an already living "intermediate" that gives an easier transition).

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Why start with a cow?

Why not a hippo or a manatee?

How do you know which one is right? I'll start with "In the beginning God created," thanks. God made the cow a cow and a whale a whale. There is no transition, and no evidence of a transition (and there should be BILLIONS of transitions if Darwin was right).

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How do you know which one is right? I'll start with "In the beginning God created," thanks. God made the cow a cow and a whale a whale. There is no transition, and no evidence of a transition (and there should be BILLIONS of transitions if Darwin was right).

Sorry, I doubled posted on you. Hippos and whales are more evolutionary related. Go back up and read the post.

There are transitions. In some cases though a transition might even be seen as a transition based on the fossil evidence. Remember, all we have left a lot of times is the bones.

He mentioned eyes and skin. You can do a lot w/ eyes and skin and not change the bones underneath.

It's like leaving you the shell (frame) of a car. Is it a stick or automatic?

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The problem is your analogy is flawed because it ASSUMES that only that one set of cards gives life (this then carries over to your other post and why I don't really understand why people result to requiring multiple universes- maybe almost any combination of physical constants results in a universe capable of bearing "life").

No, you're not getting my point.

If life can only evolve under the conditions they describe, and if those odds are one in a bazillion (or whatever), the bridge hand analogy you presented is fallacious, as I showed.

Now, you can argue that life might have evolved on Earth under different circumstances, and I'll freely admit that I don't know that to be wrong (though Barrow and Tipler would seem to argue otherwise), but even if you're right, that just means that the odds aren't calculated properly.

In no case does the "improbable stuff happens everyday" counterargument work, because it proceeds under the flawed assumption that all probabilities are equal in the argument it is trying to defeat, and they are not.

As to why many physicists (not, you will note, biologists) are intrigued by the multiple universes angle, it's because while you might be able to argue that if the Earth had other factors life might still have evolved, some of the "fine-tuning" in astrophysics involves scenarios where there would be no stars, or where the universe collapses in on itself, or the like, which is a lot more problematic. Kind of hard for any life to evolve without a universe at all to evolve in. ;)

You are correct for now. When the new LHC finally comes online, there might be some experimental results to point the correct direction.

I hope so. It will be cool to see what comes out of it. :)

If it doesn't kill us all first. :silly:

Of course, then we'd know, right? :D

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Oh, oh, I see a pattern! It's a list of supremely qualified, real scientists who dare to question the establishment. But I'm sure you'd debate him and make him look like a little boy, right? :rolleyes:

Berlinski's an agnostic. So what's his motive for proving ID? He doesn't believe the Bible. He's just honest with the facts.

Let's look at his qualifications to discuss the mathematical probabilities of evolution:

He's not exactly a born-again Christian. I just appreciate his honesty to look at the evidence without bias. That's science.

Giggle.

The 15 or so employees paid by a creationist institute all lack bias.

Meanwhile, the millions of biologists in the world who think creationism is not valid science are all biased.

Thanks for the enlightenment.

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No, you're not getting my point.

If life can only evolve under the conditions they describe, and if those odds are one in a bazillion (or whatever), the bridge hand analogy you presented is fallacious, as I showed.

Now, you can argue that life might have evolved on Earth under different circumstances, and I'll freely admit that I don't know that to be wrong (though Barrow and Tipler would seem to argue otherwise), but even if you're right, that just means that the odds aren't calculated properly.

In no case does the "improbable stuff happens everyday" counterargument work, because it proceeds under the flawed assumption that all probabilities are equal in the argument it is trying to defeat, and they are not.

As to why many physicists (not, you will note, biologists) are intrigued by the multiple universes angle, it's because while you might be able to argue that if the Earth had other factors life might still have evolved, some of the "fine-tuning" in astrophysics involves scenarios where there would be no stars, or where the universe collapses in on itself, or the like, which is a lot more problematic. Kind of hard for any life to evolve without a universe at all to evolve in. ;)

I get your point, but you've mistaken mine.

Mine is EXACTLY that the odds aren't calculated right.

They have a sample space of one (ours) and are trying to draw conclusions about an infinite space. It isn't realistic.

This is from the same place as I drew the bridge analogy, but further down in the link:

http://www.epicidiot.com/evo_cre/13cards.htm

"It's easy to imagine an ammonia-breathing intelligent being somewhere right now saying, “wow, what are the odds that this planet has just the right amount of ammonia in the atmosphere, we are just the right distance from our sun to maintain an average temperature of 180º F, the three moons provide just the right amount of tidal action, . . . My, what a finely tuned planet this is.”

You are sitting there with your cards, and he with his and both saying 'Wow this is amazing.'

From the same link about the whole universe:

"The same extends to the universe. If the nuclear forces were different, then the laws of physics would be different, atoms (or their equivalent) would form differently, but something somewhere might be posing the exact same argument that their nuclear forces (which are different from what we happen to experience) were just the exact type needed to . . .

Like getting any particular set of 13 cards, the odds are incredibly small that you would get that particular formation, yet the odds are good that you would have gotten something, in which case you would be looking at it and saying what are odds."

Basically, what set of physical constants ACTUALLY gives you a collapsed universe?

Do any of them?

What happens to a universe with those constants when it does collapse?

We are getting to the point where we can't really address such questions via experimentation or even good theory, but to say that because you can't disprove my statistics (e.g. that this universe is uniquely set-up for life at the odds of 1 to infinity) means I'm right is worthless in science and as scientific as saying, I am right because that's what God did because the Bible says so and you can't prove I'm wrong.

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Here's a perfect analogy for what they are doing. I have a billion cards in front of me. I flip one over and it is 1. Based on the font and its size of the 1, somebody has calculated that there are possibly millions and millions of combinations of numbers that could fit on the face of the cards. Then they declared that MUST mean that the cards are uniformly distributed between all of those possible numbers and ones are rare, and any other flip was not likely to result in another 1.

Of course, they (and in this case all of us) have no idea what the real underlying distribution is and therefore no idea how likely it is we'd get another 1. Can I rebut their argument and conclusively demonstrate they are wrong? No, but realistically, they all could be ones.

We have one universe and really one planet. We know that in that one universe and on that one planet, there is life. What that means for other possible universes and even other planets is completely unclear.

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I almost hate to point this out, but this particular argument is itself fallacious.
I want to comment on this, because it appears that Peter conceded a point back here, which has led the conversation down a path towards incoherence. I think that tb actually has it wrong on this point...
The problem is that it assumes that all outcomes are equally likely and useful, whereas the argument put forth by The Priveleged Planet is that in the 1 in "whatever" chance, everything but that "1" are equally bad and prevent life, while the "1" is the only good outcome.

For the analogy to truly work, it would be more like a person with a gun is dealing you a hand of bridge, and unless you get one particluar hand, he's going to shoot you. You get just the right hand, and you live.

I think the Russian Roulette/Bridge analogy is very good.
At that point, I think the absurd statement would be "Oh... if I hadn't got just the right hand, I'd be dead, and so I wouldn't be here to observe that I lived through it."
I don't see what is absurd about this statement though. We live in a universe surrounded by dead bridge players, and we are the ones that lived to tell about it.
It would, on the other hand, be perfectly reasonable to think "Hey... that hand must have been rigged in my favor somehow. What's the dealer up to?"
It would be perfectly reasonable to ask this question, and that is why gamblers thank God when they win, but science has shown that however God is rigging the deck, he is doing it in a way that the Vegas cameras are not able to detect.

Small miracles happen every day. People win the lottery, fumbles leap into the hands of defensive tackles, chromosomes mutate in developing embryos ... the hand of God may play a role in all of these things, but thus far we have proven incapable of predicting or understanding God's role.

To us, these processes all look random, and evolution appears to be the same way. Randomness does not imply the absence of God - only that God works in mysterious ways...

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Here's a perfect analogy for what they are doing. I have a billion cards in front of me. I flip one over and it is 1. Based on the font and its size of the 1, somebody has calculated that there are possibly millions and millions of combinations of numbers that could fit on the face of the cards. Then they declared that MUST mean that the cards are uniformly distributed between all of those possible numbers and ones are rare, and any other flip was not likely to result in another 1.

Of course, they (and in this case all of us) have no idea what the real underlying distribution is and therefore no idea how likely it is we'd get another 1.

We have one universe and really one planet. We know on that in that one universe and on that one planet, there is life. What that means for other possible universes and even other planets is completely unclear.

I'm sorry, Peter, but this one doesn't really address the underlying argument properly either. Honestly, I was hoping to stay out of this, because I don't want to distract you from your (probably futile) attempt to explain the scientifc method to skinsfan51 (I only wanted to correct one fallacious argument). It would appear I can't, though, so I'm going to go whole hog. I will present to you the basics of what is called the Teleological argument, what the scientific consensus is regarding fine tuning (note, not the conclusion of ID, just the fine tuning itself), and in the process, I will hopefully show you just how your reasoning is going awry. I'll also cover, as you asked, some of the variables we're talking about, including the ones that would cause the collapse of the universe if tweaked a bit.

To begin with, it is not at all controversial to suggest that the universe is fine tuned for life. From How bio-friendly is the universe?, an article in the International Journal of Astrobiology 2 (2) : 115–120 (2003) by P C W Davies:

There is now broad agreement among physicists and cosmologists that the universe is in several respects ‘fine-tuned’ for life.

That article, by the way, is not a bad introduction to the concept, as well as some of the theories that have been proposed to help explain it.

So, what exactly does it mean to say that the universe is "fine-tuned" for life, and what are the implications? An excerpt From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (the title of this source might be a clue to skinsfan51, by the way, more on that at the end ;)):

4.1 Cosmic Fine-Tuning

It was recognized centuries back that conditions necessary for the flourishing of life were fairly tightly constrained (making the move to design in natural conditions and laws inherently attractive), but not until quite recent times has it been revealed through science itself just how wildly tight the constraints actually are, and just how many separate things have to converge, each within a miniscule value interval. For instance, here are two examples taken from Robin Collins:

1. If the initial explosion of the big bang had differed in strength by as little as one part in 10^60, the universe would have either quickly collapsed back on itself, or expanded too rapidly for stars to form. In either case, life would be impossible. (As John Jefferson Davis points out, an accuracy of one part in 10^60 can be compared to firing a bullet at a one-inch target on the other side of the observable universe, twenty billion light years away, and hitting the target.)

3. Calculations by Brandon Carter show that if gravity had been stronger or weaker by one part in 10^40, then life-sustaining stars like the sun could not exist. This would most likely make life impossible. (Collins 1999, 49.)[28]

In light of these and other examples, Collins remarks that “Almost everything about the basic structure of the universe … is balanced on a razor's edge for life to occur.” (Collins 1999, 48).

There is some disagreement over just how many such independent factors there are, but by some counts there are over 100, although not all requiring the above degree of precision.[29] But the apparent probability of all the necessary conditions sufficient to allow just the formation of planets (let alone life) coming together just by chance is utterly outrageously tiny—by Roger Penrose's calculation, the probability of chance alone producing cosmoi capable of producing planets is 1 in 10 raised in turn to the 10^123 (Penrose 1990, 343-4). With respect to key enzymes occurring by chance, astrophysicist Fred Hoyle throws around numbers like 10^-40000 (Hoyle 1982, 4-5). (Although there is no consensus, some, following e.g., Emile Borel, suggest that a probability of occurrence of less than 10^-50 can be taken as equivalent to practical impossibility.) Apparently crushing improbabilities of that order tied to the apparent value of a life-permitting (or intelligence-permitting) universe has given rise to cosmic fine-tuning arguments for design, according to which improbable fine-tuning of the cosmos for life and intelligence is taken as empirical evidence of design, purpose, and deliberate intent. In fact, the tighter the constraints, the more reasonable it becomes to see design in the conditions meeting those constraints. Other things being equal, deliberate, intentional design would constitute a plausible explanation for a universe like ours existing against the odds and out of all the myriad possible life-precluding or life-hampering universes.

Please notice that the low side of the first example would have the universe collapse back in on itself, while many of the other factors would prevent stars, planets, galaxies, and so on.

If you'd like to see one of those factors more indepth, consider this piece of a larger work from Roger Penrose, an eminent mathematical physicist at Oxford (here's his wikipedia page). Relevant excerpts:

Try to imagine the phase space (cf. p. 177) of the entire universe! Each point in this phase space represents a different possible way that the universe might have started off. We are to picture the Creator, armed with a `pin' which is to be placed at some point in the phase space (Fig. 7.19 not shown). Each different positioning of the pin provides a different universe. Now the accuracy that is needed for the Creator's aim depends upon the entropy of the universe that is thereby created. It would be relatively `easy' to produce a high entropy universe, since then there would be a large volume of the phase space available for the pin to hit. (Recall that the entropy is proportional to the logarithm of the volume of the phase space concerned.) But in order to start off the universe in state of low entropy-so that there will indeed be a second law of thermodynamics-the Creator must aim for a much tinier volume of the phase space. How tiny would this region be, in order that a universe closely resembling the one in which we actually live would be the result? In order to answer this question, we must first turn to a very remarkable formula, due to Jacob Bekenstein (1972) and Stephen Hawking (1975), which tells us what the entropy of a black hole must be.

and (skipping over a lot of mathematical physics)

This now tells us how precise the Creator's aim must have been: namely to an accuracy of one part in 10^10^123.

This is an extraordinary figure. One could not possibly even write the number down in full, in the ordinary denary notation: it would be `1' followed by 10^123 successive `0 's! Even if we were to write a `0' on each separate proton and on each separate neutron in the entire universe-and we could throw in all the other particles as well for good measure-we should fall far short of writing down the figure needed. The precision needed to set the universe on its course is seen to be in no way inferior to all that extraordinary precision that we have already become accustomed to in the superb dynamical equations (Newton's, Maxwell's, Einstein's) which govern the behaviour of things from moment to moment.

So, that's sort of a quick thumbnail of the science behind the conclusion of "fine-tuning". Now I will turn to the two analogies, and why they are flawed.

The first was the "Bridge Hand", or put another way,

Small miracles happen every day. People win the lottery, fumbles leap into the hands of defensive tackles, chromosomes mutate in developing embryos ... the hand of God may play a role in all of these things, but thus far we have proven incapable of predicting or understanding God's role.

As I said, that anaology assumes that all probabilities are equally good, and that is simply not the case. "Fine tuning" means that the factors are right and necessary for intelligent life, and any difference creates a non life-permitting universe. So, all probabilities are not equal. This argument is not suggesting that improbability requires divine intervention. That's a misunderstanding of the probabilities here.

Again, for the analogy to truly work, it would be more like a person with a gun is dealing you a hand of bridge, and unless you get one particluar hand, he's going to shoot you. You get just the right hand, and you live.

At that point, I think the absurd statement would be "Oh... if I hadn't got just the right hand, I'd be dead, and so I wouldn't be here to observe that I lived through it."

It would, on the other hand, be perfectly reasonable to think "Hey... that hand must have been rigged in my favor somehow. What's the dealer up to?"

Now, there is a further objection that

I don't see what is absurd about this statement though. We live in a universe surrounded by dead bridge players, and we are the ones that lived to tell about it.

But the probabilities involved are so crushing that this hardly seems like a credible option. To quote Dr. William Lane Craig in his THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE (which is also a good primer for this stuff, by the way):

But does the Anthropic Philosophy follow from the Anthropic Principle, as Barrow and Tipler claim? Let us concede that it follows from WAP that

3. We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence.

For if the features of the universe were incompatible with our existence, we should not be here to notice it. Hence, it is not surprising that we do not observe such features. But it follows neither from WAP nor (3) that

4. We should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with our existence.

For although the object of surprise in (4) might at first blush appear to be simply the contrapositive of the object of surprise in (3), this is mistaken. This can be clearly seen by means of an illustration (borrowed from John Leslie{16}): suppose you are dragged before a firing squad of 100 trained marksmen, all of them with rifles aimed at your heart, to be executed. The command is given; you hear the deafening sound of the guns. And you observe that you are still alive, that all of the 100 marksmen missed! Now while it is true that

5. You should not be surprised that you do not observe that you are dead,

nonetheless it is equally true that

6. You should be surprised that you do observe that you are alive.

Since the firing squad's missing you altogether is extremely improbable, the surprise expressed in (6) is wholly appropriate, though you are not surprised that you do not observe that you are dead, since if you were dead you could not observe it. Similarly, while we should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our existence, it is nevertheless true that

7. We should be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with our existence, in view of the enormous improbability that the universe should possess such features.

The reason the falsity of (7) does not follow from (3) is that subimplication fails for first order predicate calculus. For (3) may be schematized as

3'. ~S: (x) ([Fx × ~Cx] É ~Ox)

where "S:" is an operator expressing "we should be surprised that" and "F" is "is a feature of the universe," "C" is "is compatible with our existence," and "O" is "is observed by us." And (7) may be schematized as

7'. S: ($x) (Fx × Cx × Ox)

It is clear that the object of surprise in (7') is not equivalent to the object of surprise in (3'); therefore the truth of (3') does not entail the negation of (7').{17}

Therefore, the attempt of the Anthropic Philosophy to stave off our surprise at the basic features of the universe fails. It does not after all follow from WAP that our surprise at the basic features of the universe is unwarranted or inappropriate and that they do not therefore cry out for explanation. But which features of the universe should thus surprise us? --those which are necessary conditions of our existence and which seem extremely improbable or whose coincidence seems extremely improbable. Thus, we should amend (7) to read

7*. We should be surprised that we do observe basic features of the universe which individually or collectively are excessively improbable and are necessary conditions of our own existence.

Emphasis mine on a better analogy still.

That is why the Bridge analogy is flawed, and that was all I was really trying to say. :)

As to the rest, I believe the Teleological argument is quite persuasive, because I think it's far more plausible to argue that the game is rigged than that it just happened depsite these crushingly small probabilities. Online poker players have uncovered cheating for far less. Corrupt voting has been decried by independent watchdog groups for the barest fraction of what we're talking about here.

I think the power of the case is only heightened by the number of otherwise sober scientists that have begun proposing alternate theories that their peers, as in the link earlier, decry as "metaphysics".

Which brings me to my last point. While the fine tuning is hard science (as hard as it can be, anyway, given our always limited knowledge), the conclusion I drew from it (that God exists) is not. It is metaphysics (or philosophy). I have no problem admitting that. It doesn't bother me, because I know that science is not the only tool to gain knowledge of the world.

Heck, science itself relies on philosophy to attain knowledge.

I would not, therefore, teach the Teleological argument in my Physics classes. It doesn't belong there. It belongs in Philosophy, which High Schools don't offer (in most places).

Which is a shame, because that's one of the reasons some people seem to have the mistaken impression that science is the only acceptable route to knowledge.

Or proof, for that matter. (That one's for you, Peter, because you've been using the term "proof" in the strictly scientific sense, without explicitly saying so. There are lots of kinds of proofs.)

So, in summary, PeterMP... You're right about what science is, and wrong about the probability calculus.

The end.

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To begin with, it is not at all controversial to suggest that the universe is fine tuned for life. From How bio-friendly is the universe?, an article in the International Journal of Astrobiology 2 (2) : 115–120 (2003) by P C W Davies:

hey this article doesn't suck

it is definitely reasonable to ask if the deck is fixed...

I don't understand much after the first few paragraphs... quantum mechanics I don't get

Still no doubt, that a naturalist would reply that if there were infinite manifestations of the universe before this one? For example: universe collapses in on itself, and then expands and there are new constants within the universe? This process could hypothetically go on forever, and of course only the one that had the right tuning would be perceived by life forms. Of course that assumes the laws of physics could be something else before the big bang... which might be conceivable but no more scientific than any other theory.

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Still no doubt, that a naturalist would reply that if there were infinite manifestations of the universe before this one? For example: universe collapses in on itself, and then expands and there are new constants within the universe? This process could hypothetically go on forever, and of course only the one that had the right tuning would be perceived by life forms. Of course that assumes the laws of physics could be something else before the big bang... which might be conceivable but no more scientific than any other theory.

Actually, this one I can answer. The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem demonstrates that our universe can't have an infinite past. This is probably yet another reason some turn to the multi-verse (Vilenkin, for one).

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As I said, that anaology assumes that all probabilities are equally good, and that is simply not the case. "Fine tuning" means that the factors are right and necessary for intelligent life, and any difference creates a non life-permitting universe. So, all probabilities are not equal. This argument is not suggesting that improbability requires divine intervention. That's a misunderstanding of the probabilities here.
I still don't really understand your statement that the probabilities are not equal.

You do seem to be making the suggestion that the high degree of improbability implies divine intervention.

But the probabilities involved are so crushing that this hardly seems like a credible option.
That is the crux of your argument.
As to the rest, I believe the Teleological argument is quite persuasive, because I think it's far more plausible to argue that the game is rigged than that it just happened depsite these crushingly small probabilities. Online poker players have uncovered cheating for far less. Corrupt voting has been decried by independent watchdog groups for the barest fraction of what we're talking about here.
I do think the teleological argument is pretty persuasive, but you have to admit that the teleological rests solely on the premise that extreme improbability implies divine intervention. Your examples (poker players and corrupt voting) are simply based on probabilities, and the teleological argument simply presents a smaller probability.
Which brings me to my last point. While the fine tuning is hard science (as hard as it can be, anyway, given our always limited knowledge), the conclusion I drew from it (that God exists) is not. It is metaphysics (or philosophy). I have no problem admitting that. It doesn't bother me, because I know that science is not the only tool to gain knowledge of the world.
I can accept that. Also realize that I am not trying to argue that science disproves God. I think the evidence actually weighs in favor of the existence of God but, as you say, it does not prove God. I am pretty sure that Peter believes in God as well. You're not arguing against a bunch of atheists here.
So, in summary, PeterMP... You're right about what science is, and wrong about the probability calculus.
I still think you're wrong about the probability calculus though.

You are still committing the fallacy that Peter pointed out. Yes, the probability is very low no matter how you calculate it, but we really don't know the universe we are working with. We don't know how many planets are out there, how many dimensions, how many universes ... maybe you don't want to believe in those theories, but the fact is that we can't properly calculate the odds. We don't even know what the correct parameters should be.

I personally find much more evidence for God in the order of the universe, and the fact that it appears to obey elegant rules, than in our flawed estimates at probabilities...

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Why can't evolution just be the how, not the why? Why must Moses' words be taken literally, have we even translated them correctly? Why can't Earth, at one point, have been Venus which was once knocked back to it's current orbit?

Cosmogony is an awesome topic!

And why must life only exist in this form, under the laws of the Universe we have discovered thus far? If the Big Bang happened differently, perhaps there would simply be a different Universe.

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I'm sorry, Peter, but this one doesn't really address the underlying argument properly either. Honestly, I was hoping to stay out of this, because I don't want to distract you from your (probably futile) attempt to explain the scientifc method to skinsfan51 (I only wanted to correct one fallacious argument). It would appear I can't, though, so I'm going to go whole hog. I will present to you the basics of what is called the Teleological argument, what the scientific consensus is regarding fine tuning (note, not the conclusion of ID, just the fine tuning itself), and in the process, I will hopefully show you just how your reasoning is going awry. I'll also cover, as you asked, some of the variables we're talking about, including the ones that would cause the collapse of the universe if tweaked a bit.

I'm sorry techboy, but you are wrong. It really is still an argument from ignorance. You've just taken it to the next degree.

Nobody knows what happens if a universe collapses. It is possible the FIRST thing our universe did was a very fast collapse and only AFTER that collapse are subsequent events possible that allow for a large spreading of matter and life.

Your calculations ASSUME that a collapsed universe inhibits life. It is possible that a universe that first collapsed is in fact a REQUIREMENT for life.

Same thing for gravity, it starts by assuming it is even POSSIBLE for gravity to be different.

It then goes on to assume that life wouldn't be possible that life would not have happened.

Here's a softball question: What happens to all of the matter in all of the stars if gravity is slightly more or slightly less?

I LOVE this quote:

"4.1 Cosmic Fine-Tuning

It was recognized centuries back that conditions necessary for the flourishing of life were fairly tightly constrained (making the move to design in natural conditions and laws inherently attractive), but not until quite recent times has it been revealed through science itself just how wildly tight the constraints actually are, and just how many separate things have to converge, each within a miniscule value interval."

Really? What one constraint has been varied in any sort of setting and then tested for the occurence of life in that setting?

Then how do you know they are very tightly constrained in a manner required for life?

Is there even a case where somebody has even attempted a computer simulation?

Has anybody done ANYTHING beyond write down a bunch of numbers and conclude it couldn't (or could) happen?

You have a billion of cards in front of you. You've flipped one over and you are trying to draw conclusions about what is on the other side of all of the others cards from that one card you've flipped over.

And the funny thing is you are trying to argue what that one card DOES show must be extremely rare that it couldn't have been random chance that you selected that card.

A sample size of ONE essentially NEVER gives you enough data to draw conclusion about anything other than that one sample, and you aren't even trying to extrapolate to two or three samples, but essentially to an infinite number of samples (which is what you really need to know- given every possible setting for every possible variable what is the probability of getting life under each one (and note we don't know how many variables were talking or even how many settings there can be (how many possible relationships can there be for gravity?)).

No, I can't say the numbers are wrong because the fact of the matter is that I don't have enough information to even start to guess what the odds are, and unless we get to the time we can simulate universe sized data and large numbers of constants, we never will.

Any other conclusion is ludicrous.

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I still don't really understand your statement that the probabilities are not equal.

It's simple. Let's drop the Bridge example and use another common one, becoming the Queen of England. Now, it could be argued that the odds of Elizabeth the 1st becoming the Queen of England are very small, given the number of English alive at the time.

The thing is, that analogy doesn't compute, because if Elizabeth hadn't become monarch, someone else would have. All chances are equally small, and yet all outcomes are equal. Someone becomes queen. Someone wins the lottery. Nothing can be inferred from that.

In the case of fine-tuning, there's one life-permitting universe, out of bazillions that are not. It's like a needle in the haystack (times a billion billion). Picking a particular piece of hay is unremarkable, but picking the needle is.

I can accept that. Also realize that I am not trying to argue that science disproves God. I think the evidence actually weighs in favor of the existence of God but, as you say, it does not prove God. I am pretty sure that Peter believes in God as well. You're not arguing against a bunch of atheists here.

I know Peter believes in God, and really, I was only trying to show him why the Bridge analogy inaccurately described the argument. I was goaded into the rest...

You are still committing the fallacy that Peter pointed out. Yes, the probability is very low no matter how you calculate it, but we really don't know the universe we are working with. We don't know how many planets are out there, how many dimensions, how many universes ... maybe you don't want to believe in those theories, but the fact is that we can't properly calculate the odds. We don't even know what the correct parameters should be.

It's actually not relevant to the probability calculus we're using. Consider this excerpt from THE FINE-TUNING DESIGN ARGUMENT, by Dr. Robin Collins. (Another great article on the topic, by the way, and yes Predicto, this paper was funded by the Discovery Institute, but they actually had a falling out, for reasons I will share below, which might actually bring us back on track).

ii. The Principle of Indifference

In the following subsections, we will use the principle of indifference to justify the assertion that the fine-tuning is highly improbable under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis.

a. The Principle Stated

Applied to cases in which there is a finite number of alternatives, the principle of indifference can be formulated as the claim that we should assign the same probability to what are called equipossible alternatives, where two or more alternatives are said to be equipossible if we have no reason to prefer one of the alternatives over any of the others. (In another version of the principle, alternatives that are relevantly symmetrical are considered equipossible and hence the ones that should be assigned equal probability.) For instance, in the case of a standard two-sided coin, we have no more reason to think that the coin will land on heads than that it will land on tails, and so we assign them each an equal probability. Since the total probability must add up to one, this means that the coin has a 0.5 chance of landing on heads and an 0.5 chance of landing on tails. Similarly, in the case of a standard six-sided die, we have no more reason to think that it will land on one number, say a 6, than any of the other number, such as a 4. Thus, the principle of indifference tells us to assign each possible way of landing an equal probability--namely 1/6.

The above explication of the principle applies only when there are a finite number of alternatives, for example six sides on a die. In the case of the fine-tuning, however, the alternatives are not finite but form a continuous magnitude. The value of G, for instance, conceivably could have been any number between 0 and infinity. Now, continuous magnitudes are usually thought of in terms of ranges, areas, or volumes depending on whether or not we are considering one, two, three or more dimensions. For example, the amount of water in a 8oz glass could fall anywhere within the range 0oz to 8oz, such as 6.012345645oz. Or, the exact position that a dart hits a dart board can fall anywhere within the area of the dart board. With some qualifications to be discussed below, the principle of indifference becomes in the continuous case the principle that when we have no reason to prefer any one value of a parameter over other, we should assign equal probabilities to equal ranges, areas, or volumes. So, for instance, suppose one aimlessly throws a dart at a dart board. Assuming the dart hits the board, what is the probability it will hit within the bulls eye? Since the dart is thrown aimlessly, we have no more reason to believe it will hit one part of the dart board than any other part. The principle of indifference, therefore, tells us that the probability of its hitting the bulls eye is the same as the probability of hitting any other part of the dart board of equal area. This means that the probability of it hitting the bull's eye is simply the ratio of the area of the bulls eye to the rest of the dart board. So, for instance, if the bulls eye forms only 5% of the total area of the board, then the probability of its hitting the bulls eye will be 5%.

b. Application to Fine-Tuning

In the case of the fine-tuning, we have no more reason to think that the parameters of physics will fall within the life-permitting range than the any other range, given the atheistic single-universe hypothesis. Thus according to the principle of indifference, equal ranges of these parameters should be assigned equal probabilities. As in the case of the dart board mentioned in the last section, this means that the probability of the parameters of physics falling within the life-permitting range under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis is simply the ratio of the range of life-permitting values (the "area of the bulls eye") to the total relevant range of possible values (the "relevant area of the dart board").

Now physicists can make rough estimates of the range of life-permitting values for the parameters of physics, as discussed above in the case of gravity, for instance. But what is the "total relevant range of possible values"? At first one might think that this range is infinite, since the values of the parameters could conceivably be anything. This, however, is not correct, for although the possible range of values could be infinite, for most of these values we have no way of estimating whether they are life-permitting or not. We do not truly know, for example, what would happen if gravity were 1060 times stronger than its current value: as far as we know, a new form a matter might come into existence that could sustain life. Thus, as far as we know, there could be other life-permitting ranges far removed from the actual values that the parameters have. Consequently, all we can say is that the life-permitting range is very, very small relative to the limited range of values for which we can make estimates, a range that we will hereafter refer to as the "illuminated" range.

Fortunately, however, this limitation does not effect the overall argument. The reason is that, based on the principle of indifference, we can still say that it is very improbable for the values for the parameters of physics to have fallen in the life-permitting range instead of some other part of the "illuminated" range. (8) And this improbability is all that is actually needed for our main argument to work. To see this, consider an analogy. Suppose a dart landed on the bulls eye at the center of a huge dart board. Further, suppose that this bulls eye is surrounded by a very large empty, bulls-eye-free, area. Even if there were many other bulls eyes on the dart board, we would still take the fact that the dart landed on the bulls eye instead of some other part of the large empty area surrounding the bulls eye as strong evidence that it was aimed. Why? Because we would reason that given that the dart landed in the empty area, it was very improbable for it to land in the bulls eye by chance but not improbable if it were aimed. Thus, by the prime principle of confirmation, we could conclude that the dart landing on the bulls eye strongly confirms the hypothesis that is was aimed over the chance hypothesis.

Emphasis mine.

I personally find much more evidence for God in the order of the universe, and the fact that it appears to obey elegant rules, than in our flawed estimates at probabilities...

I can go with that too. :)

By the way, I think that Dr. Collins has an interesting take on ID, why it is not science (exactly), but what role it can play with science (this is why he had a falling out with the Discovery Institute).

Intelligent Design not Science But Metascience

After raising some important but neglected points regarding whether Intelligent Design (ID) is or is not science, I would like to propose a mediating position, a position that I have articulated in more depth at my homepage at www.Robincollins.org. Opponents of ID often argue that as a matter of methodology, scientific explanations should only refer to natural entities and processes, thus excluding reference to a transcendent designer. This position is called methodological naturalism. One cost that goes along with this claim is that if the hypothesis of a transcendent designer is excluded as a matter of methodology, then one cannot claim that science (at least when it theorizes about origins) purports to tell us the truth about the world, but only that science gives us the best naturalistic story. This, however, moves finding the truth about questions of origins partly outside the domain of science, to philosophy or theology.

As an analogy, if before starting an investigation, a racist detective excludes all white people from being the murderer, we would not expect his methodology to reliably determine the actual murderer. This means that, insofar as they are speaking as scientists who subscribe to methodological naturalism, opponents of ID need to be honest in their presentations of evolution. Instead of presenting it is the true (or most probable) account of the origin of life on earth, they need to present it as only the best naturalistic account. Of course, speaking as philosophers or theologians, they could claim that evolution is the best overall explanation of life on earth. Even making this distinction, however, means that some minimal philosophy of science must be discussed in the classroom, leaving an opening for ID even if, following Judge Jones, one does not consider it science.

On the other hand, the major problem I see with ID's claim that we should include the hypothesis of a transcendent or generic designer as part of science is that it is not what I have called scientifically tractable. Typically, when scientists propose an explanation of some set of phenomena, that explanation can be filled in using other branches of science. For example, consider the big bang theory. The postulated "fireball" that resulted in our current universe provides a detailed explanation of such things as the microwave background radiation and the abundance of elements because we can use current particle physics to elaborate this fireball's internal dynamics. If its internal workings were forever beyond the realm of current science to investigate, it is doubtful such an hypothesis would be of much scientific interest. Ditto for the theory of evolution and other scientific theories.

Insofar as the hypothesis of ID invokes a transcendent or generic designer, it lacks this characteristic. One cannot use current science to elaborate the internal dynamics of a transcendent or generic designer (though one might for a specific sort of non-transcendent designer, such as an extraterrestrial intelligence). Yet, lacking this characteristic is no small matter, since it is what allows scientific hypotheses to provide detailed explanations and predictions, and it gives scientists something to work with. It is not sufficient for advocates of ID to reply that intelligent design is the best explanation of various features of the natural world: many theists argue that God is the best explanation of the big bang and the laws of nature and many platonists argue that the existence of an immaterial realm of mathematical truths is the best explanation of the success of mathematics in science, but clearly this is insufficient to make the God hypothesis or platonic hypothesis part of science. So, whether or not one wants to consider ID as part of science, this significant and relevant difference between it and regular scientific hypotheses should be acknowledged.

Instead of treating the hypothesis of an intelligent designer as part of science, what I propose is that we treat the hypothesis of design, particularly design by God, as not itself a part of science, but an hypothesis that could potentially influence the practice of science. I call such an hypothesis a metascientific hypothesis. Such an hypothesis can influence science by affecting how we think the world is likely to be structured. Taking seriously the possibility of design opens science up to investigate, instead of simply dismissing, various hypotheses about the nature of the physical world that postulate "designlike" patterns at a fundamental level. Hypotheses falling in this category include those advocating biocentric laws and higher-level patterns of teleology in evolution, such as explored by Teilhard Chardan, Rupert Sheldrake, Simon Conway Morris, and others. I thus applaud the kind of work being engaged in by some of supporters of ID at the Seattle based Biologic Institute in which they look for design-like patterns in nature that seemingly cannot be explained by neo-Darwinian evolution. Although such patterns themselves are purely naturalistic, one would probably not look for and discover such patterns (given that they exist) if one rejected any sort of design hypothesis. In contrast, those who subscribe to a purely naturalistic view of the world favor hypotheses that minimize the appearance of design.

Treating the world as if it were designed has already been productive in physics. Since the scientific revolution, physics has implicitly assumed that underlying physical reality has a beautiful and elegant mathematical design. As Morris Kline, the famous historian of mathematics, has observed: "From the time of the Pythagoreans, practically all asserted that nature was designed mathematically." Historically, starting with Galileo and Kepler, this has been what has grounded the search for an underlying elegant mathematical order in nature, though today such an order is largely taken for granted apart from any theistic basis. Indeed, as Banish Hoffman, one of Albert Einstein's main biographers, notes, "When judging a scientific theory, his own or another's, he asked himself whether he would have made the universe in this way had he been God." This shows that in doing science, Einstein treated the world as if it were created by God, even though he did not believe in God.

I propose that such a stance could be fruitful in other areas outside of physics, and that this is where the true significance for the practice of science of the question of whether the universe and life were in some way intelligently designed. Further, in terms of science classrooms, this view of ID still allows it to be legitimately discussed as part of more general discussions of the philosophy and meaning of science, as has been emphasized by my historian of science colleague Ted Davis. Indeed, I suggest that ID push for establishing journals that scientists could contribute to in which they could discuss the meaning and implications of work in their field.

I actually really like this view.

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A sample size of ONE essentially NEVER gives you enough data to draw conclusion about anything other than that one sample, and you aren't even trying to extrapolate to two or three samples, but essentially to an infinite number of samples (which is what you really need to know- given every possible setting for every possible variable what is the probability of getting life under each one (and note we don't know how many variables were talking or even how many settings there can be (how many possible relationships can there be for gravity?)).

You might want to check the response I just made to DjTj involving the "Principle of Indifference", as well as perhaps reading that Collins paper (and maybe the Craig) one.

Any other conclusion is ludicrous.

I disagree, as do a lot of scientists, some of whom are thereby embracing theories that are getting them ridiculed by their peers as metaphysical. :)

Of course, consensus is meaningless in terms of the truth. A lot of people, even very smart and qualified ones, can be wrong. It's happened before. It will happen again. Maybe it happened here. I'll be the first to admit that I don't have the chops to check the math or conclusions of Penrose and others. It looks good to me, though, and I don't believe any of your objections are not adequately answered in the various papers I've cited.

I'd remind you, though, that I started this with the modest goal of showing you why the Bridge analogy doesn't properly address the argument at hand. Even if you reject the entire argument as fallacious, that's still the case. It would just fail to properly address a fallacious argument, rather than a solid one. :)

I agree with you that it's not science (as does Dr. Collins, as you see above). I don't mind that you don't accept the argument. Not every argument will work for every person, and that's fine with me.

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It's simple. Let's drop the Bridge example and use another common one, becoming the Queen of England. Now, it could be argued that the odds of Elizabeth the 1st becoming the Queen of England are very small, given the number of English alive at the time.

The thing is, that analogy doesn't compute, because if Elizabeth hadn't become monarch, someone else would have. All chances are equally small, and yet all outcomes are equal. Someone becomes queen. Someone wins the lottery. Nothing can be inferred from that.

In the case of fine-tuning, there's one life-permitting universe, out of bazillions that are not. It's like a needle in the haystack (times a billion billion). Picking a particular piece of hay is unremarkable, but picking the needle is.

You are arbitrarily deciding that we are the needle. Why must we be the needle? Can't we tweak the parameters to create a universe with super-intelligent superior beings? Wouldn't they then be the needle? Couldn't there be multiple needles? The truth is that all theoretical universes, including our own, are really pieces of hay, and the probabilities are all equal.
It's actually not relevant to the probability calculus we're using. Consider this excerpt from THE FINE-TUNING DESIGN ARGUMENT, by Dr. Robin Collins. (Another great article on the topic, by the way, and yes Predicto, this paper was funded by the Discovery Institute, but they actually had a falling out, for reasons I will share below, which might actually bring us back on track).
I don't see how Collins's argument adds anything. For all we know, there are billions of darts surrounding us in the non-bullseye area. We can only see our own dart, so any conclusions we draw from that are incomplete.
By the way, I think that Dr. Collins has an interesting take on ID, why it is not science (exactly), but what role it can play with science (this is why he had a falling out with the Discovery Institute).

Intelligent Design not Science But Metascience

I actually really like this view.

I do like Collins's take on ID though. I think ID-like arguments definitely have a role in challenging the hypotheses of evolution. Forcing biologists to explain how the eye developed, or why there is a lack of transitional fossils, is an exercise that pushes evolutionary biology forward. We definitely do not completely understand how evolution works, and progress can only be made by raising questions.
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